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Executive Summary 
The EU contributes financially to the prevention, eradication and control of livestock epidemics in MS. This 
report investigates five different options for replacing the current EU rules for co-financing of emergency 
measures. These options differ with respect to the approach of co-financing and their impact on emergency 
measures taken by the MS's. The identified options are: 
Option 1: “No change scenario”, which preserves the existing legal framework for animal disease direct-
losses compensation. 
Option 2: EU co-financing rules are maintained, however a maximum percentage for public financial contri-
bution to the farmers is defined, thereby ensuring that they bear a minimum percentage of the direct costs 
(which could be insurable). 
Option 3: Development of an EU harmonized framework for CRSS: 
• Option 3.a: establishing an obligation for a gradual introduction of CRSS by all MS's respecting cer-
tain harmonized criteria established at EU level. 
• Option 3.b: establishing the possibility for individual MS to develop CRSS provided that these 
schemes comply with EU harmonized criteria while allowing others to maintain the option of getting 
EU co-financing according to the current rules. 
Option 4: Deregulation. 
• Option 4.a: to limit EU intervention to cases of catastrophic events; 
• Option 4.b: to grant lump sum payments to the MS instead of co-financing. 
Option 5: Establishment of a fully harmonised EU CRSS system managed by the Commission for compensat-
ing losses due to animal diseases. 
For option 3.a and 3.b harmonised criteria at the EU level should be at least: 
• obligation of MS to cover certain animal diseases considered as priorities at EU level by the CRSS 
with compulsory participation of livestock producers; 
• objective of the CRSS, i.e. providing efficient transfer of animal health risk from farmers to a CRSS 
and inducing efficient on-farm risk management through differentiation of contributions and condi-
tions of coverage; 
• basic principles for efficient schemes like conditions for incentive compatibility, covered risks and 
public financial support; 
• maximum threshold for public funding; 
• WTO compliance. 
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EU financial contribution to the CRSS developed in the MS (option 3.a and 3.b) could be: 
• peace-time support;  
• co-financing of direct losses (excluding business interruption costs). Co-financing of direct losses 
could follow the lines of the current system of financial compensation.  
This public financial support could have the following three main pillars: 
• support of prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of the livestock numbers covered 
by a CRSS; 
• support to the losses due to animals slaughtered as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator; 
• previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC. This would be in contrast to the current situation where other direct costs are co-
financed on basis of the real expenses incurred, which may lead to inflated costs and complicated 
procedures. The flat rates would have to be defined at EU level in advance and could be related to 
the numbers of animals/operators affected etc, taking into account appropriate price indices to re-
flect reasonable differences between MS's. 
The economic impact, likelihood, timescale, magnitude of direct and consequential losses and monetization 
of impacts of these policy options were evaluated. Special emphasis was given on the feasibility of an EU 
harmonized framework for a Cost and Responsibility Sharing Scheme (CRSS) options 3.a and 3.b. In this 
CRSS, the deficiencies of the current system as limited incentives for prevention, distortions in favour of high 
risk areas, partial compensation in case of an outbreak, complex community co-financing rules and the 
budget risk for the community should be avoided, or at least reduced. A general assessment on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of these options has been made. In addition, co-financing of indirect/consequential 
losses including business interruption costs is briefly assessed on whether it is possible/adequate or not, and 
if it is, how this can be done. If appropriate, other ways of providing EU financial aid are proposed. 
An overview of the existing systems and mechanisms compensating animal disease losses is given based 
on expert consultation of the CVO’s of the MS’s. The present EU regulation for compensating animal disease 
losses and risk prevention support follows budget lines from both DG SANCO and DG AGRI with different 
procedures involved. EU co-financing is foreseen in the event of an epidemic livestock disease. Council Deci-
sion 90/424/EEC allows for co-financing 50% of the costs of compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter and of 
related operational expenditure (60% FMD). Cost categories eligible for co-financing have recently been 
specified in more detail in Regulation 349/2005. The actual reimbursements from the Emergency Fund ac-
cording to the current eligibility criteria in place in the period 1997- 2009 were € 1,109 million, of which 88% 
was related to the major livestock diseases CSF, FMD and AI. Moreover, analysis revealed that high risk areas 
were responsible for the majority of the EU contributions in the current system. 
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Financing schemes related to the non-EU compensated part of animals that are compulsory culled and 
other costs related to the control and eradication differ between MS’s. While some MS’s finance the direct 
losses from the national budget, other MS’s have set up some form of statutory public-private financing 
system. These public-private financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure in which all farmers pay a 
levy (i.e. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and The Netherlands). The amount that is payable by the farmer 
depends mainly on whether or not there were major outbreaks in previous years. In some MS’s, a 
compensation scheme for consequential losses is implemented, either by means of private funding (e.g., a 
compulsory scheme in Romania), by means of public funding (Austria, Cyprus, Czech, Finland, France, 
Portugal, Sweden) or by a private-public scheme (Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania). To share the risks between 
the national government and the sector proportional as well as non-proportional schemes exist. 
A widely adopted EU private insurance scheme covering all epidemic diseases for all types of livestock is 
absent. Only a few private insurance schemes exist on the European market to cover the risk of 
consequential losses from livestock epidemics (e.g. Germany).  
CVO’s opinion on the different policy options was collected by means of a questionnaire to all 27 MS’s. All 
but 3 responded. All CVO’s agreed that it is vital that during an outbreak adequate compensation should be 
ensured. There was consensus to develop an EU harmonized framework for CRSS. There was less agreement 
amongst the CVO’s in the required financial arrangement; one group suggested a substantial participation of 
farmers while others suggested a pure public funding structure. The opinions to include or exclude conse-
quential losses differ between the CVO’s: arguments in favour of including at least part of them stipulate 
that during an outbreak farmers might suffer substantial costs due to a standstill period; especially in 
Densely Populated Livestock Areas farmers might face severe animal welfare and technical problems in case 
of long-lasting epidemics; arguments that are against mostly point out that these losses are difficult to calcu-
late, a substantial administrative burden is expected and the market losses will become too costly. 
Comments of other stakeholders (Copa-Cogeca) were gathered. In their opinion there should be a ceiling of 
maximum threshold for contribution by farmers, above which governments should bear the risk. The system 
should comply with WTO criteria and provide peace-time support (vaccinating, vaccine banks, surveillance, 
operation of bio-security schemes as well as co-financing losses in crisis). All direct and indi-
rect/consequential losses should be covered. Cost-sharing also implies the sharing of responsibility. The pri-
vate sector and authorities should co-operate at the same level. 
The PEST-analysis of the “no change scenario” revealed that there is on all criteria room for improvement. 
Option 3a (mandatory gradual introduction of harmonised scheme) offers on all included criteria the pros-
pect of improvement, both compared to the default Option 1 and to all other alternatives. Moreover, there 
are no indications that future developments would dramatically endanger the performance or robustness of 
this option. As for Option 2 (public-private system) and Option 5 (fully harmonised), they too offer im-
provement although with less support from all stakeholders involved. Option 3b (voluntary harmonisation) 
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and Option 4 (deregulation) either do not offer the prospect of major improvements, or have even the risk 
of decreased performance. 
However, the already increasing production costs and competitive pressure from third countries as well as 
social/cultural differences between MS can reduce the feasibility of an introduction of compensation sys-
tems with public-private costs and responsibility sharing in all MS’s. The social structure of particularly new 
MS with a large number of ‘backyard’ farmers might hamper the realisation of public-private cooperation in 
disease compensation and control. Whether it is worth the effort to include backyard and non-commercial 
holdings in the CRSS has to be based on epidemiological, economic as well as political arguments. 
Based on these criteria a proposal for a CRSS is presented. It consists of the following items: 
 Risk Sharing between MS and the EU: introduction of a Bonus-Malus system (BM), which alter-
nately rewards (B) or penalizes (M) claiming behaviour. The Bonus is an increase in reimbursement 
percentage which is given if no claim is made in the previous year. Malus is a discount in the reim-
bursement percentage if there was a claim in the previous year. As an incentive for adequate con-
tainment of an outbreak, a differentiation in Malus is suggested based on the size of the outbreak. If 
the outbreak is contained effectively, there will be a minimal reduction of future reimbursement. If 
the outbreak is moderate the Malus should be larger. Moreover, when there is a large outbreak, the 
Malus should be substantial. 
 Reduction of reimbursement in case of large outbreaks: a reduction in reimbursement is proposed 
if the size of the outbreak/claim exceeds a predefined amount. 
 A Public Private Partnership (PPP) within MS to co-finance the losses not paid by the EU Veterinary 
Fund. It is a formal relation within a MS between government and farmers and other stakeholders to 
cover the direct costs by means of a compulsory public statutory compensation scheme. Cost shar-
ing between participants can be proportional or non-proportional. For individual participants contri-
bution can be risk based (sector and/or implementation of preventive measures).  
The proposed CRSS was evaluated. The criteria on which the alternatives were evaluated were: 
a) To achieve a more prevention-driven and incentive oriented approach of the EU financial aid for 
the control and eradication of animal diseases. Effective preventive measures taken by the MS will 
be rewarded by a lower incidence of outbreaks and as such a higher reimbursement rate in case of 
an outbreak, whose impact will be more limited. Implementing a PPP to finance the MS’s share 
means communication with stakeholders since it involves not only cost sharing but also responsibil-
ity sharing. PPP are best organized in different MS to be able to adequately implement national and 
regional differences. These PPP’s can stimulate their stakeholders to implement preventive meas-
ures by premium differentiation and through the possibilities for MS to subsidize the implementa-
tion of these measures. If the system is organized such that in case of a small outbreak there will not 
be a reduction in reimbursement class, there will be an incentive for the MS to timely report it. 
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b) To balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities between authorities, EU institutions and 
farming sector. An agreement about responsibility sharing has to be reached before the details on a 
cost sharing programme are determined. However, it is a highly complex matter: it is unlikely a one 
size fits all solution but there is a need for a systematic approach. 
 
c) To maximise effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication of animal diseases. The 
proposed CRSS takes into account the differences between MS in risk and impact of outbreaks of 
contagious diseases. The BM system rewards MS’s with low risk profiles by the fact that the per-
centage of the direct costs reimbursed is higher since the occurrence of outbreaks is less frequent. 
Also the fact that there is a difference in the drop in reimbursement class depending on the size of 
the outbreak differentiates between MS’s that have small outbreaks compared to MS’s that have to 
cope with more substantial outbreaks. 
 
d) Establishing simple and clear rules for EU co-financing of losses due to animal diseases and ensuring 
consistency and coherence of the several compensation mechanisms established at EU level. The 
CRSS program is relative easy to implement because it is based on claim history. Moreover, it is also 
straight forward to monitor the class status of each MS by the EU. In countries which already im-
plemented a PPP a differentiation in premium paid by livestock owners is often based on the live-
stock sector and farm type. In the case of implementing the CRSS in MS's in which there are a large 
number of holdings with backyard farming or non-commercial holding, the CRSS is faced with chal-
lenges (registration of livestock owners, to find incentives to motivate compliance to regulations and 
to collect levies cost effectively). Whether it is worth to include backyard and non-commercial hold-
ings in the CRSS has to be based on epidemiological, economic and political arguments. In many MS, 
farmers have no say in the decision making process for preventing and managing outbreaks of con-
tagious diseases. Modulation of control strategies based on the different interests of livestock sec-
tors and in consultation with them might be a way to raise awareness and commitment.  
 
At present there are large differences between MS’s in how they have organized the financing of direct costs 
related to outbreaks of contagious diseases. In case the BM system with a compulsory PPP would be intro-
duced, there would need to be a transition period for MS’s to adapt to this new situation. To enable this 
transition, temporary support from EU might be needed. Also, the extent to which farmers suffer large con-
sequential/indirect losses due to an outbreak differs between MS’s. Large differences between MS exist in, 
for example, livestock density of production areas or export position. Therefore we would suggest excluding 
the coverage of consequential losses from the EU Veterinary Fund. There must be a clear investigation into 
how MS’s can be supported in the event they want to establish a scheme that supports farmers that suffer 
from consequential losses. Such a scheme might improve the willingness of farmers to participate in a PPP 
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to cover the MS part of the direct costs. The coverage of consequential/indirect losses adjacent to the CRSS 
could introduce a kind of virtuous circle with two directions bottom-up and top-down, in three steps: 
1. Farmers could be subsidized for their participation in the mutual insurance to cover the consequen-
tial/indirect losses; this participation is also/alternatively included amongst the factors considered to 
differentiate levies, resulting in a reduced financial contribution. 
2. Governments are motivated to encourage the participation of the primary sector in this mutual (and 
in the PPP, if not compulsory), by an additional bonus recognised at EU level after reaching a tar-
geted percentage. 
3. In terms of specific objectives, the EU benefits from this increased participation as the two levels of 
the CRSS are more interdependent and all actors involved would allow it function as a single system, 
that would be more integrated and, as a consequence, more "shared": the benefits will 
consequentially stream to all MS’s, in particular in the medium and long term. 
An integrated CRSS can enhance the acceptability and feasibility of the CRSS in comparison with an approach 
in which only direct losses are covered. It is likely to result in a more prevention-driven and incentive ori-
ented approach, a balanced distribution between costs and responsibilities, more effective and efficient 
prevention and eradication and economic sustainability of farming business. 
 
e) To prevent distortion of competition between MS’s. The possible distortion of competition intro-
duced by the current different compensation schemes in place in different MS is negligible com-
pared with other differences in taxation, income, etc. that exist in the EU. The proposed BM system 
is an improvement over the previous system in that it rewards MS that do not have large and costly 
outbreaks of epizootics and puts a large part of the costs on those MS that have these large out-
breaks. Having a large concentrated livestock sector in a MS has infrastructural benefits for farmers 
in the periods where the area is not affected with outbreaks of contagious diseases. These benefits 
become major drawbacks in periods of outbreaks. Although the risk for the EU budget is assumed to 
be less than in the current situation, there may arise a situation (such as a large and costly outbreak 
in several MS at a time) in which a large claim on the EU budget may occur. Part of this is cushioned 
by the lower reimbursement in case the claim exceeds a fixed amount. 
 
f) To avoid risks for the EU and MS budgets. Given the irregular occurrence of major outbreaks of live-
stock epidemics, the budget planning of the Veterinary Fund within the present annual framework 
remains as a major challenge. There is the risk of extending the annual budget, which has to be 
borne by the EU budget. However over a longer period the fluctuation is more limited. It is possible 
to re-insure this remaining risk, but this will probably be a costly option. A reduction of reimburse-
ment to MS in case of a large outbreak decreases the total costs for the EU budget substantially, 
however the MS are faced with substantial additional costs in a period of crisis. This might have a 
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negative impact on the feasibility of the system. Solutions in which a strategic reserve must be main-
tained should be considered. 
 
g) Ensure economic sustainability of farming business in the EU and to ensure consistency with the 
animal health, animal welfare and food safety policy objectives as well as broader EU policies (cli-
mate change, sustainability) and international commitments of the EU (WTO). 
 
An economic analysis of the proposed CRSS was performed, consisting of two parts. A historical analysis of 
the budgetary consequences for the EU in the case the proposed CRSS would have been implemented, re-
vealed that the total costs for the EU Veterinary Fund would be substantially lower in the prospective situa-
tion. The main reason for the estimated differences is that MS’s with large outbreaks would receive a 
smaller reimbursement compared to the current situation. Moreover, in the new situation FMD is treated 
equal as other epidemics (reimbursement of 50% instead of 60%). 
The CRSS is also analysed by means of a normative modelling approach in which the impacts of its tentative 
modalities are analysed jointly as well as separately. Three groups were identified: (1) MS’s with densely 
populated livestock areas (NL), (2) Old MS’s with mainly medium or sparsely populated livestock areas (FI), 
(3) New MS’s with mainly medium or sparsely populated livestock areas (RO). 
For three selected diseases (CSF, FMD and HPAI) the assessment consisted of (1) an estimation of the prob-
ability of occurrence of outbreak/epidemic, (2) an estimation of the size of outbreaks, and (3) an estimation 
of future costs and reimbursements. 
All MS’s would be rewarded with a higher reimbursement class only if the Bonus element is taken into con-
sideration. This system would be more advantageous for those MS’s with infrequent outbreaks and thus less 
claims from the Veterinary Fund. If only the Malus is taken into consideration, all MS’s would be penalised, 
depending on their exposure. A reduction for ongoing large outbreaks would also reduce the total costs for 
the Veterinary Fund. MS’s with large claims would be reimbursed more often at lower levels. 
 
h) Stakeholders’ consultation with participation of livestock sector and different parts of the livestock 
production chain. Different components of the CRSS were evaluated: the BM system and a PPP to 
cover the MS part of direct losses due to disease outbreaks and excluding/including indi-
rect/consequential losses in a CRSS. The five participating organisations in the workshop show di-
verse and complementary views. The processing and trade industry is more in favour of the more 
advanced options for reconsideration of the compensation system for animal diseases, whereas the 
representatives of farmers and breeders organisations are more conservative (no BM, no compul-
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sory PPP). However, the last two organisations are in favour of adding indirect/consequential losses 
to a CRSS. 
In conclusion, the proposed CRSS has substantial benefits compared to the current system. However its im-
plementation requires careful preparation, negotiation and trust building in which EU, MS, and farmers 
should be involved.  
Although a compulsory gradual introduction of the CRSS by all MS’s respecting harmonised criteria fixed at 
EU level appears to be sound and preferred by MS’s, there are numerous modalities of such system possible. 
The merit of the modalities should be that stakeholders are encouraged to implement more preventive sys-
tems and more effective eradication strategies. To what extent each CRSS option would help to achieve the 
objectives pursued by the initiative is not the object of this study. The costs in the prospective situation will 
be overestimated since the effects of potential additional preventive measures due to a CRSS are not quanti-
fied in the current analysis. In the envisaged CRSS the deficiencies of the current system should be avoided, 
or at least reduced. This holds particularly for issues such as limited incentives for prevention, distortion in 
favour of high risk areas, partial compensation in case of outbreak, complex co-financing rules, budget risk 
for the EU. 
Based on the findings in this report four recommendations are formulated.  
 
Recommendation 1: Harmonising EU reimbursement rate. Council Decision 2009/470/EC allows for co-
financing 50% of the costs of compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter and related operational expenditure; 
however, for FMD a co-financing of 60% is allowed. Harmonising the EU co-financing to one default level will 
ensure a more consistent and coherent compensation scheme.  
Recommendation 2: Risk based EU compensation. A more comprehensive step is to reward and/or penalize 
the preventive measures taken by the MS’s by deviating from the default reimbursement rate. Such ap-
proach has usually a positive effect on claim statistics, as it stimulates to be more eager in preventing out-
breaks that would lead to the loss of bonus.  
The BM system rewards MS’s with low risk profiles by the fact that the percentage of the direct costs reim-
bursed is higher since the occurrence of outbreaks is less frequent. Also the difference in the drop in reim-
bursement class depending on the size of the outbreak differentiates between MS’s that have small out-
breaks compared to MS’s that have to cope with more substantial outbreaks.  
The CRSS program is relative easy to implement because of its simplicity. Moreover, it is also straight for-
ward to monitor the class status of each MS by the EU. We suggest starting at the present percentage cov-
ered by the EU (50% compensation): MS’s with a low incidence of disease outbreaks will gradually move up 
and the MS’s with a higher incidence will move down. 
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If in case of a small outbreak there will not be a reduction in reimbursement class, there will be an incentive 
for MS's to timely report an outbreak. In order to obtain support by MS’s for this revision the range of the 
reimbursement rates should be limited (approximately 10% points). More extreme values will decrease the 
demands on the Veterinary Fund on the long run (affecting the potential additional preventive measures 
taken) but will lack a wide-range support in all MS’s. 
In summary, it is recommended that EU compensation to the MS for epidemic livestock diseases should be-
come more risk based. This could be envisaged by introducing one or more incentive based modalities (i.e., 
bonus and Malus elements, and/or reduction in reimbursement rate for large claims). 
Recommendation 3: Share of responsibility and costs between public and private sector. First, a credible 
arrangement for sharing responsibility between government and relevant stakeholders has to be established 
before decisions on cost sharing can be properly debated and defined. Sharing responsibility should be tar-
geted such that the total risk is reduced by increasing the biosecurity and minimizing the effect of a possible 
outbreak. The envisaged PPP is a tool to provide incentives for farmers and thus stimulates behavioural 
changes for risk factors involved. The PPP should impose standards towards for example the maximum 
number of animal contacts with other farms, farm hygiene practices, the proper usage of hygiene barriers in 
place, reservation of e.g. 5% free places to cover temporary animal surpluses, and implementation of quality 
assurance schemes.  
Second, the PPP should manage a fund structure in which all farmers pay a levy to the compensation 
scheme. The PPP can stimulate their stakeholders to implement preventive measures by premium differen-
tiation to the fund and through the possibilities for MS to subsidize the implementation of preventive meas-
ures. Determining an appropriate base for cost sharing is a complex matter and it is unlikely that there will 
be a “one size fits all” solution but there is a need for a systematic approach. Therefore PPP’s are best organ-
ised in the different MS to be able to adequately implement national and regional differences but based on 
a EU set of basic principles and requirements.  
Costs and benefits of running the national PPP differ between MS’s. In MS’s with infrequent and marginal 
risks of large disease outbreaks, the transactions costs of implementing and maintaining a complex levy sys-
tem may be disproportionate to the possible benefits. Therefore a compulsory PPP for all MS’s will only be 
supported if the level of complexity of the PPP is risk based. MS with marginal risks would only be required 
to implement a PPP in which responsibility would be shared enforcing a kind of quality system and an ex 
post levy to cover the non-EU funded part of the costs in the unlikely event of an outbreak. If a mandatory 
PPP is not supported at EU level, a voluntary system should be accompanied by mechanisms to incentivise it. 
The PPP will take a relative long time before full establishment and thus a transition period must be fore-
seen to adapt to this new situation, especially for a MS in which at present the direct costs are fully borne by 
the government (10-15 years is the minimum period that should be considered); temporary support from EU 
might be needed (for example to finance initial costs). 
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Recommendation 4: MS’s flexibility in expanding coverage by including part of the consequential/indirect 
losses. The substantial benefits of introducing coverage of these losses adjacent to the CRSS are as follows: 
 The uptake of a PPP by farmers could be improved by connecting the PPP with a coverage of (part 
of) the consequential/indirect losses (this coverage is outside the review of Decision 2009/470/EC 
for the CRSS, typically it should be voluntary and could be a mutual or a commercial insurance). It 
seems appropriate to include this compensation for farms where all animals were culled as well as 
farms within surveillance and movement restriction zones.  
 It would facilitate the implementation of preventive measures since it opens the possibility of pre-
mium differentiation based on the implementation of such measures. 
Coverage of the consequential/indirect losses is not a part of the proposed CRSS. However, possibilities to 
cover (part of) these costs can facilitate the introduction of a CRSS, especially those costs that are due to 
business interruption of farms in which animals are culled or farms in a Surveillance or Movement restriction 
zone. Hence, only farms located in the movement restriction zones should be eligible for compensation of 
(part of these) consequential/indirect losses. Premiums in such schemes paid by farmers should be risk de-
pendent. Support by MS or EU by subsidizing the premiums paid to this mutual could increase the participa-
tion of farmers to this fund. 
A major drawback to correctly determine the consequential/indirect losses is the fact that they are difficult 
to calculate and most of the time only can be estimated after the outbreak ended. A solution for this might 
be that beforehand a fixed sum per production unit (e.g. dairy cow, sow or pig place) per day is set by the 
farmer and the mutual or commercial insurance fund. We suggest to make arrangements for farms culled 
that are confronted with loss of income during the time the farm is not fully repopulated and in production 
and confronted with additional start-up costs. Also arrangements could be made for farms in a Surveillance 
or Movement restriction zone during the stand still period confronted with consequential/indirect losses, 
mainly due to the fact that they are not able to freely move animals or livestock products. It seems neither 
favourable nor feasible to compensate for losses due to trade restrictions. The reasons for this are that 
these costs cannot be determined explicitly and the whole sector in a MS is confronted with these losses at 
the same time, i.e. also farms outside the zones with movement restrictions. Insurance would mean that 
farmers in effect would pay for their own losses. Although in major market-disruptive outbreaks, farmers 
outside areas with movement restrictions might benefit from temporally higher prices. 
There is currently an on-going investigation as to whether art. 68 of Council Regulation 73/2009 (establish-
ing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and estab-
lishing certain support schemes for farmers) can be used to allow premium subsidy of farmers by MS. Note 
that in the current situation MS's may provide financial compensation to farmers for economic losses caused 
by the outbreak of animal diseases by way of financial contributions to mutual funds (Article 70, EU, 
COM(2008) 306). 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Cost and Responsibility Sharing Schemes (CRSS) 
The new Animal Health Strategy for the EU (2007 – 2013) pursues the objective of developing a modern 
animal health framework including an EU harmonised Cost and Responsibility Sharing Scheme (CRSS) for 
animal diseases. Based on the results of the Evaluation of the Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP) 
(2006), preparatory work for the establishment of the main EU objectives and the criteria for developing 
CRSS took place in the Working Party of Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs).  
The specific objectives for a CRSS defined by the working party are described as follows: 
1) To achieve a more prevention-driven and incentive oriented approach of the EU financial aid for the 
control and eradication of animal diseases. This specific objective will be achieved by the following op-
erational objectives: 
• encouraging the implementation of preventive measures such as bio-security measures; 
• making operators to bear an adequate part of the losses due to animal diseases. 
2) To balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities between competent authorities, EU institutions 
and the farming sector and stimulating the development of common approaches to be applied by these 
actors developing a consultation mechanism between cost sharing partners, particularly during a crisis. 
3) To maximise effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication of animal diseases, encouraging 
preventive behaviour and early reporting of animal disease outbreaks and maximizing the effectiveness 
and flexibility of implementation of CRSS at national or regional level. 
4) Establishing simple and clear rules for EU co-financing of losses due to animal diseases and ensuring 
consistency and coherence of the several compensation mechanisms established at EU level. 
5) To prevent distortion of competition through: 
• establishing harmonised criteria for the development of CRSSs; 
• establishing harmonised and adequate thresholds for public resources contributing to the sys-
tems; 
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6) To avoid risks for the EU and the Member States’ (MS’s) budgets through: 
• establishing proportionate thresholds for public resources linked to the categorisation of the 
diseases or other relevant criteria, e.g. the ability of farmers to affect the risk of the diseases oc-
curring (in which case the private sector should make some contribution); 
• ensuring long term stable financing for disease control, especially for emergency situations of 
high priority diseases. 
7) Ensure economic sustainability of farming business in the EU through: 
• maintaining a system of EU co-financing; 
• enabling an efficient risk-transfer from the farmers to the CRSS; 
8) To ensure consistency with the animal health, animal welfare and food safety policy objectives as well as 
broader EU policies (Common Agricultural Policy, climate change, sustainability) and international com-
mitments of the EU (WTO). 
(Source TOR for feasibility study) 
1.2. Objectives  
In this study the feasibility and the possible social and economic impacts of an EU harmonised cost and re-
sponsibility sharing scheme (CRSS) are assessed.  
This CRSS can be part of the overall strategic objective of the EU to support a more prevention driven and 
incentive oriented approach of the EU financial aid for the control and eradication of animal diseases.  
 
1.3. Options 
For this evaluation five different options have been identified that differ with respect to the approach of co-
financing and their impact on emergency measures taken by the MS to control and eradicate animal disease 
outbreaks. The 5 identified options are: 
Option 1: “No change scenario”, which preserves the existing legal framework for animal disease direct-
losses compensation. 
Option 2: EU co-financing rules are maintained, however a maximum percentage for public financial contri-
bution to the farmers is defined, thereby ensuring that they bear a minimum percentage of the direct costs 
(which could be insurable). 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 20 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
Option 3: Development of an EU harmonised framework for CRSS: 
• Option 3.a: establishing an obligation for a gradual introduction of CRSS by all MS’srespecting cer-
tain harmonized criteria established at EU level. 
• Option 3.b: establishing the possibility for individual MS to develop CRSS provided that these 
schemes comply with EU harmonised criteria while allowing others to maintain the option of getting 
EU co-financing according to the current rules. 
Option 4: Deregulation. 
• Option 4.a: to limit EU intervention to cases of catastrophic events; 
• Option 4.b: to grant lump sum payments to the MS instead of co-financing. 
Option 5: Establishment of a fully harmonised EU CRSS system managed by the Commission for compensat-
ing losses due to animal diseases. 
 
Criteria for option 3 
For option 3.a and 3.b harmonised criteria at the EU level should be at least: 
• obligation of MS to cover certain animal diseases considered as priorities at EU level by the CRSS 
with compulsory participation of livestock producers; 
• objective of the CRSS, i.e. providing efficient transfer of animal health risk from farmers to a CRSS 
and inducing efficient on-farm risk management through differentiation of contributions and condi-
tions of coverage; 
• basic principles for efficient schemes like conditions for incentive compatibility, covered risks and 
public financial support; 
• maximum threshold for public funding; 
• WTO compliance. 
EU financial contribution to the CRSS developed in the MS (option 3.a and 3.b) could be: 
• peace-time support;  
• co-financing of direct losses (excluding business interruption costs). 
Co-financing of direct losses could follow the lines of the current system of financial compensation. This pub-
lic financial support could have the following three main pillars:  
• support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of the livestock numbers covered 
by a CRSS; 
• support to the losses due to animals slaughtered as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator; 
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• previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Coun-
cil Decision 2009/470/EC. This would be in contrast to the current situation where other direct costs 
are co-financed on the basis of the real expenses incurred, which may lead to inflated costs and 
complicated procedures. The flat rates would have to be defined at EU level in advance and could be 
related to the numbers of animals/operators affected etc. Definition of flat rates should take into 
account appropriate price indices to reflect reasonable differences betweenMS’s. 
 
A general assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of these options has been made. For options 3.a 
and 3.b an in-depth feasibility assessment is carried out. 
In addition, co-financing of indirect/consequential losses including business interruption costs is briefly as-
sessed on whether it is possible/adequate or not, and if it is, how this can be done. In text box 1 the working 
definitions used in this study for direct and indirect/consequential losses are presented. If appropriate, other 
ways of providing EU financial aid are proposed. 
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Text box 1 
Direct costs and consequential losses during an outbreak of a highly contagious livestock dis-
ease  
During an outbreak and control of a highly contagious livestock disease, farmers, government and 
other stakeholders are confronted with different direct and consequential losses. When evaluat-
ing the costs of an epidemic or an outbreak of contagious disease different components can be 
distinguished: 
• Direct costs related to the control of the epidemic.  
These include the costs for the infrastructure for the control of the epidemic, the costs associated 
with culling and destroying of infected and contact animals, the costs associated with disinfection, 
destruction of feed and eggs on detected farms, and the compensation and vaccination costs. 
These costs are co-financed by the EU (Council Decision 2008/470/EC). 
Besides these direct costs, additional indirect/consequential losses occur during an outbreak. The 
following consequential losses can be determined: 
• Costs related to movement restrictions affecting the primary sector. 
Farms culled during the epidemic are confronted with loss of income during the epidemic and 
during the time the farm is not fully repopulated and in production. Also, they are confronted 
with additional start-up costs. 
Farms in a Surveillance or Movement restriction zone during the stand still period are also con-
fronted with indirect losses, mainly due to the fact that they are not able to freely move animals 
or livestock products.  
The total livestock sector is affected since due to an epidemic the national and international mar-
ket access for animals of susceptible species and their products is restricted. After the last out-
break it takes time until all the restrictions in trade are lifted and the situation from before the 
epidemic is restored. 
• Ripple effects.  
The effects from outbreaks are felt upstream and downstream along the livestock value chain – 
breeding, feed production, input supply, slaughter, processing, final sale and consumption. 
• Spill-over effects.  
During outbreaks tourism and other services in a MS might be confronted with reduced incomes 
as well. Since other than typical agricultural production is becoming more important for the rural 
economy these spill-over effects are likely to become a large part of the total epidemic costs.  
A major drawback of consequential losses is the fact that they are difficult to determine and most 
of the time only can be estimated after the outbreak ended and the situation is back to business 
as usual. 
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2. Methodology and activities 
The overall strategic objective of this project is to support a more prevention driven and incentive oriented 
approach of the EU financial aid for the control and eradication of animal diseases. Therefore five different 
options are examined. To achieve this objective, the activities are organised into four interdependent work 
packages (WP) described below. In addition there is a fifth WP, the organising managerial task. 
The focus of the project is on major epidemic livestock diseases in which financial contributions of EU to 
MS’s are foreseen in case of an outbreak. Foot and Mouth disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF) and 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) serve as an example.  
The relation between the different WP’s is given in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1  Relation between the different WP’s in the study 
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In this study the following WP’s can be distinguished: 
Work package 1. Study design:  
Deliverable: Inception report and oral presentation 
Activities: development of a detailed planning of the study, including methodology to be used, planning of 
stakeholders' consultation and data sources to be used. 
 
Work package 2. Evaluation and critical review of the different policy options 
Deliverable: Description of the baseline scenario for the development of CRSS based on an overview of the 
existing systems and mechanisms for compensating animal disease losses, including mechanisms developed 
so far to encourage preventive behaviour by farmers.  
The baseline scenario is described based on an overview of the existing systems and mechanisms for com-
pensating animal disease losses, including mechanisms developed so far to encourage preventive behaviour 
by farmers.  
Activities: The following tasks are defined: 
 
Task 2.1: Overview of the existing systems and mechanisms compensating animal disease losses  
Deliverable: an overview that covers the presence, market penetration and take-up of insurance for animal 
diseases and also other possible existing systems (including non-statutory diseases) and the degree of risk 
determination used when setting premia. 
First a literature review of available studies in this field is performed. Subsequently a questionnaire is pre-
pared to make sure the data are up-to-date and to collect lacking data from EU Member States (send to the 
CVO’s). MS’s were also asked about the use of the possibility of co-financing private-public funds (mutual 
funds) aimed at supporting farmers for certain losses (Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009). An overview of 
the situation regarding compensating schemes in the different MS’s as well as a general overview of the 
state-of-the-art livestock disease insurance schemes within the EU is given.  
 
Task 2.2: Gathering experts' opinion on policy options 
Deliverable: Experts’ opinion on the different policy options  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 25 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
The following sub-tasks are defined:  
Task 2.2.1: A questionnaire addressed to Governments and policy makers:  
Approached to contribute to the study are: 
• All MS’s CVO’s,  
• EU Commission officials (members of the ISSG and policy makers DG SANCO and DG AGRI)  
• Copa Cogeca (farmers’ organisation)  
 
Questionnaire 
In order to gather the vision of the experts of the project team, CVO’s and key stakeholders on the different 
options, a questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire consisted of three parts: 
1. general questions regarding the different policy options, whereby the degree of agreement must 
be rated on a 1-5 points scale + motivation; 
2. open questions regarding the different policy options (among others about social, environ-
mental and economic impacts of the options and relevant forces influencing its feasibility), and  
3. specific questions focusing on stakeholder opinions concerning crucial conditions for option 3.a 
and 3.b (the EU harmonised CRSS). The full text of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. 
The questions in Part I of the questionnaire were based on the eight criteria the Working Party of Chief Vet-
erinary Officers identified which CRSSs need to comply with. The respondents were asked to include a short 
motivation of the given scores.  
Part II and Part III of the questionnaire consisted of open questions and were more specific, often asking an 
opinion instead of a knowledge-based answer.  
 
Workshop ISSG 
Part I of the questionnaire was discussed with the ISSG members and members of DG SANCO and DG AGRI, 
in a workshop held on the 8th of July 2010. 
In the same workshop, the discussion about the questions of Part II and III of the questionnaire was started 
with the ISSG members as a basis for a further PEST analysis.  
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CVOs 
After the ISSG workshop, the questionnaire was adjusted. The CVO’s of EU MS’swere asked to complete the 
extended questionnaire. Of the 27 MS’s all but 4 responded. 
Key stakeholders 
Key stakeholders are selected in consultation with DG SANCO. It included representatives of the major live-
stock sectors (represented by Copa-Cogeca) to contribute to the study by filling in the questionnaire.  
 
Task 2.3: PEST analysis of different policy options 
Deliverable: PEST analysis of different policy options 
Based on the results of the pre-feasibility study and the results of 2.1.1, the different policy options de-
scribed in chapter 1 are evaluated in a PEST analysis.  
 
 
Activities: 
The approach used consisted of the following steps: 
 Arranging results from questionnaires: In appendix 5, detailed results of questionnaires regard-
ing the choice options are presented. These results were used to re-arrange and summarize 
them for (1) each choice option and (2) for each criterion from the questionnaire. Moreover, the 
current ‘No change’ scenario was used as a basis for comparison. In this way, all choice options 
could be compared on whether they would be an improvement or a worsening compared to the 
current system;  
 Strengths and Weaknesses: Based on the Comparison Table, the Strengths and Weaknesses of 
the different choice options were derived. This was done by the expert team on the basis of 
consensus. Again, these Strengths and Weaknesses are relative to the current ‘No change’ sce-
nario; 
 Opportunities and Threats: Thereafter, several future scenarios were defined, which could have 
an impact on the performance of the respective choice scenarios. On the basis of these scenar-
ios, Opportunities and Threats of the different choice options were estimated by the expert 
panel, again on the basis of consensus; 
 Final conclusions: finally, the different choice options were judged by the panel of experts in 
view of (expected) future developments. 
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Work package 3. Detailed assessment of policy option 3 Development of an EU harmonized framework for 
CRSS 
Deliverable: Detailed assessment of policy option 3 Development of an EU harmonized framework for CRSS. 
For a detailed assessment of esp. policy option 3 Development of an EU harmonized framework for CRSS 
two sub-tasks are defined: 
 
Task 3.1: Modelling the impact of the different strategies esp. option 3  
This consisted of two steps: 
1) Analysis of the results of the BM system using historical data. 
2) A modelling approach to estimate the impact of future outbreaks (epidemiological and economical 
risk analysis). 
For the different steps in the used BM the following assumptions are made: 
 a small outbreak with total costs of 1 million € or less leads to a reduction in the reimbursement 
percentage for the next year of 1 %; 
 a medium outbreak with total costs exceeding 1 million € but smaller than 9 million € leads to a 
reduction of the reimbursement percentage of 5 %; 
 a large outbreak with total costs exceeding 9 million € leads to a reduction the reimbursement 
percentage of 10 %. Also it will cause a reduction of the reimbursement in the present claim of 
10% for direct costs exceeding 9 million €. 
 (These assumptions are derived from the historical distribution of direct costs and claims to the 
Veterinary Fund.)  
Ad 1) Analysis of the results of the BM system using historical data. 
The analysis based on historical data was done using the data on payments from the veterinary fund to MS’s 
in the period 1997-2009. From these the direct costs of different outbreaks were calculated. These outbreak 
data were used to calculate payments for the hypothetical situation that the BM system was put in place in 
1997 and functions until 2010. The actual reimbursement is compared with the reimbursement under the 
proposed system. Also the reimbursement percentage at the end of the evaluation period is determined. 
 
Ad 2) A modelling approach to estimate the impact of future outbreaks (epidemiological and economical 
risk analysis). 
Three connecting issues are evaluated: 
 An epidemiological risk analysis of outbreaks of the selected diseases;  
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 An economic risk analysis; 
 Modelling the costs of the different financing options. 
 
Task 3.1.1: Epidemiological risk analysis  
Method 
In this study it was important to build on epidemiological expertise across the whole spectrum of both for-
mer List-A and List-B diseases, in order to get both the broad picture and some potentially important details 
right. In a recent project of the OIE (2004) we have used the mathematical modelling approach to estimate 
the consequences of introductions of CSF, FMD and HPAI in relevant livestock areas in six EU member states. 
The results obtained in that project provide a stepping stone for the work here.  
 
Part 1: an epidemiological risk analysis is carried out concerning the risk of introduction of FMD, CSF and NAI 
in Finland, Romania and the Netherlands.  
Because of the short time frame in which the study had to be finished, it was not possible to perform a full 
quantitative risk analysis, this would have taken several years for the three MS’s and the diseases of con-
cern.  
On the basis available, officially reported and verifiable data from the European Union, using accumulated 
data from the Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) and from the World Organization of Animal Health 
(OIE) using accumulated data from Handistatus II (for the period up till 2005) and WIHAD (for the period 
from 2005 onwards), an expert opinion was formed. In an operation sense, the risk of introduction of the 
diseases of concern in the different MS’s was estimated on the basis of true frequency of occurrence of out-
breaks in the past 20 years.  
 
Part 2: Estimating the magnitude of size of future outbreaks  
Based on an evaluation of the relevant literature that is available on the consequences of outbreaks in the 
Netherlands, Finland and Romania, estimation was made on size and economic consequences of future out-
breaks. 
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Task 3.1.2: Economic risk analysis 
Epidemiological outbreak data as presented in the previous paragraphs are the basis of the economic calcu-
lations. The economic risk analysis builds on previous economic studies carried out both for former List A 
diseases and List B diseases.  
The size of the cost factors for MS’s under study are based on EUROSTAT, a literature review complemented 
if necessary expert assumptions. In this study the consequential losses are excluded since they are not part 
of the CRSS. Detailed input parameters used to make the economic parameters are described in appendix 7. 
Cost factors considered include: 
 
 value of the animals culled under depopulation and welfare control measures; 
 direct costs of organisational aspects comprising the following main components: screening, 
surveillance, cost for enforcement of implemented control measures, treatment (vaccination if 
applicable or culling). Cost of enforcement of control measures in Surveillance and Movement 
restriction zones were available for the last outbreaks of FMD in the Netherlands, for other dis-
eases and other countries these were missing. Therefore these costs have been estimated. In 
this estimation, price level and population density in the different MS’s were used.  
 
The default control strategy assumed comprises culling and disinfection of infected farms and implementa-
tion of a surveillance and movement restriction zone. For the Netherlands the contingency plan foresees 
additional measures: 
 
 ring culling in a circle of 1 km around infected farms; 
 for FMD and CSF this ring culling strategy is replaced by a vaccination-to-live strategy after 1 
week. 
To get an insight into the economic aspects of the different options for the three cases of the identified 
MS’s, a mathematical model that was developed and used extensively by members of the expert team has 
been updated (Meuwissen et al. 2003, Van Asseldonk et al., 2003, and Van Asseldonk et al. 2006). The ap-
proach gives insight into the following impacts of the policy options: 
 Economic impact; 
 Likelihood - uncertainty and sensitivity analysis; 
 Timescale - time affecting the scale of impacts; 
 Magnitude – significance of each impact; 
 Direct costs of the options; 
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 Quantification / Monetization of impacts; 
 
A sensitivity analysis in which all the parts of the proposed CRSS are evaluated separately is performed to 
get insight into the impact of the different parts.  
 The goal of this task was to integrate (1) risk analysis; (2) risk management insights; and (3) capital and in-
surance market knowledge, in order to: 
 complete and integrate the various partial studies and understandings that currently exist in the 
field of livestock risk financing;  
 transfer theoretical designs into practically feasible instruments; and  
 extend cost calculations for stakeholders from loss costs to costs of risk financing. 
 
Task 3.2: Stakeholder consultation 
To evaluate the outcomes and prioritise the different options a further expert consultation was carried out.  
 
Work package 4 Synthesis  
In this work package the different findings work packages are combined. Based on the findings during the 
research conclusions and recommendations are added.  
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3. Review of the existing systems and mechanisms com-
pensating animal disease losses 
In this chapter an overview of the existing systems and mechanisms for compensating animal disease losses 
is given. It consists of three paragraphs: 
  
• In 3.1 the EU regulation for compensating animal disease losses, risk management support, and the 
payments from the EU Emergency Fund to the MS’s (period 1997-2009) are described.  
• In 3.2 the actual situation regarding compensating schemes for animal disease losses in the various 
MS’s is described. For this, the input given by the MS’s is used.  
• In 3.3 an overview is presented that covers the presence, market penetration and take-up of insur-
ance for animal diseases. Also other possible existing systems (including non-statutory diseases) and 
the degree of risk determination used when setting premia are briefly discussed. 
3.1. Present regulation in the EU for compensating animal disease 
losses and risk prevention support 
Compensation of animal disease losses 
Community measures related to outbreaks of epidemic livestock diseases are currently funded under budget 
lines from both DG SANCO and DG AGRI with different procedures involved. These may include co-financing 
of veterinary emergency measures such as the slaughter of animals (direct losses) and exceptional market 
support measures that provide support to farmers/breeders affected by restrictions imposed by the veteri-
nary authorities (indirect/consequential losses). Expenditure in the veterinary field is financed by EAGGF 
(Guarantee Section) funds. The “Veterinary Fund” is administered by DG SANCO and refers to the funding of 
veterinary emergency measures allocated under budget line 17.0403 (as of 2004) entitled “emergency fund 
for veterinary complaints and other animal contaminations which are a risk to public health.” Council Deci-
sion 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field brings together all Community finan-
cial measures for the eradication, control and monitoring of animal diseases and zoonoses. It lays down the 
relevant procedures governing the Community's financial contribution. Co-financing is foreseen in the event 
of an epidemic livestock disease; typically the MS in which the disease outbreak occurred submits a claim 
and the Commission then determines the actual reimbursement according to the eligibility criteria in place. 
Council Decision 90/424/EEC allows for co-financing 50 percent of the costs of compulsory and pre-emptive 
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slaughter and of related operational expenditure (this co-financing is 60 percent for Foot-and- Mouth Dis-
ease).  
 
In Council Decision 90/424/EEC the type of losses covered are described, these are: 
 
• Costs of compensation to owners the market value of compulsory slaughtered animals or destroyed 
eggs. 
• Costs associated with the compulsory slaughter of animals. 
• Costs associated with the destruction of carcasses and/or eggs. 
• Costs associated with cleaning, disinfecting, and disinfection of holdings. 
• Costs associated with the destruction of contaminated feed stuffs and/or milk. 
• Costs associated with the destruction of contaminated equipment. 
• In connection with vaccination, eligible expenditures. 
 
In the case of serious market disturbances due to restrictions imposed by the veterinary authorities in the 
case of outbreaks of animal diseases like FMD or CSF, exceptional market support measures can be intro-
duced by the Commission in order to support the farmers affected by these restrictions. The cost categories 
that are eligible for co-financing have recently been specified in more detail in Regulation 349/2005. 
Exceptional market support measures are implemented under the authority of DG AGRI.i Such measures can 
only be introduced once MS’s have introduced the veterinary measures necessary to stamp out epizootic 
diseases, “only to the extent and for the duration strictly necessary to support the market concerned.” 
Risk management support 
The legal background of risk management support to farmers comes from several parts of the EU legislation: 
Art. 32,1 EU Treaty defines: “The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agriculture 
products”.  
Following Art.33,1: “The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: (a) to increase agri-
cultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the national development of 
agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular la-
bour”. 
In the “Community guidelines for state aid in the agricultural and forestry sector 2007-2013 (OJ C319 
of 27.12.2006) IV.L. Aids in the livestock sector, (109) the Commission will declare State Aid in the 
livestock sector compatible with Article 87 of the Treaty if it fulfils all conditions of Article 16. The 
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Commission will not authorize State aid towards the costs covered by this chapter in favour of large 
companies.”  
In general, the EU legislation always points out that allowance for support is limited to small farmers or 
“small and medium-sized’ enterprises (Commission regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15.12.2006 on the ap-
plication of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty). However, not all aids to compensate for damage to agricul-
tural production or the means of agricultural production are allowed (V.B. OJ C 319). Allowances must be in-
terpreted “restrictively” (V.B.102) and in case of aids for combating animal diseases (V.B.4.) under general 
rules. (V.B.4.1.) Especially, “only diseases which are a matter of concern for the public authorities, and not 
measures for which farmers must reasonably take responsibility for themselves may be the subject of aid 
measures”((132(b)). The objectives of the aid measures should be either 132 c I,ii,iii: “Preventive or compen-
satory or combined”. 
The Commission regards (V.B.5. 138ff) “aids towards the payment of insurance premia” as useful. (139 a) “In 
many instances, insurance is a most helpful tool for good risk and crisis management”. Therefore, and in 
view of the often reduced financing possibilities of farmers, the Commission has a positive attitude towards 
State aid for insurance in favour of primary production (farmers). For arable farming, the Commission has 
even declared: (V.B.3.1. 126) “in order to further improve risk management, farmers should be encouraged 
to take out insurance wherever possible. Therefore, from a certain moment in the future onwards, adverse 
weather compensation should be reduced to farmers who have not taken out insurance for the product 
concerned. Only if a MS can convincingly show that, despite all reasonable efforts made, affordable insur-
ance for a given type of event or product is not available, the Commission should waive this requirement.” 
Further rules regarding risk management are laid down in Art. 70-71 of Council regulation (EC) No. 73/2009 
(Health Check). For example, MS’s have to submit an annual report on the implementation (Art.71.10.). 
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3.1.1. Payments from the Veterinary Fund 
In table 3.1 and figure 3.1 an overview is given of the contribution to the MS from the Emergency Fund. Only 
MS’s that received a contribution in this period from the Emergency Fund are mentioned. The total costs in 
the period 1997- 2010 are € 1, 109, 05 million, of which 88% is related to the major livestock diseases CSF, 
FMD and AI. Measures related to Blue tongue control account for a large part of the remaining costs.  
 
All payments from the Veterinary Fund Payments by the Veterinary Fund related to FMD/CSF/AI 
  
Figure 3.1  Distribution payments by the EU to the MS from the Emergency Fund (1997-2010) 
As can be seen from table 3.1 and figure 3.1 the payments are not equally distributed amongst the different 
MS’s: the outbreaks of CSF and FMD especially in the UK and the Netherlands required large payments from 
the Emergency Fund.  
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Table 3.1: Total payments (in Million €) by the EU to the MS’s from the Veterinary Fund (1997-2010) 1 
Country All diseases FMD/AI/CSF 
United Kingdom 582.70 576.55 
The Netherlands 265.56 249.44 
Italy 68.09 45.18 
Spain 63.84 36.05 
Germany 59.56 31.25 
France 22.31 5.33 
Belgium 16.50 12.48 
Greece 5.89 4.44 
Ireland 5.42 5.42 
Denmark 4.81 0.55 
Portugal  3.87 0.05 
Sweden 2.09 0.00 
Luxembourg 2.07 1.59 
Czech Republic 1.76 0.51 
Austria 1.71 0.00 
Hungary 1.00 1.00 
Poland 0.85 0.85 
Slovakia 0.48 0.48 
Estonia 0.35 0.00 
Cyprus 0.19 0.19 
Finland 0.04 0.00 
   
Total  1109.05 971.244 
1 Including 2.0 M€ payments in 2010 related to outbreaks in previous years) 
 (Source data DG SANCO) 
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3.2. Overview of existing systems and compensating mechanisms in the 
EU MS’s 
In Table 3.2 an overview of the present existing systems and compensating mechanisms in the EU MS’s is 
given. This overview is based on the results of the questionnaires sent to the EU MS’s. Of the 27 sent ques-
tionnaires, 24 returned and the remaining countries after repeated requests did not respond. The results 
from the returned questionnaires are presented in Table 3.2 and provide an overview of characteristics of 
financing schemes of the individual EU Member States covering direct and (part of) consequential losses due 
to contagious animal diseases. The full responses of the individual MS’s are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 3.2: Existing systems and compensating mechanisms in the EU MS’s  
 Country Scheme to cover direct 
losses 
Compensation 
Direct losses Consequential losses 
1 Austria Public Fully compensated Partly (Tierseuchenkasse) 
2 Belgium Compulsory levy scheme/ 
private 
FMD, CSF : 100% AI 90% No compensation (compe-
tence of regional authorities) 
3 Bulgaria Public Compensated but amount 
unclear /not determined 
No compensation 
4 Cyprus Public Fully compensated (Partly) compensated) 
5 Czech Republic Public Fully compensated Full public compensation 
6 Denmark Public Full compensation + 20% 
when whole herd is slaugh-
tered 
Cattle and swine: compulsory 
levy scheme to cover 80% of 
losses 
7 Estonia Public Fully compensated No compensation 
8 Finland Public Fully compensated Public up to 100% 
9 France Public Fully compensated Partly compensated/ private 
solidarity fund 
10 Germany Organized by Bundesland 
public/private 
100% (50% covered by the 
Federal state) 
Not covered but private in-
surance (Ertragsschaden-
versicherung) possible  
11 Greece No information received No information received No information received 
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Table 3.2: Existing systems and compensating mechanisms in the EU MS’s (continued) 
 Country Scheme to cover direct 
losses 
Compensation 
   Direct losses Consequential losses 
12 Hungary No information received No information received No information received 
13 Ireland Public (for TB partly levies) Fully compensated  No compensation 
14 Italy Partly public, partly private 
insurance 
Fully compensated  Private insurance scheme, 
supported by public funding  
15 Latvia Public Fully compensated Public-private compensation 
(no detailed information) 
16 Lithuania  Public-private Compensated Public-private compensation 
17 Luxembourg Public Fully compensated Private insurance scheme for 
consequential losses and the 
state supports the payment 
of the farmers paid premiums 
with 50% (small uptake) 
18 Malta No information received Fully compensated No compensation 
19 Netherlands Public-private Fully compensated Private insurance schemes; 
(ad hoc public financial aid) 
20 Poland Public Fully compensated Information not clear 
21 Portugal Public Fully compensated Compensated 
22 Romania Public Fully compensated Private compensation 
23 Slovakia Insurance (voluntary) 
scheme  
Insurance (voluntary) scheme Insurance (voluntary) scheme 
24 Slovenia Public Fully compensated No (ad hoc public financial 
aid) 
25 Spain Public / voluntary private 
insurance scheme 
Fully compensated Voluntary private insurance 
scheme  
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Table 3.2: Existing systems and compensating mechanisms in the EU MS’s (continued) 
 Country Scheme to cover direct 
losses 
Compensation 
   Direct losses Consequential losses 
26 Sweden Public Fully compensated Some diseases fully covered, 
broilers excluded (private in-
surance possible) 
27 United King-
dom 
Public Fully compensated Not covered (ad hoc financial 
aid) 
 
Currently in all MS’s (except Slovakia according to their answer in their questionnaire) the values of the ani-
mals that are compulsory culled and other costs related to the control and eradication of an epizootic dis-
eases are compensated by means of a public or public-private financing vehicle. While some MS’s finance 
the direct losses from the national budget, other MS’s have set up some form of statutory assessment sys-
tem. The amount that is payable by the farmer depends mainly on whether or not there were major epi-
demics in the previous years.  
As Table 3.2 illustrates, most MS’s finance the direct losses entirely from the national budget. Only in a few 
MS, e.g. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and The Netherlands, the animal production sector is contributing to 
the funding for compensation of direct losses. These public-private financing schemes have a compulsory 
fund structure in which all farmers pay a levy.  
In Germany the fund is established by the Bundeslander, which draws up the detailed rules of the applica-
tion. The program is run by an administrative council that decides the level of the levy etc. The administra-
tive council is made up of farmer and ministry representatives. The compensation payments are made from 
the available funds and the Ministry of Agriculture will pay for the costs if the fund runs out of money. The 
levy is only used to co-finance the EU veterinary measures following a disease outbreak and thus only pays 
for culled animals under EU Veterinary measures. No compensation is paid to farmers in surveillance zones. 
The Lander and the levy fund each pay half of the remaining non-EU compensated part. In Belgium the levy 
can vary depending on the level set by the government and is differentiated on basis of species and farm 
size. With respect to pig production in addition the premium is differentiated on basis of farm structure (i.e., 
open (purchase of pigs) versus closed pig production). Note that differentiation between species and farm 
structure is determined post epidemic and based on occurred losses per species but also subjective criteria.  
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In some Member States, a compensation scheme for (part of the) consequential losses is implemented, ei-
ther by means of private funding (Romania (compulsory)), by means of public funding (Austria, Cyprus, 
Czech, Finland, France1, Portugal, Sweden) or by private-public participation (Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania). 
In Slovakia a (voluntary) insurance scheme to compensate direct and indirect losses exists. 
Few private insurance schemes exist on the European market to cover the risk of consequential losses from 
livestock epidemics. Those that do exist are either extensions of general livestock insurance policies or spe-
cific policies of limited insurers and mutual insurers. Many standard livestock insurance policies in Europe 
assure farmers for animal losses as a result of a number of perils, but some have been extended, sometimes 
as an option, to cover at least a part of consequential losses from epidemics. Most general livestock insur-
ance schemes cover death and emergency slaughter due to illness, but also the risk of accident, theft, con-
tamination of products, fire and storm and are in most policies amenable for pooling. The additional conse-
quential loss coverage in case of epizootic livestock diseases have one of the following contract specifica-
tions: 1) is based on a proportion of the insured sum of the value of the livestock, or 2) is based on the pe-
riod with business interruption or 3) is based on the actual losses (a typical business interruption coverage).  
 
3.3. Compensation schemes and insurance 
General characteristics of compensation schemes 
Some studies have already thought out the characteristics of agricultural insurance schemes in the MS’s and 
worldwide (Koontz et al., 2006). The main findings are summarized below (focused on livestock insurance). 
Protection against losses of livestock farmers is organized by statutory compensation schemes (state owned 
or state controlled public funds; calamities or mutual funds with levies) or by ad-hoc payments. Sometimes 
there is no state established system; only private insurance can be purchased. 
  
                                                 
 
1
For France this is mainly restricted to exceptional circumstances and that not all sorts of consequential losses are covered. 
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Characteristics of public funds: 
Public funds have the following characteristics: 
 
 Public funds guarantee a reliable protection for all farmers; 
 The catastrophes and disaster protection is state guaranteed, there are no financial capacity 
problems and no need for reinsurance protection; 
 Compensation only for direct losses; 
 Compensation only for farmers for the culling of herds following formal state advised acts;  
 No compensation of farmers where the farm is situated in restriction zones; no compensation 
for consequential losses;  
 Limited input and incentives for loss prevention measures;
2
 
 No individual risk adjusted contribution or claim settlement possible. 
Levy funds 
In several countries levy funds are established to cover direct and sometimes part of the consequential 
losses of outbreaks of epidemic livestock diseases. The risk financing is based on a levy system. Risk financ-
ing by means of a levy system is based on pooling over time within the sector. Payments to the fund can be 
organised through up-front payments (deposit) or through assessment payments after an epidemic, or both. 
These latter systems have no annually fixed levies. The government will finance the compensation payments 
in advance. The input of the government will however be repaid over the following years. Therefore, after 
an epidemic, the levy is set according to the amount that the government paid in advance for the sector. 
Note that the levy can and in most cases will also vary between livestock species. 
In case of co-financing to complement the public part, the amount that is financed by the sector can be pro-
portional or non-proportional, or both. If risks are shared between the sector and the national government 
by means of a proportional contract (i.e., pro-rata contract) the levy is specified as a fraction of the cover-
age. With non-proportional contracts, the national government indemnifies only claims in excess of a par-
ticular threshold. 
 
                                                 
 
2
 Prefeasibility study, chapter 3.4. p31 
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Characteristics of private insurance: 
Private insurance schemes for animal diseases have the following characteristics: 
 
 Compensation possible for direct and consequential losses; 
 Individual risk designed contracts for farmers possible; 
 Protection against business interruption and loss of income; 
 Incentives for loss prevention; insurance protection only for farmers that fulfil stringent sanitary 
standards and are monitored by dairies or pig control units;  
 Insurers have specialized staff for individual risk adjusted premium and claim settlement; 
 Mutual insurance companies can combine the advantages of mutual funds and insurances;  
 Freedom of contracting, no compulsory schemes;  
However there are a few major drawbacks with respect to private insurance: 
 In most MS’s, private livestock insurance is not developed; 
 There is limited interest of the insurance industry to provide this kind of insurance to the live-
stock sector;  
 In case of a disaster due to an epidemic of a major livestock disease there is a problem of disas-
ter coverage: reinsurance for these kind of risks is only limited available;  
 Relative high premiums because of tax and administration costs. 
3.4. In summary  
Financing schemes related to the non-EU compensated part of animals that are compulsory culled and other 
costs related to the control and eradication costs differ between MS’s. While some MS’s finance the direct 
losses from the national budget, other MS’s have set up some form of statutory public-private financing 
system. These public-private financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure in which all farmers pay a 
levy (i.e. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and The Netherlands). The amount that is payable by the farmer 
depends mainly on whether or not there were major outbreaks in previous years. To share the risks 
between the national government and the sector proportional as well as non-proportional schemes exist. 
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In some MS’s, a compensation scheme for consequential losses is implemented, either by means of private 
funding (e.g., a compulsory scheme in Romania), by means of public funding (Austria, Cyprus, Czech, Finland, 
France, Portugal, Sweden) or by a private-public scheme (Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania). A widely adopted EU 
private insurance scheme covering all epidemic diseases for all types of livestock is absent. Only a few 
private insurance schemes exist on the European market to cover the risk of consequential losses from 
livestock epidemics (e.g. Germany).  
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4. Gathering experts’ opinion on the different policy op-
tions 
4.1. Assessment on the five different policy options 
To evaluate the characteristics of the five different policy options, the opinion of the different MS’s, the ISSG 
steering group and policy makers from DG SANCO and DG AGRI, and response of the Copa-Cogeca was gath-
ered. The response of MS’s and Copa-Cogeca was gathered by means of an e-mail response to the question-
naire described in appendix 1. The response from the ISSG members and members of DG SANCO and DG 
AGRI was gathered during a workshop held in Brussels. Appendix 6 presents the detailed responses of the 
respondents. These responses were re-arranged and summarized for (1) each choice option and (2) for each 
criterion. The current ‘No change’ scenario was used as a reference for comparison. In this way, all choice 
options could be compared on whether they would be an improvement or a worsening compared to the 
current system.  
 
In Table 4.1, the results of the MS’s are summarized with regard to the mentioned policy options and crite-
ria. For Option 1, the average (point) results are presented (which can range from 1 (minimum, - score) to 3 
(maximum, + score); hence, 2 points means a neutral judgement by the experts. For all other options, the 
deviations from the Option 1 score is presented; hence, a positive value indicates a more favourable judge-
ment and a negative value indicates a less favourable judgement. 
For the description of the scores/results, the following criteria were used: 
 Values (averages) for Option 1 between 1.5 and 2.5 were regarded as a more or less neutral 
judgement, scores above 2.5 were regarded as a strong point, values below 1.5 were regarded 
as a weak point; 
 Values (differences) for the other options larger than 0.7 were regarded as strong points (com-
pared to the default Option 1), values lower than 0.7 were regarded as a comparative weak 
point. 
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Table 4.1: Results from MS’s expert opinion on strong and weak points of the different policy options 
 
Note: for Option 1 the average (Av) results are presented, for all others the deviations compared to Option 1 (Dev). 
 
Evaluation of Table 4.1 shows the following:  
Option 1 is valued neutral (value 2) to a little weak (values below 2), particular with regard to criteria 1 and 2 
(Table 4.1.). Hence, with regard to Option 1 there is room for improvement on all criteria included. 
 
 
 
 
  Option  
1 
Option 
 2 
Option 
3a 
Option 
3b 
Option 
4a 
Option 
4b 
Option 
5 
  No 
change 
EU co-
financing 
with max 
% 
EU 
harmo-
nised 
CRSS 
gradual 
intro-
duction 
EU 
harmo-
nised 
CRSS or 
‘No 
change 
De-
regula-
tion - 
catas-
trophic 
events 
De-
regula-
tion- 
lump 
sum 
pay-
ment- 
Fully 
harmo-
nised 
CRSS 
man-
aged by 
EC 
 Criterion Av Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev 
1 
Prevention driven and in-
centive oriented 
1.5 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 
2 
Balance the distribution of 
costs and responsibilities 
1.5 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 1.1 
3 
Effectiveness and efficiency 
on prevention and eradica-
tion 
1.7 0.4 1.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.7 
4 Simple and clear rules 2.1 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 0.4 
5 
Prevent distortion of com-
petition between MSs 
1.7 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.5 
6 
Avoid risks for EU and MS 
budgets 
1.7 0.5 1.0 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.8 
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Option 3a appears to have several strong points compared to Option 1, particularly with regard to criteria: 
 
 1  Prevention driven and incentive oriented,  
 2  Balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities ,  
 3  Effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication and  
 6  Avoid risks for EU and MS budgets besides these.  
Also on criteria 4 and 5, Option 3a is considered more favourable compared to Option 1. 
 
Option 2 and Option 5 also have positive differences compared to Option 1 on all criteria. This holds particu-
larly true for criteria 1, 2, 4 and 6 for Option 2, and for criteria 1, 2, 3 and 6 for Option 5. Option 5 is favour-
able compared to Option 2 on all (but one) criteria. These positive differences of Option 2 and 5 are smaller 
than the differences of option 3a.  
 
Option 3b appears all-in-all more or less similar to Option 1: for criteria 1, 2, 3, and 6 some positive differ-
ences can be observed, however criterion 4 Simple and clear rules is a small comparative weakness of this 
option compared to option 1. 
 
Option 4a and Option 4b both have on all criteria 3 to 6 (small) negative differences, hence comparative 
weaknesses, whereas for the criteria 1 and 2 the differences are (close to) zero. 
 
The findings for MS’s experts are in accordance with the findings for the ISSG steering group and policy 
makers from DG SANCO and DG AGRI as well as and the response of Copa-Cogeca.  
 
On criterion 5 (Prevent distortion of competition between MS’s) particular attention should be paid, since 
all options score relatively moderate to negative on this criterion: the average value for Option 1 is 1.7 
(hence: neutral to weak) and the differences of the other options are slightly positive (e.g. 0.4 for Option 3a) 
to slightly negative (e.g. -0.4 for Option 4b). Hence, regardless the final choice, particular attention should 
be given to this aspect. 
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In terms of choice making, it seems obvious from Table 4.1 that, compared to the current option 1 (no 
change), improvement is possible. Hence, a change of system in general has a positive potential. In this re-
spect, Option 3a (EU harmonised frame-work CRSS with gradual introduction) has the highest potential: this 
option has higher scores on all criteria with particular comparative strengths on criteria:  
 
 1  Prevention driven and incentive oriented,  
 2  Balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities ,  
 3  Effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication and  
 6  Avoid risks for EU and MS budgets besides these.  
 
Also Option 2 (EU co-financing rules maintained with maximum public percentage) and Option 5 (Fully har-
monised CRSS managed by EC) is supposed to bring about improvements on (nearly) all criteria, however to 
a lower extend compared to Option 3a. Option 3b, Option 4a and Option 4b all have some comparative 
weaknesses compared to Option 1, which are not compensated for by other criteria, hence a choice for 
these options would not bring about much improvement compared to the current situation. 
 
4.2. Detailed assessment of policy option 3a  
4.2.1. Response of Member States 
In the questionnaire the 27 MS’s are also asked to answer more detailed questions concerning the policy op-
tions 3.a and 3.b. In this section a synthesis of the different responses is given (the detailed responses of the 
individual MS’s are described in appendix 4). 
 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
All MS’s agreed that the diseases covered by a CRSS should be harmonised—at least the epizootic diseases 
FMD, CSF, AI and NCD should be included. There should be an efficient risk transfer to the CRSS but also a 
proportional risk sharing between all cost sharing actors. Some MS’s also mentioned the inclusion of dis-
eases with a major zoonotic impact like BSE, Rabies and Bovine tuberculosis. The MS’s consider vital that 
during an outbreak of a disease covered by the CRSS, irrespective of the stage of the outbreak, adequate 
compensation should be ensured.  
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There is less agreement amongst the MS’s regarding the extent of public funding in a CRSS: one group of 
MS’s suggest a substantial participation of farmers in the CRSS while others suggest that public funding up to 
100% should be possible. Also differences occur between MS’s whether participation by farmers in a CRSS 
should be compulsory or voluntary. They agree that voluntary or compulsory participation should be har-
monized between the MS’s. In case of participation by farmers, the contribution of the individual farmers 
should be risk based and preventive measures should be supported.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
All MS agree that there always should be support in times of a crisis. Opinions differ in relation to peace time 
support. Members in favour of this peace time support would like to include costs of exercises related to 
outbreak management, costs related to control and surveillance, as well as eradication (vaccination) pro-
grams, and cost made by farmers for taking preventive measures. The MS’s that do not see added value of 
peace time support mention the fact that these costs are difficult to calculate and largely consist of adminis-
trative burdens. Financing mechanisms that are mentioned for preventive measures are single farm pay-
ments and CAP measures.  
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Two parts of compensation for direct losses are distinguished, namely firstly compensation for animals 
culled during an outbreak as well as other costs related to the outbreak and secondly compensation for 
costs related to taking preventive measures and surveillance. Several MS’s mention the hurdle of adminis-
trative procedures related to the current practices of compensation of the direct losses. They propose a 
harmonised system in which culled animals are valued at market prices and the additional direct costs as a 
fixed percentage of the value of the culled animals (flat rates). Compensation of these costs should be based 
on livestock numbers.  
 
Which losses compensated 
The MS’s seriously disagree whether consequential losses should be compensated in a CRSS. A majority of 
12 MS’s are against compensation of direct and consequential/indirect losses in a CRSS. Some MS’s mention 
that other financing mechanisms like national programmes or the CAP should be used for financing conse-
quential losses. A group of 5 MS’s are in favour of including consequential/indirect losses in a CRSS. Slovenia, 
who is in favour of including the consequential losses, uses the argument that especially for a small country 
it is likely that a very large part of the livestock sector will be affected by the cost of an outbreak and as a 
consequence the future of the livestock sector will be seriously threatened.  
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Arguments pro including at least part of the consequential losses stipulate that during an outbreak farmers 
confronted with movement restrictions might suffer substantial costs due to a standstill period (especially in 
Densely Populated Livestock areas farmers might face severe animal welfare and technical problems). Some 
MS’s state that there is a rationale for compensating consequential/indirect losses that farmers are con-
fronted with due to measures taken by the government. This is to support the sustainability of farms that 
would otherwise suffer problems with business continuation. They fear for moral hazards to occur on those 
farms when the outbreak is long-lasting.  
Arguments contra including consequential losses mostly relate to the fact that the consequential losses are 
difficult to calculate and a substantial administrative burden is expected. When market losses would be in-
cluded in the compensation of the consequential losses, these losses will become too costly. The majority of 
the MS’s oppose the idea of including consequential losses in a CRSS, most on the technical argument that 
the losses are difficult to calculate, losses will differ substantially between MS’s and it would be too big of a 
challenge to make rules for compensation that can be easily harmonised and controlled. This poses a risk of 
an administrative burden and fraud. Suggestions are made to make arrangements nationally to cover conse-
quential/indirect losses by insurance (which premiums might be subsidised). In this case it should be clear 
that distortion of competition is avoided. 
  
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Most of the MS did not comment on this issue. Those that did suggested that direct support to on-farm bio-
security measures might be supported by the CAP budget.  
 
4.2.2. Response of Copa-Cogeca 
The full response of Copa-Cogeca is in Appendix 4. Here is only a selection of those arguments that are con-
sidered either additional to other respondents or strongly emphasized by the respondent. 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
In the view of Copa-Cogeca there should be a ceiling of maximum threshold for contribution by farmers. 
Above that ceiling governments should bear the risk. Copa-Cogeca foresees that risk premiums to cover ex-
treme losses will be too high for farmers to bear. To avoid trade distortion and unfair competition with third 
countries, the system should be in compliance with WTO criteria. In WTO regulations, risk schemes are ap-
proved if the own-risk of the farmer is at least 30% of the total cost. This minimum percentage of own-risk 
for farmers is still considered by Copa-Cogeca too high for farmers. This however depends on the details of 
the cost-sharing scheme, e.g. what costs are eligible.  
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A reliable CRSS system is considered important for the EU’s international reputation. On such matters, any 
system in place in the EU should be fully recognised by third countries and should not affect competition 
rules at international level. It would be useful to explore CRSSs already in place in third countries.  
Besides farmers, other actors might be at risk for the introduction and spread of a disease. This risk might be 
outside the control possibilities of farmers or government. In the opinion of Copa-Cogeca society should be 
ready to share responsibility for eradication failures related to such agents. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
 
In the view of Copa-Cogeca it could be both:  
 
 Peacetime: for vaccinating against crucial diseases, vaccine production and storage, surveillance, 
operation of bio-security schemes;  
 Outbreaks: co-financing of all costs explained beforehand. This should also include consequen-
tial costs e.g. market problems as a result of emergency vaccination, etc.  
Which losses should be compensated? 
Besides the direct losses, consequential losses should be compensated as well. These include business inter-
ruptions, marketing problems due to emergency vaccination, losses for farms located in the restriction 
zones, et cetera. 
Regarding compensation of consequential losses 
As a general comment, Copa-Cogeca states that all costs borne by the farmer to get back in business should 
be covered. Some examples of support mentioned are:  
 
 Payment per animal lost at current market prices;  
 Payment per kg/l/number of production lost (meat, milk, eggs, animals, etc.) at current market 
prices, or compensation for price drops;  
 Per diem payments for income lost during the time of business operation;  
 Costs of cleaning, disinfections, vet, etc.;  
 Replacement of feed, manure, straw bedding, etc., and farm equipment destroyed during the 
outbreak;  
 Costs of restocking (getting used to new breeds, etc.);  
 Cost of monitoring and surveillance measures, as well as costs of biosecurity measures in place.  
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It should be considered that these costs could also be incurred outside of protection/surveillance zones.  
According to Copa-Cogeca, consequential cost can be determined since prices are widely monitored, avail-
able and can be determined by neutral bodies. 
Moral hazards can be prevented by making all actors financially responsible for disease prevention and con-
trol. This should include the processing industry, dairies, slaughterhouses, retail, animal traders, veterinary 
practitioners, etc., but also operators outside of agriculture, such as tourism businesses and nature reserve 
organisations. It is important that these costs are made visible in future cost-sharing schemes. 
 
General remark concerning a CRSS 
Cost-sharing should also mean responsibility sharing. In other words, this would mean that the private sec-
tor and authorities co-operate at equal level when solving animal disease problems. More simplification is 
needed and target orientated legislation is a prerequisite for effective action. 
 
4.3. PEST- analysis 
The current situation in which a modern animal health framework has to perform is different from that in 
the past. Several trends can be observed that have contributed to these changes. These trends can be 
grouped into Political, Economic, Social/Cultural and Technological forces. With respect to the feasibility of 
the different policy options, the following trends are distinguished by experts (ISSG and policy makers of DG 
SANCO and DG AGRI): 
 
Political forces: 
 Increased EU attention to the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
 Increased EU attention to the polluter-pays-principle. 
Economic forces: 
 Increasing production costs for EU farmers and increasing competition from third countries. 
 Increasing competitive pressure towards high-added value products. 
Social/cultural forces: 
 Increasing societal demands towards sustainability. 
 Social/cultural differences between MS. 
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Technological forces: 
 Risk of emerging diseases due to climate change. 
Each trend might have an impact on the feasibility of the different identified policy options. It might enforce 
the feasibility of an option defined as an upward pressure; or it might reduce the feasibility of an option: a 
downward pressure; or the force might be neutral as it does not have an effect on the feasibility of the op-
tion.  
The different policy options for a CRSS are evaluated in perspective of the defined trends and events that 
might affect the feasibility of these options. Input was provided by experts from various origins, i.e. MSs, 
ISSG and Copa-Cogeca. Their input was particularly focused on upward and downward pressures on the dif-
ferent choice options. In this chapter the highlights are discussed. In Annex 6 a detailed description of the 
identified forces and the effect on the different policy options is given. In the criteria for evaluating the dif-
ferent policy options, several trends were already included and discussed. In this chapter only those forces 
are discussed, that were not already included within the CVO criteria for CRSS in table 4.1. First the impact 
of political and economic forces for each separate policy option will be discussed, followed by a discussion of 
the impact of social/cultural and technological forces on the options in general. 
 
4.3.1.  Evaluating the different policy options in a changing external environment 
For Option 1, with respect to political forces this no-change scenario is badly in line with the identified po-
litical trends.  
The EU principle of proportionality and subsidiarity - which implies that the EU shall only act on matters of 
common interest if the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, and that the EU action shall not exceed what is necessary (no overregula-
tion) – gets anno 2011 more emphasis than in the past. It puts a downward pressure on option 1, since this 
option is characterized by central regulation, accompanied by a heavy administrative burden and enforce-
ment effort on EU level.  
The increased emphasis in the EU on the polluter-pays principle forms a downward pressure for maintaining 
this policy option. MS‘s with frequent (large) outbreaks of contagious diseases put strong claims on the EU 
budget compared to MS’s with low risk production structures.  
Within the EU-27, more emphasis is given on ensuring that individual interests of MS are assured. This could 
form either a downward or an upward pressure for this option, dependent on the MS category (countries 
with expected high claims might have different interests than countries with smaller claims).  
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The increased attention to sustainable agriculture also expressed in the theme of the EU animal health pol-
icy –prevention is better than cure- forms a downward pressure for maintaining option 1. The current reim-
bursement system does not contain any incentives for a more preventive behaviour nor does it contribute 
to awareness of farmers of their own responsibilities regarding a more sustainable production (e.g. human 
health, animal health, animal welfare).  
Economic forces that influence the feasibility of this option are the increasing production costs for EU farm-
ers due to increased feed prices, societal demands as well as the decrease in direct payments (CAP) may 
form an upward pressure for maintaining option 1, as it does not require farmers’ contribution to compen-
sation of direct costs of disease outbreaks. The tendency towards market strategies aiming at more high-
added value products, however, forms a downward pressure for this option.  
 
For Option 2 (EU co-financing with maximum and minimum farmers participation), partly the same upward 
and downward pressures related to external political forces apply as for option 1. In this option a MS with 
frequent outbreaks of notifiable diseases, put larger claims on the budget than a MS with low risk. At the EU 
level, the tendency towards increased importance of the polluter-pays principle also does not promote op-
tion 2.  
At MS-farmer level, the situation is different though. Option 2 obliges farmers to bear a minimum percent-
age of the direct costs in case of outbreaks. This contains more incentives for preventive behaviour, private 
responsibility and cost sharing than the actual reimbursement system. This is at present already the case in 
MS’s that implemented some form of private involvement in the contribution to costs of outbreaks. Individ-
ual interests of MS’s with frequent outbreaks might provide in an upward pressure for option 2, since the 
risks to the MS budgets may be lower due to the private contribution to reimbursement of direct costs.  
For the economic forces, the already increasing production costs for EU farmers and the increased competi-
tion from third country imports give a downward pressure for the feasibility of option 2, since this option in-
cludes a maximum for public reimbursement of disease outbreak costs. As a result, especially in high risk 
MS, production costs will further increase. However, the increased interest in high animal health and animal 
welfare as well as public health might be a legitimacy for direct payments in the revision of the CAP to sup-
port farmers in case of a disease outbreak.  
Option 3A (a gradual introduction of a harmonised CRSS) is in line with the EU principle of proportionality 
and subsidiarity, as it delegates more responsibility to the MS, provided that overregulation by the EU is 
avoided. A reduction of administrative burden in enforcement could be an important incentive for MS and 
livestock sector for realising a public-private CRSS. On the other hand, recent economic and financial crises 
have raised public questions on how private parties manage risks without appropriate controls from public 
authorities. Since not only costs but also responsibilities have to be shared in this option, this means that the 
sector will claim an important voice in policy development regarding outbreak prevention and control (e.g. 
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vaccination, culling). If the option is not properly implemented, the risk of poor implementation of CRSSs 
could lead to major animal disease outbreaks and high costs.  
 
At the level of the relationship between EU - MS, compliance of option 3A with the polluter-pays principle 
depends on whether the EU reimbursement to the MS will be related to the risk profile of the MS.  
 
On the level of the relationship between MS and farmers, option 3A is in line with the polluter-pays princi-
ple. A public-private partnership emphasizes the farmers’ own responsibility with regard to prevention of 
transmission of pathogens, and creates necessary incentives for the different stakeholders to comply with 
preventive measures. It also emphasizes the allocation of responsibilities between individual farmers, the 
livestock sector and the government. For example: prevention strategies for vector borne diseases are not 
exclusively the responsibility of farmers. They need fine-tuning between national legislation and enforce-
ment, transport, and veterinary services and preventive measures taken on farm level.  
With respect to economic forces the already increasing production costs due to EU demands and policies 
form a downward pressure for implementation of a harmonised public-private costs and responsibility shar-
ing scheme, as this option might cause further costs increase for farmers, and decrease of the competitive-
ness of agricultural business. Additional costs might increase the gap with third country producers. On the 
other hand, less distortion of production due to disease outbreaks, high food safety and animal-human 
health standards might be a competitive advantage on the market and increase profitability (higher added 
value). Implementation of a CRSS might also provide easier access to EU and MS funds for compensation of 
‘public goods’ production. The tendency towards large scale farming also forms an upward pressure for im-
plementation of option 3A, as large farms will have less difficulties with economic sustainability when costs 
of disease outbreaks will have to be internalized, and will have as well less difficulties with implementation 
of a CRSS. Unlike the increasing costs, increasing societal demands also can have an upwards pressure on 
this policy option which gives emphasis to corporate/livestock sector social responsibility. 
 
Most current initiatives regarding public-private costs and responsibility sharing concerning disease out-
breaks can be found in the densely populated livestock areas like Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands. In 
those countries that already implemented a PPP often a differentiation in premium paid by different live-
stock owners is made based on the livestock sector and farm type. This differentiation is based on risk pro-
file and ability to bear costs.  
 
The structure of animal husbandry in especially new MS is characterised by both large commercial animal 
production enterprises as well as large numbers of ‘back yard’ farming. In the case of implementing the CRSS 
in the MS in which there are large number of holdings with back yard farming or non-commercial holding 
the CRSS is faced with several challenges. The first challenge is registration of livestock owners, the second is 
to find incentives to motivate to comply with regulations and the third is to collect levies cost effectively. 
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These challenges might hamper the political willingness to strive for and the feasibility of a mandatory intro-
duction of public-private partnerships in a CRSS.  
The main reason for farmers to participate in a CRSS is the responsibility sharing. In many MS’s, farmers have 
little say in the decision making process regarding prevention and management of outbreaks of contagious 
disease where they consider themselves most affected by the outbreak. Modulation of control strategies 
based on the different interests of livestock sectors and in consultation with the different livestock sectors 
might be a way to raise awareness and commitment of the stakeholders involved.  
 
Option 3B offers MS the possibility to either implement a harmonised CRSS or maintain the current reim-
bursement system. MS with densely populated livestock areas and a well organised production chain could 
choose to implement a public-private CRSS, while new MS or MS with sparsely populated production areas 
could avoid the effort of CRSS development and implementation. This option offers some flexibility to MS 
with difficulties to implement a public-private CRSS. Both the opportunities and threats as mentioned for 
option 1 (no change) and option 3A (harmonised CRSS) apply for this option, depending on the chosen vari-
ant by the different MS. Individual interests of MS, especially of MS with sparsely populated livestock areas, 
might form a downward pressure for implementation of a CRSS, as MS with high risk profiles might also 
choose to maintain the existing system and keep on claiming a non-proportional part of the EU budget for 
reimbursement. Also the upward or downwards pressures on economic forces from the described economic 
forces depend on which scenario will be chosen by the MS: no change or implementation of a harmonised 
CRSS. 
 
Option 4A limits EU intervention to cases of catastrophic events. This option is in line with the principle of 
proportionality and subsidiarity, as it complies with the EU policy towards more simplification and deregula-
tion. The option leaves policy choices regarding public-private partnerships to the MS involved. It is not in 
line with the polluter-pays principle. Catastrophic events are more likely to happen in high risk areas, which 
means that the unbalance as occurring in the current compensation system is at least maintained, but 
probably even further supported. (Dis)advantages compared to the current system will depend on the defi-
nition of catastrophic events and the compensation rate that will be applied. The option does not provide in 
specific incentives for a more prevention-driven approach: in case of catastrophic events, the EU will com-
pensate for direct costs, regardless of the efforts made to prevent the outbreak. However, as MS get 
less/not reimbursed in case of (small or medium) outbreaks and more own responsibilities in policy making 
and legislation regarding animal diseases, it might support a more prevention-driven approach by MS.  
With respect to economic forces: The increasing competition from third countries as well as the already in-
creasing production costs for EU farmers due to societal demands and fall in direct payments form a down-
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ward pressure for deregulation of disease outbreak compensations to catastrophic events. It depends, of 
course, on the definition of ’catastrophic event’, but will in any case lead to higher costs for farmers in high 
risk areas.  
 
Option 4B grants lump sum payments to the MS instead of co-financing. This option is in line with the prin-
ciple of proportionality and subsidiarity, as it meets tendencies towards decentralisation of responsibilities 
from EU to MS and simplification and deregulation. The polluter-pays principle could form an upward pres-
sure for this option, at least on level of the relationship between EU – MS, provided that lump sum pay-
ments will be paid to all MS in dependence of herd sizes in the MS (flat rates of number of animals) and 
without taking into account the specific risk status of the MS. Introduction of policy option 4B is in that case 
not in the individual interest of category 1 MS with densely populated livestock production areas and high 
risks of disease outbreak. In contrast, new MS’s with professional farmers as well as non-organised backyard 
farmers could be in favour of this option, as it does not oblige to realise public-private partnerships.  
Increasing production costs and increasing competitive pressure are economic forces that might have, where 
it concerns MS with a low risk profile, an upward pressure on this option with lump sum payments for all 
MS’s, provided that the lump sums will be established regardless of the risk profile in relation with animal 
health. For high risk MS, the opposite effect is at stake, as costs of large outbreaks will exceed the lump sum, 
which means that a larger part of the reimbursement will become the responsibility of MS and/or its farm-
ers.  
 
Option 5 is the establishment of a fully harmonised EU CRSS system managed by the Commission. In this op-
tion the same upward and downward pressures are identified as with option 3A. However, there are impor-
tant differences. A fully harmonised EU CRSS, managed by the Commission, is not in line with the principle of 
proportionality and subsidiarity, which strives for decentralisation of responsibilities from EU to individual 
MS’s where possible. The tendency towards simplification and deregulation also forms a threat for imple-
mentation of option 5: a CRSS managed by the Commission will put a heavy burden on regulative admini-
stration and enforcement. It might also create a conflict with individual interests of MS’s, as a EU wide har-
monised CRSS cannot take into account differences in cultural characteristics of relevant stakeholders within 
the MS, with whom the public-private partnership must be realised, and with the risk characteristics and 
production structure of the MS at stake. The EU policy towards sustainable agriculture forms an upwards 
pressure for implementation of this option, as it puts emphasis, as option 3A does, on corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) of entrepreneurs. For a fully harmonised CRSS managed by the EC, the same upward and 
downward pressures of economic forces are at stake as with option 3A. 
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Besides political and economic forces several social/cultural and technical forces affect also the feasibility of 
the different options. The most important ones are briefly discussed. 
 Differences in production practices in MS, e.g. the occurrence of backyard farming in especially new 
MS, will have a downward pressure on implementation of a public-private CRSS for reasons already 
mentioned (option 2, 3A, 3B, 5).  
 Increasing social unrest by large scale killing in cases of notifiable animal diseases is a social/cultural 
force that has an upward pressure on the policy options with public-private costs and responsibility 
sharing (options 3A, 5, 2 and partially 3B), as these options are more prevention-driven and therefore 
supposed to lead to lesser disease outbreaks and/or smaller outbreaks. The necessity of large scale kill-
ing consequently decreases. 
 Climate change with the risk of introduction of new livestock epidemics puts a downward pressure on 
compensation schemes that lack incentives for a more prevention-driven approach of farmers and for 
this reason forms an upward pressure for policy options with public-private sharing of costs and re-
sponsibilities (option 3A and 5), or at least private contribution to compensation systems (option 2). 
 The increasing availability of diagnostic and monitoring tools forms an upward pressure for the effi-
ciency and efficacy of all policy options, as it supports a rapid detection of outbreaks and efficient 
monitoring of the effectiveness of control measures.  
 The increasing development of quality insurance schemes forms an upward pressure for policy options 
with an increased private responsibility (options 2, 3A, 5), as quality insurance schemes might enhance 
the possibilities of getting premium market prices for ‘healthier’ animal products.  
4.3.2. Conclusions of the PEST analysis 
The PEST-analysis presented above aimed to support the evaluation of the feasibility of the different policy 
options at present times by evaluating the impact of present major trends that are related to political, eco-
nomic, social and technological forces.  
From the PEST analysis, we draw the following conclusions: 
 
 Most of the above mentioned major trends emphasize the development and implementation of com-
pensation systems with public-private costs and responsibility sharing (CRSSs), especially option 3A, op-
tion 5 and to a lesser extent option 2. 
 
 The already increasing production costs and competitive pressure from third countries as well as so-
cial/cultural differences between MS can reduce the feasibility of an introduction of compensation sys-
tems with public-private costs and responsibility sharing. The social structure of, in particularly, new MS 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 57 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
with a large number of ‘backyard’ farmers might hamper the realisation of public-private cooperation in 
disease compensation and control. Whether it is worth the effort to include backyard and non-
commercial holdings in the CRSS has to be based on epidemiological, economic as well as political argu-
ments. 
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5. Proposal for a EU harmonized framework for a Cost 
and Responsibility Sharing Scheme 
The current system for reimbursement by the Veterinary Fund in case of an outbreak of major livestock dis-
eases is perceived as having no specific incentives for prevention, has distortions in favour of high risk areas, 
partial compensation in case of an outbreak, complex community co-financing rules and a risk for the com-
munity budget. At present the EU reimburses up to 50% (60% in case of FMD) of the direct cost of an out-
break of the former known list-A epidemic livestock diseases, irrespectively of prevention measures taken 
and the claim history by a Member State. The remaining part of the direct cost has to be covered by the MS. 
Whether that is fully paid from the government’s budget or is (partly) covered by farmers’ contribution at 
present differs between MS’s (chapter 3.1 and 3.2 describe the present situation in detail).  
Based on the information presented in the previous chapters and expert consultation, in this chapter a first 
outline of option 3A- an EU harmonised framework for Cost and Responsibility Sharing - is presented. The 
presented outline of a new CRSS tries to include components that avoid the drawbacks of the present sys-
tem. The objectives presented by the Working party of CVO’s as described in paragraph 1.1 are used for this 
evaluation. Besides these criteria the following additional criteria for a CRSS will be taken into account. A 
CRSS should: 
 
 Be simple and easy to implement.  
 Contain incentives for preventive measures.  
 Take into account the differences between Member States in occurrence and impact of outbreaks of 
contagious diseases.  
 Consider different types of public-private partnership and not only private insurances. With regard to 
consequential/indirect losses, it is assessed whether it will be convenient or not to include conse-
quential losses in the CRSS and whether this will be better covered through private or public parties 
(easier to manage in private or public schemes).  
 Include which animal health risks might be insurable by the private insurance sector and in which 
cases EU or MS governmental contribution might help insurers providing insurance cover at a price 
that livestock owners can pay (allocation of responsibilities is also a key issue to be addressed). 
 Ex ante financing and the development of ex ante schemes should also be considered. Taking into ac-
count the different situation in the individual Member States, depending on the risk exposure and in-
surance market’s features, it is assessed whether an EU harmonised scheme would be feasible when it 
comes to private insurance. Trade aspects and distortion of competition are a key aspect to be con-
sidered as well. 
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 Be limited to the major livestock diseases FMD, CSF and AI. 
The components of the CRSS are described in paragraph 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. In paragraph 5.1.3 the proposed 
CRSS will be evaluated with the present system as reference. Besides evaluation on the above mentioned 
criteria the final EU expenditure that would be needed in a large-scale epidemic, if the proposed CRSS is in 
place, is compared with the current situation.  
In the presented CRSS to cover the direct costs of an outbreak, two levels of relations can be distinguished: 
 
1) Risk sharing between the MS and the EU – for this we propose a Bonus Malus system-, 
and 
2) Risk sharing between farmer and MS – for this we propose a Public Private Partnership 
(PPP). 
 
A system that could be implemented to cover consequential/indirect cost is only briefly discussed since it is 
not a component of the proposed CRSS. However, a system to cover consequential losses could facilitate the 
implementation of a CRSS. 
 
5.1. Risk sharing MS – EU: introduction of a Bonus Malus (BM) system 
for the coverage of direct losses 
Baseline description of the BM system 
Parts of the drawbacks of the present system can be overcome or improved by implementing a Bonus Malus 
arrangement (BM) which alternately rewards (bonus) or penalizes (malus) claiming behaviour. A BM usually 
has an effect on claim statistics, as it stimulates to be more careful in preventing outbreaks that would lead 
to the loss of bonus. 
The fundamental principle of BM for the CRSS is that claim history (frequency and claim amounts) of a 
Member State has an impact on the entitled reimbursement percentage in case a claim has to be made due 
to an outbreak of an epidemic livestock disease (in this report we will limit ourselves to FMD, CSF an AI).  
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 The Bonus is an increase in reimbursement percentage which is given if no claim is made in the previ-
ous year. 
 Malus is a discount in the reimbursement percentage if there was a claim in the previous year.  
In Table 5.1, a hypothetical BM system for CRSS is presented. Here is described what will happen in case of 
an outbreak of an epidemic livestock disease with respect to the reimbursement percentage a MS can claim 
from the Veterinary fund. This hypothetical BM system divides Member States by classes, where each class 
has its own reimbursement percentage. The starting class for a MS when the system is implemented is set at 
the current reimbursement level (50%), and over years can increase up to for example 60%, or drop to 40% 
depending on claim history3. The claim history comprises all main epidemic livestock diseases jointly (in con-
trary to a BM system per livestock sector and disease).  
In case of no outbreak 
In case a MS did not have an outbreak of either FMD, CSF or AI in the previous year the reimbursement class 
increases by 1% up to a maximum level of 60%. This is the maximum reimbursement level a MS can achieve. 
In case of an outbreak 
In case of an outbreak the proportion of reimbursement is equal to the reimbursement class of the year of 
the outbreak. However, if there is a large outbreak and the costs exceed a predefined amount, there will be 
a reduction (-5%) in reimbursement of the exceeding costs. (The definition of large outbreaks has to be de-
fined by MS’s and EU. The absolute costs of the outbreak or the percentage of livestock involved and dura-
tion of the outbreak can be used to classify the size of an outbreak.) Sometimes an outbreak covers more 
than one calendar year, in this case it is assumed to be one outbreak and not two successive outbreaks.  
  
                                                 
 
3
 The percentages given are hypothetical and are used to illustrate the approach. 
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Table 5.1: A hypothetical Bonus-Malus (BM) system for a Cost and Responsibility Sharing System (CRSS). 
 Reimbursement in case of an 
outbreak 
Class after claim in next year 
Class in ini-
tial year 
Initial Reim-
bursement 
Large outbreak  No claim Small out-
break 
(-1) 
Medium 
outbreak 
(-5) 
Large out-
break 
(-10) 
60 60% 50 60 59 55 50 
59 59% 49 60 58 54 49 
….. …..  ….. ….. ….. ….. 
51 51% 41 52 50 46 41 
50 50% 40 51 49 45 40 
49 49% 39 50 48 44 40 
….. …..  ….. …... ….. ….. 
40 40% 30 41 40 40 40 
 
The year after an outbreak 
In case a MS has suffered an outbreak the reimbursement class will be lower in the succeeding year. This 
class reduction depends on the size of the outbreak. 
 In case of a small outbreak there is only a very small (or no) reduction in entitled reimburse-
ment. The rational is that there should be no moral hazard for a MS to postpone the disclosure 
of outbreaks. The cost that should be covered, in our opinion, is the initial cost for taking all the 
compulsory preventive measures around the index case of an outbreak (cost for implementa-
tions of EU measures e.g. culling of the first farms, tracking and tracing and implementation of 
movement restrictions). We expect that these initial costs do not vary much between MS, so a 
fixed lump sum is suggested. 
 However, if the cost exceeds these initial costs the reimbursement rate for the next year re-
duces with 5% in case of a Medium outbreak. 
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 In case of a Large outbreak a reduction of 10% is foreseen. 
 There is a minimum reimbursement class that a MS will receive (here approximately 30% in case 
of large outbreaks). This minimum –but still substantial- reimbursement rate ensures that a MS 
will be motivated to adequately eradicate the outbreak in line with the regulations as formu-
lated in the Veterinary Fund.  
Once again the values in this example are hypothetical, while also the definition of medium and large out-
breaks has to be defined by MS’s and EU. 
Please note that the present EU system for management evaluation during an outbreak remains in place. 
This system includes incentives for a quick and adequate response of the MS to control and eradicate the 
disease. 
 
Example 
Suppose a MS suffers an outbreak of FMD and that will cost 10 million €. This outbreak occurs in year 6 after 
introducing the schema (reimbursement class 56%) 
 Assume that: 
 The amount that is agreed upon as being a large outbreak is 9 million €.  
 Reduction in case of medium outbreak exceeds 1million € and large outbreak 9 million €. 
The contribution by the EU in this case will be 5.5 million € (56% of 9 million €) and 46% of 1 (10-9) million 
€). In the next year the reimbursement class will be 41% (51-10). 
 
The BM system is a robust and a simple compensating system, which is moreover easy to control and to be 
implemented. The simplicity is that BM system does not require information on risk prevention strategies 
implemented in each member state since it rewards or penalizes the outcome of measures taken. 
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Additional remarks and comments 
 
 The used percentages and steps presented in the proposed BM system are hypothetical and 
typically can be adjusted based on consultation and negotiations between EU, MS and stake-
holders. 
 A cost neutral implementation implies that some MS’s benefit from the system while it is disad-
vantage for other MS’s. However, if the merit of the BM system is that it facilitates risk preven-
tion on the long run, it might be beneficial for all. 
 Outbreaks in neighbouring MS’s that spill over will impact the reimbursement for other affected 
MS’s. However, if the response of a MS is adequate and the outbreak can be contained quickly, 
there will only be a very small reduction in reimbursement class.  
 The proposed blueprint in relation to reduced reimbursement of direct costs also provides an in-
centive for an adequate response of the Member State. The potential moral hazard that could 
occur when a MS is tempted to “wait and see” to avoid a reduction in future reimbursement is 
reduced by the fact that small outbreaks do only result in a reduction in future reimbursement 
of only 1%.  
 Ex post and not ex ante. The presented system does not evaluate the risk prevention of the MS 
but only evaluates the outcome. This overcomes difficulties in evaluating the effects of preven-
tive measures ex ante.  
 Additional bonus for implementing additional measures. To create incentives for a MS to imple-
ment preventive measures or financing mechanisms that involve stakeholders’ participation an 
additional bonus could be considered. 
 
Reduction in reimbursement in case of large claim during an outbreak 
The bonus malus system is affecting the reimbursement of future outbreaks. To stimulate an effective and 
adequate response of the responsible authorities during an outbreak in the proposed CRSS a reduction in re-
imbursement for exceptionally high claims to the Veterinary fund is proposed. In this hypothetical example 
when the total direct costs of an outbreak exceed 9 million€ a reduction of 10% in reimbursement of the 
cost above this amount is proposed. 
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5.2. Risk sharing between farmer and Member State; a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). 
The second part of the CRSS focuses on the relation within a MS between government and farmers and 
other stakeholders to cover the direct costs by means of a compulsory public statutory compensation 
scheme.  
To cover the national part of the direct costs, we propose a public–private partnership (PPP) which is funded 
and operated through a partnership of the national government and the primary livestock sectors. This PPP 
shares responsibilities and funds the remaining direct losses to complement the EU reimbursement. Under 
the assumption that the contribution by the national budget of the Member States is a fraction of the re-
maining direct losses, the costs that have to be funded by the private party depends on the outbreak size 
and BM class.  
In case a MS in the recent past was confronted with disease outbreaks and therefore a new outbreak would 
result in a lower reimbursement percentage, in order to avoid next costly outbreak this MS has additional 
incentives to implement more stringent preventive measures. These measures can be both directed towards 
introduction prevention as well as transmission prevention between farms. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Coverage of the direct costs of an outbreak of a contagious disease. 
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To illustrate the inter-linkage of the BM with the PPP, in Figure 5.1 three possible situations of EU contribu-
tion in the direct costs of an outbreak in a MS are shown, assuming a statutory compensation system. The 
differences are due to the fact of different disease history and thus different reimbursement classes. 
 
 In situation 1 the EU covers 60% of the direct costs,  
 In situation 2 this is 50%, and  
 In situation 3 this is 40%.  
Given that the direct costs of an outbreak will be 10 million € in situation 1 the EU covers 6 million €, in 
situation 2 this will be 5 million € and in situation 3 this will be 4 million €. The remaining part of these direct 
costs has to be covered by the MS. In case of a proportional cost sharing between government and farmers 
each have to contribute respectively 3, 2.5, or 2 million €.  
Responsibility sharing and Cost sharing 
A vital part of the PPP is that farmers, livestock sectors and national governments decide how responsibili-
ties and cost are shared. Given the specific situations in each MS the funding of the PPP might differ be-
tween different MS’s. In some of the MS’s a PPP already exist (e.g. Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands) or 
are under research (such as in the UK). Each of these MS has organized their PPP in a different way. Differ-
ences between the existing systems exist for example in the risk sharing strategy between farmers and gov-
ernment of the MS. In case of co-financing to complement the public part, the amount that is financed by 
the sector can be proportional or non-proportional, or both. If risks are shared between the sector and the 
national government by means of a proportional contract (i.e., pro-rata contract), the levy is specified as a 
fraction of the coverage. With non-proportional contracts, the national government indemnifies only claims 
in excess of a particular threshold. Essential parts in our view of a PPP should be: 
 
 Not only costs but also responsibilities are shared. For example this can result in involvement of 
farmers and government in the design of contingency plans and eradication strategies in case of 
an outbreak of an epidemic livestock disease. 
 Incentives for preventive measures should be addressed. Since the effect of preventive meas-
ures on the probability of introduction and spread of epidemic diseases might vary between dif-
ferent MS’s and even regions within a MS, it is up to the MS to decide how much emphasis will 
be placed on the implementation of these preventive measures. The effect of measures taken 
will affect the frequency and impact of outbreaks, and thus costs and EU reimbursement per-
centage.  
 Participation is compulsory and farmers financially participate by paying a levy. 
 The system should include risk differentiation in levies. Differentiation of levies should be based 
on those factors affecting the probability of introduction of an epidemic livestock disease. For 
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example levies can depend on the participation in a (subsidized) sanitary quality scheme. Com-
munity guidelines for state aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007-2013 (2006/C 319/01) 
allow subsidising these schemes. Moreover, levies might depend on region, animal species pre-
sent at the farm and/or contact structure.  
EU involvement in these MS’s PPP can be limited since it is an arrangement made between farmers and gov-
ernment within a MS. However, the implementation of such scheme can be stimulated by the EU. In case 
additional support is given to a MS to facilitate implementing such a PPP programs by the EU, this imple-
mentation can be based on EU guidelines (that in that case have to be developed).  
Preventive measures 
There are a number of reasons that favours the PPP approach to finance epidemic livestock disease risks 
rather than a public compensation scheme, which are related to manage the problem of asymmetric infor-
mation. Since a PPP is an arrangement made between farmers and government it will emphasize and facili-
tate proper incentives of risk prevention to farmers, better than public compensation schemes organized 
otherwise. The following incentives are to be discussed: 
 
 levy differentiation; 
 contract specification; 
 social control.  
Since farmers are an essential element in a PPP, there is likely to be broader support for differentiation of 
levies since colleague farmers instead of an anonymous government impose these measures. Moreover, be-
cause of familiarity of colleague farmers with certain production circumstances, support for differentiation 
will be more likely. Colleague farmers can also easier define and impose more stringent contract specifica-
tions on ‘due diligence’ to minimize moral hazard. A PPP is likely to have an increased attention to the re-
quired minimum standards for ‘good farming practices’. Moreover, problems of moral hazard and fraud will 
be reduced because of increased social control since farmers collectively finance part of the losses.  
The required minimum standards and a proper differentiating of levies should be according to measurable 
risk factors. What is however typical is the relatively limited amount of data about livestock epidemics as 
these are generally rare events. Even more, due to the dynamic risk environment historic data are often of 
relatively little value. These issues hamper the establishment of statistically founded risk classification 
methods and therefore the design of actuarially sound and a fair differentiation of levies. Classification crite-
ria can include for example farming sector involved, farm location, and number of animal contacts with 
other farms, farm hygiene practices, hygiene barriers in place and quality assurance schemes. 
A proper risk classification and differentiated levy scheme accordingly can induce the livestock sector to-
wards more risk prevention. Structural business changes would be required if for example region of location 
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and farm size are important risk factors. On the contrary, behavioural changes for risk factors such as proper 
usage of hygiene barriers and number of quality assurance schemes seem to be more straightforward to be 
implemented. 
Implementing structural and behavioural changes to prevent epidemics will require additional financial re-
sources. Decreased levies should off-set these additional expenditures at farm level. Adoption of these en-
hanced practices could furthermore be promoted by subsidising the initial costs.  
 
5.3. Coverage of consequential losses  
During an outbreak of contagious disease like FMD, CSF or AI farmers are confronted with substantial direct 
and consequential/indirect losses. Different types of consequential/indirect losses occur at different farms: 
 
1. Farms culled are confronted with direct losses that occur on infected or preventively culled farms. 
These losses are mostly covered by the MS (and co-financed by the Veterinary Fund). Costs compen-
sated include the value of animals and feed present at the moment of culling animals on the farm.  
However those culled farms are also confronted with non-compensated losses because of loss of in-
come during the time the farm is not fully repopulated and in production. Also they are confronted 
with additional start-up costs. 
2. Farms in a Surveillance or Movement restriction zone during the stand still period are also confronted 
with (non-compensated) consequential losses, mainly due to the fact that they are not able to freely 
move animals or livestock products. 
3. The livestock sector in a MS as a whole also is confronted with consequential losses due to trade re-
strictions. 
Coverage of the consequential/indirect cost is outside the review of Decision 2009/470/EC for the CRSS and 
typically should be voluntary and could be a mutual or a commercial insurance, possibilities to cover (part 
of) these costs however can substantially facilitate the introduction of such a CRSS. Possibilities to cover 
those losses that are not targeted via the national veterinary fund or the review of Decision 2009/470/EC 
could be voluntary mutual insurance schemes.  
In such schemes it seems appropriate to include compensation for the consequential/indirect losses of those 
farms where all animals were culled as well as farms within surveillance and movement restriction zones.  
A major drawback for compensating consequential losses is the fact that they are difficult to determine. 
Most of the time they only can be estimated after the outbreak ended and the situation is back to business 
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as usual. Therefore, in case part of these consequential losses will be compensated beforehand, a fixed sum 
per production unit is set by farmer and mutual or commercial insurance company can be agreed upon. 
It seems neither favourable nor feasible to compensate for losses due trade restrictions. The reasons for this 
are that: 
 
 these costs cannot be determined explicitly; 
 and the whole sector in a MS is confronted with these losses at the same time. Insurance would 
mean that farmers would pay for their own losses.  
There is some substantial benefit of introducing coverage of consequential/indirect losses adjacent to the 
CRSS targeted via the national veterinarian fund or the review of Decision 2009/470/EC. These are: 
 
 Improvement of the acceptability of the CRSS by the private sector. As seen from the response of 
Copa-Cogeca possibilities for coverage of consequential/indirect losses are important for the private 
sector. 
 Implementation of a voluntary scheme to cover consequential/indirect losses would facilitate the 
implementation of preventive measures since premium differentiation could be based on this im-
plementation. 
Voluntary mutual insurance schemes can cover those losses that are not targeted via the national veterinar-
ian fund. Premiums in such schemes paid by farmers should be risk dependent. A MS can for example sup-
port the participation of farmers to this fund by subsidizing the premiums paid to this mutual.  
The uptake of a PPP by farmers could be improved by connecting the PPP with coverage of the consequen-
tial/indirect losses. Especially coverage of those costs that are due to business interruption of farms in which 
animals are culled or farms in a surveillance or movement restriction zone could facilitate this uptake.  
It is at the moment under investigation whether art. 68, 69, 70 and 71 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 
of 19 January 2009 (establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the Common 
Agricultural Policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 
1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003) can be used 
to allow premium subsidy of farmers by MS. Note that Member States at the moment may provide for fi-
nancial compensation to be paid to farmers for economic losses caused by the outbreak of animal disease by 
way of financial contributions to mutual funds (Article 70, EU, COM(2008) 306). 
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6. Impact assessment of the proposed EU harmonized 
framework for a CRSS 
The impact of the proposed EU harmonised framework for a CRSS (policy option 3A described in detail in 
paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2) is assessed. This will be done in two complementary steps. The characteristics of this 
policy option are displayed in table 6.1. First, based on historical data, the impact on reimbursement per-
centages of the proposed CRSS is analysed (past). Second a modelling approach is used to study the behav-
iour of the framework for a period of the next 10 years (future). 
 
Table 6.1.: Summary of the characteristics of the CRSS. 
Bonus Malus system 
Bonus per year with no outbreak 1% 
 Total direct cost of an outbreak 
 Smaller than 1 million 
€ 
Between 1 and 9 mil-
lion € 
Higher than 9 million 
€  
Malus 1% 5% 10% 
Upper reimbursement level 60% Lower reimbursement 
level 
40% 
Reimbursement reduction current outbreak 
Reduction in current reim-
bursement  
10% If direct costs of current outbreak exceed 9 mil-
lion € all costs above this level have this reduc-
tion 
PPP compulsory   
    
6.1. Impact assessment of CRSS based on historical analysis 
The objective of this historical analysis is to determine what would have been the budgetary consequences 
for the EU up to 2010 if the proposed CRSS would have been implemented in 1997. The proposed CRSS for 
each MS is analysed given their historical outbreak data and claims due to infections with CSF, FMD and 
HPAI. For this the total direct cost of outbreaks were analysed based on the payments done by the EU vet-
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erinary fund. Although the actual payments of outbreaks were sometimes done in a time span of several 
years, in our calculations they were treated as having occurred in the first year the outbreak was reported.  
 
Table 6.2: Analysis of total direct costs of outbreaks of CSF, FMD and AI in MS in period 1997-2010 
 costs (€) 
Total direct costs of all outbreaks   1,722,884,488 
EU contribution from the Emergency Fund 971,244,107 
  
Average total direct costs per outbreak 36,242,563  
25 percentile  742,977  
50 percentile  3,589,734  
75 percentile  9,047,565  
 
As can be seen from table 6.2 the distribution of costs per outbreaks of CSF, FMD and AI is highly skewed. A 
large number of outbreaks have relatively low costs: 50 % of the outbreaks have total direct cost of less than 
3.5 Million €, whereas several outbreaks are extremely costly. This is illustrated by the fact that 25% of the 
outbreaks have cost of more than 9 Million €.  
The comparison between the current system and the BM system is shown in table 6.3.  
As can be observed from the historical analysis the total costs for the veterinary fund of the EU would be 
substantially lower (365 Million €) in the new situation compared to the present situation.  
Please note that this will be an overestimation of the costs for the veterinary fund of the EU in the new 
situation since the effect of potential additional preventive measures due to the CRSS are difficult to include 
in this analysis.  
Reasons for observed differences are:  
 
 MS’s with large outbreaks of CSF, FMD or AI would receive a smaller reimbursement compared 
to the current situation; 
 In the new situation FMD is indemnified at the same level as AI and CSF. In the present situation 
MS receive a 60% reimbursement in case of a FMD outbreak; 
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 MS’s with occasional and small outbreaks receive a higher reimbursement from the Veterinary 
Fund in the new situation compared to the present situation. 
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The impact on the annual budget for the Veterinary Fund is presented in figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2 reimbursements by EU to MS’s per year 
1  
1
The calculated original claim assumes that all cost of an outbreak is allocated to the year the outbreak was first re-
ported. The reimbursement new comprises costs for the EU budget in case the BM was adopted in 1997. The actual 
payment by the Veterinary Fund to the MS takes into account outbreaks with a multi-year duration and thus a delay in 
claims.  
The calculated original claim is associated with an extreme peakedness in budgetary needs. Analysis of the 
actual payment data shows that that there is a time lag between the moment of the outbreak and the actual 
payments to a MS. Because of his the spike is less extreme than the spike of the calculated original claim. 
This spike in monetary needs from the fund is reduced in the new reimbursement scheme. However the 
spike is still substantial. This lower spike has two reasons: (1) the 10 % reduction due to large outbreak and 
(2) the MS with large claims in the past downgraded in a lower class on the BM scale. 
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Table 6.3: Total expenditure for EU for reimbursement of outbreaks of CSF, FMD and AI in the period 1997 to 
2010 compared to reimbursement in case the proposed BM system was adopted 
 
1 Reimbursement percentage in BM system. 
As already stated, in our approach all costs of an outbreak were allocated to the year of the start of the out-
break. If a similar delay is also accounted for the BM in accordance to the actual payments the annual budg-
etary needs are expected to be less volatile.  
 
6.2. Modelling approach to analyse the impact of CRSS 
The future impact of the implementation of a CRSS is expected to vary for different MS’s within the EU. 
Three groups of MS’s can be identified: 
Country Total direct cost Reimbursement new Original claim EU BM in 2010 1 
Germany 62,279,642  22,741,585  31,253,466  42% 
Belgium 24,667,625  8,644,600  12,480,208  47% 
Cyprus 308,333  185,000  185,000  60% 
Czech Republic 1,021,294  562,739  510,647  58% 
Denmark 1,099,065  644,889  549,533  59% 
Spain 72,092,367  24,877,710  36,046,183  48% 
France 8,875,232  4,881,377  5,325,139  57% 
Greece 7,400,517  3,565,743  4,440,310  51% 
Hungary 2,000,000  1,180,000  1,000,000  57% 
Ireland 9,027,135  4,874,653  5,416,281  57% 
Italy 90,354,276  38,852,339  45,177,138  52% 
Luxembourg 3,179,468  1,748,707  1,589,734  57% 
The Netherlands 475,146,124  171,681,033  249,343,408  42% 
Poland 1,690,000  1,014,000  845,000  57% 
Portugal 100,170  60,102  50,085  60% 
Slovakia 968,356  550,091  484,178  55% 
United Kingdom 962,674,884  319,595,854  576,547,767  43% 
MS’s without outbreak     60% 
Total 1,722,884,488  605,660,421  971,244,107   
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1. MS’s with densely populated livestock areas (e.g. Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Spain); 
2. Old member states with mainly medium or sparsely populated livestock areas (e.g. Finland, Sweden, 
Austria); 
3. New member states with mainly medium or sparsely populated livestock areas (e.g. Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Romania). 
To assess the future impact of the presented policy options, from each category one MS is selected for an in-
depth analysis. The selected MS’s are for category 1: The Netherlands, for category 2: Finland, and for cate-
gory 3: Romania. 
 
6.2.1. Epidemiological risk analysis  
To evaluate the future impact, an epidemiological risk assessment of outbreaks or epidemics for the se-
lected diseases CSF, FMD and HPAI is conducted. The consequences of new outbreaks of these notifiable 
diseases are described. Historical data is used to estimate the frequency and size of future outbreaks. Here 
we use the term “outbreak” for an animal infection spreading on one particular farm, and use the term 
“epidemic” for an infection spreading across farms.  
 
For each particular disease, the assessment falls apart into two parts, namely: 
 
 Part 1: estimation of the probability of occurrence of an outbreak or an epidemic;  
 Part 2: estimation of the size of epidemic.  
Despite their irregular occurrence, the patterns of spread (both between animals and between farms) of 
contagious diseases seen in the past as well as the observed effect of eradication strategies both provide a 
useful basis for estimation of the risk of spread once an introduction of the infectious agent has occurred. 
For example, past patterns of between-farm spread of former OIE List-A diseases such as CSF, FMD and HPAI 
have shown that the risk of spread is very much dependent on the characteristics of the sector in the area or 
region where the disease is introduced. Also, the risk of introduction itself will generally be subject to re-
gional variation. Therefore, usually the risk related to livestock epidemics has to be calculated with refer-
ence to a particular region. The important epidemic diseases, such as FMD, CSF and HPAI produce low-
probability-high-consequence risks in specific regions of interest. 
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Part 1: Risk of Introduction of notifiable diseases 
Because of the lessons learned in MS’s that have actually experienced outbreaks in the past, it is fair to say 
that these experiences have resulted in a higher awareness and motivation to put in place preventive meas-
ures in those MS’s. This also means that it is reasonable to analyse the data for 3 different periods in order 
to come to a final (subjective) estimate of the risk of introduction of a notifiable disease for a specific MS: a) 
period of the last 20 years; b) period of the last 15 years; c) period of the last 10 years. 
 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 
The Netherlands 
In the last 20 years, the Netherlands experienced once a FMD introduction (in 2001). This results in a prob-
ability of introduction of FMD of once per twenty years. In the last ten years, there was one FMD introduc-
tion into the Netherlands. In the last 2-3 years, the number of ruminants imported (in particular veal calves) 
from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and the Baltic states (close to Turkey and Russia, where FMD outbreaks are 
still occurring) has increased with 50%. Taking this into account, it is assumed that the present risk of intro-
duction of FMD into the Netherlands is once per 10 years. 
Finland 
The last outbreak of FMD in Finland was in 1959, meaning that Finland has been free of this particular dis-
ease in the last 51 years. Information on import of live bovines, sheep and goats from the areas where FMD 
is still circulating close to the borders of the EU (Turkey, Russian Federation) were checked via Eurostat sta-
tistics (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/). It appears that Finland has not imported any animal from 
these species from those areas in the last 10 years. Based on this information, it is assumed that the present 
risk of introduction of FMD into Finland is roughly once per 50 years.  
Romania 
The last outbreak of FMD reported in Romania was in 1973, meaning that Romania has been free of this par-
ticular disease in the last 37 years. However, Romania is close to Turkey and Russia, where FMD outbreaks 
are still occurring. Information on import of live bovines, sheep and goats to Romania from the areas where 
FMD is still circulating close to the borders of the EU (Turkey, Russian Federation) reveals that Romania has 
not imported any animal from these species from those areas in the last 10 years. Based on this information, 
it is assumed that the present risk of introduction of FMD into Romania is once per 35 years.  
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Classical Swine Fever (CSF).  
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands had outbreaks of CSF in 1990, 1992 and 1997. This results in a probability of introduction of 
CSF of three per twenty years, or approximately once per seven years. Overall, it is assumed that the present 
risk of introduction of CSF into the Netherlands is once per 15 years since hygienic measures have improved 
substantially since the last CSF outbreak. 
Finland  
The last outbreak of CSF in Finland was in 1917, meaning that Finland has been free of this particular disease 
in the last 93 years. Based on this information, it is assumed that the present risk of introduction of CSF into 
Finland is once per 100 years.  
Romania 
Before the year 2000, the last outbreak of CSF in Romania was reported in 1974. In Romania, CSF outbreaks 
were reported in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2007. This results in a risk of introduction of CSF of six 
per twenty years, or once per three-and-a-half years. If you take a period of the last fifteen years, the risk of 
introduction of CSF was six per 15 years, or once per two-and-a-half years. Overall, it is assumed that the 
present risk of introduction of CSF into Romania is once per three years. 
 
Notifiable Avian Influenza (NAI) 
The risk of introduction of NAI consists of the risk of introduction of LPNAI and the subsequent probability of 
mutation of LPAI towards HPAI, and the probability of direct introduction of HPAI. 
Only a certain (unknown) proportion of notifiable LPAI introductions will mutate to HPAI. In an earlier study 
in the Netherlands this probability is guessed to be approximately 0.15 (or once in 7 years). 
Since 2004, a serological monitoring system has been put in operation in Member States of the EU to detect 
introductions of notifiable LPAI in commercial poultry.  
In Table 6.4, the results of the EU serological monitoring system for detection of notifiable LPAI introduc-
tions are shown for Finland, Romania and the Netherlands. 
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Table 6.4.: Years in which one or more notifiable LPAI introductions were detected via the EU serological 
monitoring system (available for 2004-2008). 
Source: (http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/eu_resp_surveillance) 
Netherlands 
The last HPAI epidemic in commercial poultry in The Netherlands was reported in 2003. It is assumed that an 
introduction of LPAI of H7N7 subtype in one poultry barn mutated to a HPAI subtype in another poultry barn 
on the same poultry farm. Seventy-five years before, the first HPAI outbreak was reported in the Nether-
lands (in the same area as the epidemic in 2003). In 2004 and 2006, LPAI introductions (in layers and swans) 
detected via the EU serological monitoring system were reported from the Netherlands. Based on this in-
formation, it is assumed that the present risk of introduction of NAI in commercial poultry into the Nether-
lands is once per 5 years.  
Finland  
There has not been any HPAI outbreak reported – not in commercial poultry or in wild birds - in Finland in 
the last 100 years. In 2006, 2007 and 2008 LPAI introductions (in ducks and geese, not in poultry) detected 
via the EU serological monitoring system were reported from Finland. Based on this information, it is as-
sumed that the present risk of introduction of NAI in commercial poultry into Finland is once per 50 years.  
Romania 
Before 2000, the last HPAI epidemic in commercial poultry in Romania was in 1942. Since 2000, HPAI out-
breaks in commercial poultry in Romania were reported in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. So, in the last ten 
years there have been 4 years with HPAI outbreaks, or once per two and a half years. On top of that, from 
2007 and 2008 statistics, LPAI introductions were reported in 2007 for Romania (see Table 1). Based on this 
information, it is assumed that the present risk of introduction of NAI in commercial poultry into Romania is 
once per two years.  
 
 
 Detected introductions of LPAI (H5 or H7 subtype) via the serological moni-
toring system 
Year Finland Romania Netherlands 
2004 no - yes 
2005 no - no 
2006 yes - yes 
2007 yes yes no 
2008 yes no no 
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Table 6.5.: Summary table with probabilities of outbreaks of FMD, CSF, and AI 
 
 
Part 2 Estimation of the size and duration of future epidemics 
The extent at which FMD, CSF and HPAI occur depends firstly on the risk of introduction as discussed in the 
previous part and is furthermore influenced by the local epidemiological situation. This is characterised by 
the following aspects: 
 
 Farm density and animal density (of the susceptible species); 
 Contact structure between these farms; 
 Preventive measures (at farm level and at national level); 
 Surveillance systems and early warning systems; 
 Speed of implementation and efficacy of control measures. 
 
We will give an overview of the epidemiological situation in the three MS’s that are used as an example in 
this study. 
The Netherlands is used as a basic information source, because recent studies have been performed on 
Dutch data, analysing these questions regarding HPAI (Backer et al., 2011) FMD (Backer et al., 2009) and CSF 
(Backer et al., 2007)]. Thus, these studies have been used as a starting point in evaluating the situation in the 
two other MS’s. This was supplemented with further information from scientific literature and background 
information regarding the MS as such, including EUROSTAT data on farm and animal densities. 
For all three infections, the Netherlands is a high density (i.e. high transmission risk) MS, with an also high 
introduction risk due to a lot of import and export. Because of this high risk situation, the country has (re-
cent) experience with the detection and control of these epidemics. The Netherlands has also invested in 
fundamental epidemiological research regarding prevention and control of these epidemics, and tends to 
apply more rigorous control measures than the minimum that is foreseen in the EU regulations. The Nether-
lands has also invested in high quality surveillance and early detection systems, as one of the measures to 
 Chance outbreak 1/xx years 
 Netherlands Finland Romania 
FMD, 1 outbreak per .. years 15 50 35 
CSF, 1 outbreak per .. years 20 100 3 
AI, 1 outbreak per .. years 10 50 2 
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minimize the High Risk Period (HRP), i.e. the period between introduction of the infection in a country and 
its detection, followed by control measures. Minimizing the HRP has a very strong reducing effect on the to-
tal size of epidemics, especially in terms of infected herds. 
Finland has a much lower farm and animal density, which leads to a relatively low risk of major epidemics of 
all three of these infections. Although detection may be somewhat slower than in the Netherlands, this is 
easily compensated by the much slower spread that can be expected in areas with lower farm density. 
Finland has a low risk and also little experience with the control of epidemics. 
Romania is a MS with a substantial variability in farm types and especially the level of professionalism at 
which these farms are run differs amongst them. It comprises of large very professionally run farms which 
are found at a low density in this country, but also contains a large number of extremely small (backyard) 
farms, with only a few ducks, chickens, pigs and ruminants (high farm density and low animal density). The 
contact structures are strongly separated by farm type, but cross-infection is still likely, since backyard farms 
are found throughout the country. Control of CSF, using vaccination, is still not very successful, probably due 
to continued introduction of the infection via (illegal) cross-border contacts with the Ukraine (Twinning re-
port, 2000). The country has experienced recent epidemics of AI and has experience with the detection and 
control of this infection too. 
As such, these three MS’s surely cover the diversity of the EU- wide epidemiological situation and are there-
fore good representatives of this spectrum. 
Several aspects of the epidemiology are especially relevant for this project. Generally, good data to answer 
the questions regarding these aspects are available in the Netherlands. Less information is available from 
Finland and Romania. Therefore extrapolation methods are applied to estimate the effect of the different 
situation in these countries as compared to the Netherlands (or more comparable countries with good data 
on these aspects). 
 
The specific aspects that are addressed here are:  
 
 Expected epidemic size; 
 Expected duration of the epidemic;  
 The uncertainty in the epidemic size and the duration of the HRP and the duration of the epi-
demic; 
 When relevant, we also discuss the likelihood and extent of spread and the estimated duration 
of the High Risk Period (HRP). 
(The first two aspects incorporate an analysis of the efficacy of control measures): 
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Foot and Mouth Disease 
The density of farms with FMD susceptible animals in Finland is much lower than in the Netherlands, which 
leads to far less transmission after the HRP, while during the HRP most transmission will be driven by animal 
transport, making it less dependent on farm density. Thus, the resulting epidemics in Finland will be compa-
rable to those in low density area epidemics in the Netherlands.  
The farm density in Romania is higher than the density in the Netherlands. However, if the backyard farms 
are not considered as separate farms, and we evaluate the village-farms as epidemiological units similar to 
the above, then the farm densities in Romania is similar to or lower than the density in Finland. We there-
fore expect that epidemics in Romania will behave similarly; although detection and reporting in backyard 
farms is probably different from detection and reporting in professional farms, it is hard to assess in which 
way this difference will influence an epidemic. 
 
The Netherlands 
In the present Dutch contingency plans for FMD outbreaks the vaccination-to-live is adopted. Recent studies 
on the on the effect of a vaccination-to-live strategy in an area of 2 km around infected farms showed that 
numbers of (preventively) culled animals decreases substantially compared to the previous applied strategy 
(ring culling in a 1or 2 km area) (Backer et al. 2009).  
For the economic evaluation of the CRSS, the Dutch situation is taken as an example for densely populated 
areas in North-West Europe. However at present other MS’s do not implement a vaccination-to-live strat-
egy. Therefore for the Dutch situation two control scenarios were evaluated namely: 1) based on the pre-
sent vaccination-to-live scenario and 2) a culling scenario in which besides infected farms also on farms in a 
radius of 1 km all susceptible animals are culled. In table 6.6 a and 6.6b the expected size and duration of 
outbreaks of FMD are given.  
 
 
Table 6.6a: Estimated size of an outbreak of FMD in the Netherlands (EU strategy and vaccination–to-live) 
 duration cattle farms pig farms sheep farms 
 in days Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. 
Average 37 24 31 408 1 10 148 0.4 12 134 
5% perc. 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95% perc. 91 102 136 1808 6 58 742 2 38 590 
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(Modified after Backer et al., 2009) 
Table 6.6b: Estimated size of an outbreak of FMD in the Netherlands (EU strategy and culling in 1 km around 
infected farms) 
 
 duration cattle farms pig farms sheep farms 
 in days Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. Infected Prev. 
culled 
Vac. 
Average 30 16 151  1 59  0 47  
5% perc. 5 2 5  0 0  0 3  
95% perc. 75 58 723  3 344  2 175  
(Modified after Backer et al., 2009) 
Finland 
Summarizing, for Finland we find that an epidemic is expected to be characterized by (between brackets 5% 
and 95% percentile values): Number of infected farms 10 (3 – 50), the duration of the outbreak will be about 
3 months (2 – 4). Those 10 farms are expected to have 300 cattle, 1000 pigs and 100 sheep.  
Romania 
An FMD epidemic is expected to infect about 20 (village-) farms (5 – 50), duration about 4 months (2 to 6) 
with a limited number of animals affected. We expect 50 cattle, 50 pigs and 100 sheep. The range in Roma-
nia is wide, since with a rather low probability (<5%) some of the professional farms will get infected, leading 
to a much higher estimate of the numbers of animals on affected farms (higher end estimate cattle 500 and 
pigs 2000 and 1000 sheep). 
 
Classical Swine Fever 
Substantial information is available regarding the risk of introduction of CSF for the Netherlands; also the 
spread and control of the infection are well studied. For Finland and Romania, an assessment will be based 
on the broad knowledge of, and experience with CSF especially in the Netherlands, but also in other Euro-
pean countries. Romania has had major problems with CSF in the last decade, and most pigs have been vac-
cinated during this period. The density of pig farms is quite high in the Netherlands and it is 20 times lower 
in Finland. In Romania the density of pig farms is extremely high, if all backyard farms are counted as sepa-
rate farms. If the backyard farms are considered as one unit per village, then the farm density is more com-
parable to the pig farm density in the Netherlands. However, the strongly regulated animal transport in the 
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Netherlands will lead to a lower number of infected farms at first detection of the infection. In some areas in 
Romania controlling the epidemic may require extended control measures, similar to high density areas in 
Belgium and in the Netherlands.  
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the vaccination-to-live strategy is adopted contingency plans for CSF. Recent studies on 
the effect of a vaccination –to- live strategy in an area of 2 km around infected farms showed that numbers 
of (preventively) culled animals decreases substantially. In culling strategies in which farms in an area of 1 
km around infected farms are culled the number of preventively culled farms is half the total number of vac-
cinated farms in vaccination strategies.  
For the economic evaluation of the CRSS, the Dutch situation is taken as an example for densely populated 
areas in North-West Europe. However at present other MS’s do not implement a vaccination-to-live strat-
egy. Therefore for the Dutch situation two control scenarios were evaluated. 1) based on the present vacci-
nation-to-live scenario and 2) a culling scenario in which besides on infected farms also on farms in a radius 
of 1 km all susceptible animals are culled.  
In table 6.7a and 6.7b the expected size and duration of outbreaks of CSF are given.  
 
 
Table 6.7a: Expected size of an outbreak of CSF in the Netherlands (EU strategy and vaccination–to-live) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Modified after Bergevoet et al. 2007)  
 duration fattening farm breeding farms 
 in days  Infected Prev. culled Vac. Infected Prev. culled Vac. 
Average  61 6 3 54 3 1 26 
5% perc. 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 
95% perc. 160 18 12 237 10 6 113 
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Table 6.7b: Expected size of an outbreak of CSF in the Netherlands (EU strategy and culling in 1 km) 
 
 (Modified after Bergevoet et al. 2007) 
 
Finland 
If an epidemic occurs in Finland, we estimate that under normal EU control measures, this epidemic will be 
controlled quite easily, and depending on the area and the number of infected farms at the time of detec-
tion, the epidemic can vary from small to medium and can be characterised as follows(between brackets 5% 
and 95% percentile values): expected size of the outbreak 3 infected farms (1 to 40), duration 60 (30 - 90) 
days, and number of pigs on infected farms: 2500 (200 to 20 000). 
Romania 
If an epidemic occurs in Romania, while all pigs are susceptible (not vaccinated), than we expect a large epi-
demic, which will be difficult to control. It is difficult to assess the interaction between large professional 
farms and backyard farms. However, given the expected size of the epidemic, it is likely that professional 
farms will get affected too. To enable quantification of the epidemic size also under those conditions, we as-
sume that vaccination will be applied, especially since vaccination against CSF has been used regularly in 
Romania.  
Thus we expect 50 (village-) farms (5 to 500) to get infected. Duration will be 6 months (2 to 12) and the 
number of pigs involved will be 500 (200 to 20 000). Although many farms will get involved, the total num-
ber of pigs infected, remains rather low, because most backyard farms only have one or two pigs. 
 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
The Netherlands 
For the Netherlands there is a recent study available, which answers the main questions required. The den-
sity of poultry farms in the Netherlands is low, but locally there are areas with extremely high farm density. 
 duration fattening farm breeding farms 
 in days  Infected Prev. culled Vac. Infected Prev. culled Vac. 
Average  64 6 26  3 13  
5% perc. 5 1 0  0 0  
95% perc. 184 22 99  10 46  
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Those are the areas where AI-epidemics can lead to major problems, while outbreaks in other areas are less 
likely and less problematic. For Finland and Romania, the assessment will be based on these results, put into 
perspective of the local situation with lower farm density and lower animal density, which reduces the ex-
pected scale of the epidemic substantially, and the size of these countries with low intensity infrastructure, 
which may lead to delayed implementation of control measures, as a negative aspect. Romania has recently 
experienced an H5N1 AI epidemic, which offers very important supporting information for this assessment4. 
 
Table 6.8.: Outbreaks of HPAI in the Netherlands (EU strategy +Culling in 1 km around infected farms) 
 
(Source Backer et al., forthcoming.) 
In Table 6.8 the expected duration and size of an epidemic of HPAI are presented. We find that an HPAI epi-
demic in a high density poultry area (more than 0.8 farms per km2) in the Netherlands can be very costly, 
since a relatively large number of farms will get infected and even more need to be culled. In sparsely popu-
lated poultry areas (<0.2 farms per km2) only a few farms will become infected, while even in medium popu-
lated poultry areas the number of infected farms easily rises over 100. To limit the extent of the outbreak 
besides EU requirements additional measures have to be taken. Culling in a radius of 1 km around infected 
farms is foreseen.  
Although a large fraction of the Netherlands is sparsely populated with poultry farms, most farms are found 
in the medium or densely populated areas. Therefore, the probability of an epidemic of less than 10 farms is 
very small (<5%), while the probability of an epidemic of more than 100 farms is very large (>50%) 
Finland 
                                                 
 
4
 Oral communications with veterinary service officials during Twinning projects Netherlands - Romania in 2002 – 2004 
 
 Duration  Poultry farms 
 In days Infected Prev. culled  Total culled 
Average 47 84 214 297 
5% perc. 0 1 11 12 
95% perc. 99 235 334 548 
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The density of poultry farms in Finland is high compared to the Netherlands; while the average farm size is 
much lower (100 to 500). It is not clear whether there are local clusters of very high density areas of poultry 
farms, but we assume a few smaller clusters, still with lower density than the Dutch high density areas. This 
aspect may actually affect the results strongly, but without more detailed spatial information, this cannot be 
addressed in detail. Based on this information we expect that an epidemic will affect on average 100 farms, 
ranging from 2 to 500, with a duration of 80 days (30 to 150 days) and 20 000 chickens (2000 to 500 000). 
Romania 
In 2005 and 2006 Romania had an AI H5N1 epidemic, which was probably introduced by wild birds. The epi-
demic mainly spread amongst the small backyard farms, and to control it, occasionally all poultry in villages 
was culled. Amongst the professional farms only a few became infected during those epidemics, probably 
caused by one introduction in the professional production chain. 
Based on the distribution of large professional farms and numerous but small backyard farms with much 
higher transmission risk, we can either expect a rather small epidemic in professional farms or an epidemic 
in many very small farms. Villages or neighbourhoods with numerous backyard farms could be addressed as 
risk units, because of the large interaction between (free ranging) poultry within a village. That also implies 
that if animals in a village are found positive, then the whole poultry flock of the village needs to be assessed 
and possibly culled. Such a “village-farm” is still much smaller in size than professional farms, but due to the 
very open contact structure, they contribute more to transmission between farms. Based on these aspects 
and the differences in farm density, we estimated the size of an AI epidemic in Romania. The average den-
sity of chicken farms is higher than the critical density (calculated in the Netherlands) above which the basic 
EU control measures will be not sufficient to control the epidemic. However, when the villages are clustered 
as a unit, the density of farms immediately reduces significantly, to a level substantially below the critical 
density. In the HRP we expect fast spread due to the open structure of the backyard farms, thus the number 
of infected farms at detection is assumed to be high, but once control of the epidemic has started, in most 
areas control is expected to be quite effective. 
All together we estimate the size of the total epidemic in number of farms comparable to the Netherlands, 
while the duration of the total epidemic will be shorter and the number of animals culled will be much 
lower. The probability of professional farms getting involved in an epidemic is low compared to backyard 
farms.  
In numbers: the expected number of (village-) farms infected and culled is estimated at 50, the duration of 
the epidemic is estimated at 50 days and the number of animals culled is estimated at 5000. The 95% per-
centile 450 farms, 90 days and 1.000.000 animals. The skewed tail of the distribution leads to an enormous 
increase in the number of animals, because of the potential epidemic in professional farms.  
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6.2.2. Economic risk analysis 
In this paragraph the results of the economic risk analysis are presented for the proposed CRSS in compari-
son with the current reimbursement system.  
Table 6.9 gives the probability that a 10 year period will elapse without an outbreak in the MS’s under re-
search, as well as the average number of outbreaks.  
 
Table 6.9.: Probability of NO outbreak in a 10 year period  
 
Given the assumptions made the risk of an outbreak for Finland is relatively limited.  
The average probability is 60% that Finland will have no claim from the Veterinary Fund in a 10 year period. 
For Romania this probability of having no outbreaks and thus no claims is approximately 0%, which is mainly 
caused by a high probability of having (multiple) outbreaks of CSF an AI. For the Netherlands the probability 
of having an outbreak is moderate for the diseases separately. However the joint probability of having no 
outbreak at all is only 12% during the whole period. 
The expected number of outbreaks varies between the three MS’s accordingly. Finland is expected to be 
confronted with 0.51 outbreaks per 10 year period of either FMD, CSF or AI, whereas in Romania this is 6.97 
outbreaks per 10 year period.  
 
 Disease Netherlands Finland Romania 
Probability of 10 years 
with no outbreak 
FMD 54% 80% 76% 
CSF 62% 91% 3% 
AI 35% 82% 1% 
FMD/CSF/AI 12% 60% 0% 
Expected number of 
outbreaks per 10 year 
period 
FMD 0.61 0.22 0.26 
CSF 0.48 0.10 2.91 
AI 0.96 0.20 3.91 
FMD/CSF/AI 2.06 0.51 6.97 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 87 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Figure 6.3 Reimbursement percentages at the end of a 10 year period 
 
The expected reimbursement percentage at the end of the first 10 year period is shown in Figure 6.3. The 
expected reimbursement percentage amounts to 52%, 48% and 46% for Finland, Romania and the Nether-
lands respectively (Figure 6.3). On average, Finland will move upward on the BM scale and the Netherlands 
and Romania will descent in comparison to the initial reimbursement percentage of 50%. In a favourable 
disease free period each MS will have achieved the maximum reimbursement percentage of 60%. However 
the negative impact of especially large outbreaks (10% reduction) is substantial. 
The average direct costs per outbreak for the MS’s under study are presented in table 6.10. The highest av-
erage costs per outbreak are expected for FMD in the Netherlands (46.5 million € per outbreak in the vacci-
nation-to-live scenario and 70.9 million € in the culling in a 1 km radius around infected farms). Lowest aver-
age costs are simulated for FMD outbreaks in Romania (11.8 million € per outbreak). 
Commission Regulation (EC) no 349/2005 defines which costs made by a MS to control are eligible for com-
pensation by the EU. Of the calculated direct costs these are the cost related to Compensation of farmers for 
culled animals, culling of animals and disinfection of the premises, destruction of culled animals and in case 
of vaccination the costs of vaccination. Direct costs that are not eligible for compensation are costs related 
to screening and sampling (including materials needed), taxation and costs to enforce the movement restric-
tions during an outbreak. These costs typically have to be borne by the government of the MS.   
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Table 6.10: Average total direct costs of an outbreak of FMD, CSF and AI (million €) 
  Netherlands Finland Romania 
 
(vaccination 
2km)
 
 
(culling 1 km) 
 
FMD Total direct costs/outbreak 46.5 70.9 27.9 11.8 
 Of which Eligible under EC 
349/2005 
39.5 43.5 0.7 0.1 
CSF Total direct costs/outbreak 16.0 21.2 18.0 24.5 
 Of which Eligible under EC 
349/2005 
6.9 6.9 0.8 0.1 
AI Total direct costs/outbreak  16.0 14.8 12.5 
 Of which Eligible under EC 
349/2005 
 4.5 0.1 0.1 
(Average result of 20000 iterations) 
 
For all three MS’s, the distribution of outbreak costs is highly skewed. Those outbreaks in which a large 
number of farms are involved and thus cause high associated costs affect the average outcome considera-
bly. The median is less profound than the average implying that most outbreaks will have substantially lower 
costs than the reported average outcomes.  
Although the frequency of outbreaks in Finland is relative low, the average direct costs of an outbreak are 
rather high. Note that the average direct costs per outbreak for FMD outbreaks in Finland are comparable to 
those published by Niemi (2008).  
The average direct costs of an outbreak of FMD and CSF in the Netherlands in the vaccination-to-live strat-
egy are substantially lower than the incurred costs of outbreaks in the strategy in which culling in a 1 km ra-
dius around infected farms is applied.  
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With respect to the direct losses, Figures 6.4a, 6.4b, and 6.4c reveal that the relative importance of the cost-
ing components differ between MS’s and diseases. In sparsely populated livestock areas, such as Finland, di-
rect losses are primarily caused by enforcement costs, which costs are not eligible for compensation under 
Regulation EC349/2005 In densely populated livestock areas, such as the Netherlands, direct losses are 
originating from a mixture of costing components (e.g., enforcement, screening, cost of culling animals, dis-
infection of farms and sampling). Diseases which cause relative small outbreaks are associated with relative 
high enforcement costs and relative low eligible costs (e, compensation, cost of culling and destruction of 
animals, disinfection of farms and screening and sampling costs). 
 
 
*marked costs are eligible for compensation under regulation EC 349/2005  
Figure 6.4a Distribution of direct costs between different cost components in the Netherlands 
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*marked costs are eligible for compensation under regulation EC 349/2005  
Figure 6.5b Distribution of direct costs between different cost components in Finland 
 
 
*marked costs are eligible for compensation under regulation EC 349/2005  
Figure 6.5c Distribution of direct costs between different cost components in Romania 
Expected total costs in a 10 year period 
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The product of the outbreak probability and the cost per epidemic results in the total costs per disease. The 
average direct (both eligible and non-eligible) losses are particularly high for FMD in the Netherlands com-
pared to Finland and Romania (Table 6.11). Also AI outbreaks in the Netherlands are more expensive to con-
trol compared to AI outbreaks in Finland and Romania.  
Analysing the allocation between costing components reveals that eligible costs can be substantial in 
densely populated livestock areas (e.g., The Netherlands), both in absolute values and in relative terms. In 
mainly medium or sparsely populated livestock areas (e.g., Finland and Romania) eligible costs are relative 
minor compared to the more general non-eligible enforcement costs. The reason for this is that in sparsely 
populated area the number of farms and the number of animals that have to be culled is small, whereas in 
the same area as in densely populated area surveillance activities and movement restrictions have to be ap-
plied.  
Table 6.11: Expected future average total direct costs of FMD, CSF and AI in a 10 year period and alloca-
tion between eligible and non-eligible cost according to EC no. 349/2005 
  Cost in million €  Percentage 
  Total Non-eligible 
costs 
Eligible costs  Non-eligible 
costs 
Eligible costs 
The Netherlands (vaccination) 
 FMD  30.45 17.54 12.91  58% 42% 
 CSF 7.72 6.79 0.93  88% 12% 
The Netherlands (culling strategy) 
 FMD  46.74 18.97 27.77  41% 59% 
 CSF 10.33 7.08 3.25  69% 31% 
 AI 16.12 12.02 4.10  75% 25% 
Finland 
 FMD  5.06 4.92 0.14  97% 3% 
 CSF 1.32 1.25 0.08  94% 6% 
 AI 2.96 2.95 0.01  100% 0% 
Romania 
 FMD  3.38 3.36 0.02  99% 1% 
 CSF 51.76 51.59 0.16  100% 0% 
 AI 36.00 35.97 0.04  100% 0% 
EU contribution under a Bonus Malus system 
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The final step in the mathematical modelling approach is to calculate the expected total direct costs and EU 
contribution under the BM compared with the present EU compensation scheme. The average EU costs for 
compensating eligible costs of infections with CSF, FMD and AI are merged for a 10 year period (Table 6.12).  
 
Table 6.12: Expected future eligible costs for the EU Veterinary Fund in a 10 year period under BM or pre-
sent system (in Million €)  
 Average 5% 50% 95% 
The Netherlands (vaccination) 
Average EU costs /period (€)- BM  13.34 0 8.33 46.63 
Average EU costs/period(€) –
present system 
15.15 0 8.59 55.36 
The Netherlands (culling)  
Average EU costs /period (€)- BM  15.49 0 5.25 78.69 
Average EU costs/period(€) –
present system 
17.75 0 5.13 93.89 
Finland 
Average EU costs /period (€)- BM 0.12 0 0 0.52 
Average EU costs/period(€) –
present system 
0.12 0 0 0.48 
Romania 
Average EU costs /period (€)- BM 0.11 0.03 0.1 0.20 
Average EU costs/period(€) –
present system 
0.11 0.03 0.1 0.20 
 
On average, the BM has a limited impact for the Veterinary fund if focused on those MS’s with infrequent 
outbreaks and sparsely populated livestock areas (e.g., Finland). MS’s with densely populated livestock areas 
(e.g., the Netherlands) will receive under the hypothetical BM on average a lower reimbursement .Please 
note again that this will be an overestimation of the EU and MS costs in the new situation since the effect of 
potential additional preventive measures due to the CRSS are difficult to ascertain and not included in this 
analysis. 
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Irrespectively of livestock density or frequency a MS will be confronted with a lower reimbursement if they 
will incur one or more large outbreaks in the coming 10 year period. For the BM example, considering the 
distribution of total cost for the Veterinary Fund there is a 95-percent probability that EU payments to the 
Netherlands are less than 46.6million € per 10 years under the vaccination-to-live strategy and 78.6 million € 
under the culling strategy . Alternatively formulated, there is a five-percent probability that the EU payments 
to the Netherlands exceed more than this amount. Under the present system there is a 5-percent probabil-
ity that EU payments to the Netherlands exceed 55.3 million € per 10 years for the vaccination-to-live strat-
egy and 93.8 million € for the culling strategy. 
6.2.3. Sensitivity analysis 
The BM has two specific characteristics in compensating future outbreaks, namely the bonus element and 
the malus element. In addition, a reduction is foreseen for on-going large outbreaks (10% in the current hy-
pothetical example). The impact of these three distinct characteristics is determined by analysing their im-
pact separately (table 6.13) 
 
Table 6.13: Expected future eligible costs for the Veterinary Fund in a 10 year period under (a partial) BM 
system or present system (in *Million €)  
 BM Only 
Bonus
1
 
Only 
Malus
2
 
Only reduc-
tion reim-
bursement 
large out-
breaks
3
 
 
Present 
system 
The Netherlands (vaccination 2km) 
Average EU costs /period (€)  13.35 16.34 13.79 13.20 15.16 
The Netherlands (culling 1km) 
Average EU costs /period (€)  15.49 18.14 16.19 15.22 17.75 
Finland 
Average EU costs /period (€) 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.12 
Romania 
Average EU costs /period (€) 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 
1
 1% bonus for each year without an outbreak,
 2 
1 % reduction for each outbreak < 1 M€, 5% reduction in future Reimbursement rate 
for each outbreak between 1 and 9 M€, 10% reduction for each outbreak > 9 M €, 
3
10% reduction in present claim that exceeds 9 
M€ 
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All MS’s will be rewarded with a higher reimbursement class if only the bonus element is taken into consid-
eration. This system will be more advantageous for those MS’s with infrequent outbreaks and thus less 
claims from the Veterinary Fund in the 10 year period under consideration (e.g., Finland). If only the malus 
element is taken into consideration all MS’s will be penalised. To which extend they will be penalised de-
pends on their claim statistics. MS’s with relative many or substantial claims from the Veterinary Fund will 
end up in the lowest reimbursement class (e.g., Romania and the Netherlands). A reduction of 10% for on-
going large outbreaks without considering a BM for future outbreaks will also reduce the total costs for the 
Veterinary Fund. MS’s with large claims will be reimbursed more often at lower levels (e.g., the Nether-
lands). 
 
The justification to balance costs and responsibilities between EU institutions, MS’s and the farming sector is 
to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication in order to reduce the impact of 
livestock epidemics on the society as a whole. The implementation of the CRSS will increase the incentives 
for MS’s and the farming sector to decrease the risk of epidemic livestock diseases. The inclusion of incen-
tives for additional measures in the CRSS (such as enhanced biosecurity and animal disease surveillance) will 
encourage stakeholders to implement more preventive systems and more effective eradication strategies. 
To what extend each of the CRSS options would help to achieve the objectives pursued by the initiative is 
not the object of this study. However to illustrate the potential of enhanced preventive behaviour and early 
reporting the impact of a 20% reduction of occurrence and outbreak size is quantitative assessed (table 
6.14). 
In relation to the analysis it can be stated that if the probability of occurrence and outbreak size is reduced 
the total costs for the Veterinary Fund will not only be reduced, but also costs borne by the MS’s and the 
farming sector will be reduced as well. The impact is most profound especially for MS’s with frequent out-
breaks (e.g., Romania) or large outbreaks (e.g., the Netherlands).  
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Table 6.14: Total costs for the Veterinary Fund in a 10 year period under BM or present system with as-
suming a more effective and efficient prevention and eradication strategy (in Million €) 
 BM BM + 
20% reduc-
tion occur-
rence 
BM+ 
20% reduc-
tion out-
break size 
BM+ 
20% reduc-
tion occur-
rence and 
outbreak 
size 
Present 
system 
The Netherlands (vaccination 2km) 
Average EU costs /period (€) 13.35 16.34 13.79 13.20 15.16 
The Netherlands (culling 1 km) 
Average EU costs /period (€) 15.49 18.14 16.19 15.22 17.75 
Finland 
Average EU costs /period (€) 0.12 0.14 0..12 0.10 0.12 
Romania 
Average EU costs /period (€) 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 
Impact of a bonus for implementing a PPP 
Only a limited number of MS’s have implemented a PPP. However such a PPP is considered to be a vital 
component of the CRSS. It provides an incentive for the responsibility sharing between government and 
stakeholders. Such a responsibility sharing is expected to contribute to a limitation of both the frequency of 
occurrence and the (financial) impact of an outbreak. This impact does not only reduce the financial load for 
the Veterinary Fund but foremost limits the impact for the stakeholders and government in the affected MS. 
Implementation of a PPP is expected not only to reduce the direct costs but also reduces the consequential 
losses for MS’s stakeholders.  
An incentive for implementing such a PPP would be an (additional) bonus on the reimbursement rate pro-
vided by the Veterinary Fund. To get an insight into the effects of such a bonus on the cost for the Veteri-
nary Fund additional calculations were performed. In these calculations a bonus of 5% for the three MS for 
implementing a PPP was assumed. In Figure 6.6 to 6.8 the financial effects of different reductions in either 
frequencies of outbreaks or extent of the outbreak is given for the MS’s NL, FL, and RO.  
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For all three MS’s similar results can be seen. Both reduction of impact of the damage as well as the reduc-
tion of probability of outbreaks and especially the combination of both have a substantial impact on the to-
tal expected costs in a 10 year period. As can be seen a reduction in the damage of an outbreak of 22% or a 
reduction in probability of outbreaks of around 30%5 or a 14 % reduction in case of a combination of dam-
age and frequency would offset the extra cost of a 5% higher reimbursement. These reductions of damage 
reduction and reduction in outbreak frequency are likely to be feasible. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 The Netherlands: Total expected claim for the Veterinary Fund for a 10 year period for different 
reductions in frequency and/or impact of outbreaks. 
 
                                                 
 
5
 This means that for example for RO the cost for the budget of the EU Veterinary Fund are neutral when the frequency of FMD in-
creases from once per 35 years to once per 46 years, for CSF from once per 3 years to once per 4 years and for AI from once per 2 
years to once per 3 years.  
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Figure 6.7 Finland Total expected claim for the Veterinary Fund for a 10 year period for different reduc-
tions in frequency and/or impact of outbreaks (in 1000€). 
  
 
Figure 6.8 Romania: Total expected claim for the Veterinary Fund for a 10 year period for different reduc-
tions in frequency and/or impact of outbreaks (in 1000€). 
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6.3. Summary 
In summary, the impact of a reimbursement reduction in case of large outbreaks in combination with a Bo-
nus and Malus for future outbreaks will reduce the budgetary impact for the Veterinary Fund considerably. 
The levels of the hypothetical BM system were arbitrarily chosen and merely served as an example. More 
extreme values in the BM system will decrease the demands on the Veterinary Budget, and vice versa (and 
affecting the potential additional preventive measures due to the CRSS).  
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7. Evaluation of the CRSS  
The proposed CRSS is compared with the current system on basis of the criteria as defined in Chapter 1. As 
discussed earlier the CRSS consists of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) to cover the MS contribution of the 
direct costs of an outbreak, and a Bonus Malus (BM) system to cover the EU contribution. 
Criteria Criteria met? 
To achieve a more prevention-driven and incentive oriented approach of the EU financial aid 
for the control and eradication of animal diseases.   
See comment 1 
To balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities between competent authorities, EU 
institutions and the farming sector.   
See comment 2 
To maximise effectiveness and efficiency on prevention and eradication of animal diseases.  
 
See comment 3 
Establishing simple and clear rules for EU co-financing of losses due to animal diseases and 
ensuring consistency and coherence of the several compensation mechanisms established at 
EU level.  
See comment 4 
To prevent distortion of competition between MS’s. 
  
See comment 5 
To avoid risks for the EU and the MS budgets. 
 
See comment 6 
Ensure economic sustainability of farming business in the EU: 
 
 
Ensure consistency with the animal health, animal welfare and food safety policy objectives as 
well as broader EU policies (climate change, sustainability) and international commitments of 
the EU (WTO). 
? expert and 
stakeholder con-
sultation  
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 Comment 1: Implementation of preventive measures included and rewarded.  
If a MS takes effective preventive measures the MS will be rewarded by a lower incidence of outbreaks and 
as such a higher reimbursement rate in case of an outbreak. The other effect of effective preventive meas-
ures is that in case of an outbreak the impact of the outbreak will be more limited. Implementing a PPP to 
finance the MS’s share means communication with the stakeholders since it involves not only cost sharing 
but also responsibility sharing. PPP are best organized in the different MS to be able to adequately imple-
ment national and regional differences. These PPP’s can stimulate their stakeholders (i.e. farmers) to im-
plement preventive measures by premium differentiation in the PPP and through the possibilities for MS to 
subsidize the implementation of preventive measures. If the system is organized such that in case of a small 
outbreak there will not be a reduction in reimbursement class there will be an incentive for a MS to timely 
report an outbreak. 
 
 Comment 2: Balance the distribution of costs and responsibilities. 
A vital part of the MS PPP is sharing costs and responsibilities amongst public and private sector. An agree-
ment about responsibilities sharing has to be reached before the details on a cost sharing programme can 
be determined. In a recent report by the England Advisory Group on Responsibility and Cost sharing (De-
cember 2010), this is given substantial attention. This Advisory group emphasised that credible arrange-
ments for sharing responsibility have to be established before decisions on cost sharing can be properly de-
bated and defined. They also indicate that determining an appropriate base for sharing is a highly complex 
matter and it is in their opinion unlikely there is to be a “one size fits all” solution to cost sharing but there is 
a need for a systematic approach (England Advisory Group on Responsibility and Cost sharing, 2010). The 
differences in structure of the PPP in those MS that already have a PPP in place and the time it took estab-
lish such systems indicate that it is unlikely that a single PPP that can be used by all MS’s.  
 
 Comment 3: Taking into account the differences between member states in risk and impact of out-
breaks of contagious diseases.  
The BM system rewards MS’s with low risk profiles by the fact that the percentage of the direct costs reim-
bursed is higher since the occurrence of outbreaks is less frequent. Also the fact that there is a difference in 
the drop in reimbursement class depending on the size of the outbreak differentiates between MS’s that 
have small outbreaks compared to MS’s that have to cope with more substantial outbreaks.  
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 Comment 4a: Simple and easy to implement. 
The CRSS program is relative easy to implement because of its simplicity (i.e., based on claim history). More-
over, it is also straight forward to monitor the class status of each MS by the EU. Our suggestion would be to 
start at the present percentage covered by the EU of the direct costs of an outbreak of CSF, HPAI or FMD 
(50% EU compensation). MS’s with a low incidence of disease outbreaks will gradually move up in the per-
centage covered, and the MS’s with a higher incidence will move down. As described in comment 2, the PPP 
will take a longer time to be established. 
In countries which already implemented a PPP a differentiation in premium paid by different livestock own-
ers is often based on the livestock sector and farm type. This differentiation is based on risk profile and abil-
ity to bear costs. In the case of implementing the CRSS in MS in which there is a large number of holdings 
with backyard farming or non-commercial holding the CRSS is faced with several challenges. The first chal-
lenge is registration of livestock owners, the second is to find incentives to motivate compliance to regula-
tions and the third is to collect levies cost effectively. Whether it is worth the effort to include backyard and 
non-commercial holdings in the CRSS has to be based on epidemiological, economic and political arguments. 
The main reason for farmers to participate in a CRSS is the responsibility sharing. In many MS farmers lack a 
voice in the decision making process regarding prevention and management of outbreaks of contagious dis-
eases whereas they consider themselves as most affected by the outbreak. Modulation of control strategies 
based on the different interests of livestock sectors and in consultation with the different livestock sectors 
might be a way to raise awareness and commitment.  
 
 Comment 4b: Transition period. 
As the results from WP 2 shows, at present there are large differences between MS’s in how they have or-
ganized the financing of the direct costs related to outbreaks of contagious disease in livestock. In case the 
new BM system with a compulsory PPP would be introduced there needs to be a transition period for MS’s 
to adapt to this new situation (see also Comment 2). Especially for a MS in which at present the direct costs 
are fully covered by the government this might by a major transition, to have the PPP’s established. To en-
able this transition temporally support from EU might be needed (for example to finance initial costs for es-
tablishing the PPP’s).  
There still needs to be a decision on whether sectors with low paying capacity need support to pay the levies 
in the first years after establishment of the PPP. 
If PPP’s will be made compulsory by the EU, there should be laid down certain criteria on:  
 The (minimum) amount of levy paid by farmers (i.e., risk retention primary sector) and possibly 
contribution by other private parties;  
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 MS contributions (i.e., risk retention public). 
 
Comment 4c: Consequential/indirect losses. 
The extend farmers suffer large consequential/indirect losses due to an outbreak differs between MS’s. For 
example large differences between MS exist in e.g. livestock density of production areas or export position. 
Therefore we suggest excluding the coverage of consequential losses from the EU Veterinary Fund.  
It has to be investigated how MS’s can be supported, in case they want to establish a scheme that supports 
farmers that suffer from consequential losses. Such a scheme might improve the willingness for farmers to 
participate in a PPP to cover the MS part of the direct costs. Introducing the coverage of consequen-
tial/indirect losses adjacent to the CRSS could introduce a kind of virtuous circle with two directions bottom-
up top-down in three steps: 
1. Farmers could be subsidized for their participation in PPPs including the mutual insurance to cover 
the consequential/indirect losses; this participation is also/alternatively included among the factors 
considered to differentiate levies (PPP), resulting in a reduced financial contribution. 
2. Governments are motivated to encourage the primary sector participation in this mutual (and in the 
PPP, if not compulsory), by an additional bonus (incentive) recognised at EU level after reaching a 
targeted percentage. 
3. In terms of specific objectives, the EU benefits from this increased participation as the two levels of 
the CRSS-PPP are more interdependent and all actors involved will let it function as a single system, 
that will be more integrated and, as a consequence, more "shared": the benefit will consequentially 
stream to all MSs, in particular in the M/L term.  
An integrated CRSS in which direct and consequential/indirect costs are covered can enhance the acceptabil-
ity and feasibility of the CRSS since the following aspects of the CRSS are further enhanced in comparison 
with an approach in which only direct losses are covered. A combination is likely to result in a more preven-
tion driven and incentive oriented approach and a balanced distribution between costs and responsibilities 
and as a result more effective and efficient prevention and eradication and a farming business in which eco-
nomic sustainability is ensured. 
 
 Comment 5: To prevent distortion of competition between MS’s. 
Given the differences in conditions between different livestock sectors in the MS’s and differences between 
MS’s it is always a challenge to find a system that prevents distortion of competition between MS’s. The 
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possible distortion of competition introduced by the current different compensation schemes in place in dif-
ferent MS’s is negligible compared with other differences in taxation, income, etc. that exist in the EU. The 
proposed BM system is more just than the previous system in that it rewards MS that do not have large and 
costly outbreaks of epizootics and puts a large part of the costs on those MS’s that have. Having a large con-
centrated livestock sector in a MS has infrastructural benefits for farmers in those periods the area is not 
confronted with outbreaks of contagious diseases. These benefits become major drawbacks in times of out-
breaks and contribute to the possible spread of the disease and to an extent cost of an outbreak. 
 
 Comment 6: Risk for the EU budget. 
Although the risk for the EU budget is assumed to be less than in the present situation there might be situa-
tions (e.g. a large and costly outbreaks in several MS at a time) that there will be a large claim on the EU 
budget. Part of this is cushioned by the lower reimbursement in case the claim exceeds a fixed amount. 
Given the irregular occurrence of major outbreaks of livestock epidemics the budget planning of the Veteri-
nary Fund within the present annual framework remains challenging. There is a risk of extending the annual 
budget, which has to be borne by the EU budget. However over a longer period the fluctuation is more lim-
ited. Perhaps it is possible to re-insure this remaining risk, but this probably will be a costly option. A reduc-
tion of reimbursement to MS in case of a large outbreak decreases the total costs for the EU budget sub-
stantially, however the MS are faced with substantial additional costs at a moment of crisis. This might have 
a negative impact on the feasibility of the system. Solutions in which a strategic reserve must be maintained 
should be considered. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the proposed CRSS to cover the costs of outbreaks of contagious diseases which consists of a 
BM system for the reimbursement of part of the direct cost by the EU and a PPP between MS’s government 
and farmers that covers the rest of the direct costs has substantial benefits compared to the current system. 
However implementation of a new system for CRSS requires careful preparation, negotiations and trust 
building in which EU, MS, and farmers should be involved.  
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8. Stakeholder consultation 
To evaluate the outcomes and prioritise the different options a stakeholder consultation has been carried 
out. Representatives of the livestock sectors, processing industry, and veterinarians participated in the 
stakeholder consultation (participants in Annex 8). 
The aim of the consultation was to discuss the proposed harmonized EU framework for a cost and responsi-
bility sharing scheme (CRSS) for animal diseases. Participants were asked to prioritise the different compo-
nents and to rank the possible policy alternatives.  
For this prioritisation, the technique of Participative Multi Criteria Analysis (PMCA) has been used. PMCA is a 
technique that allows different stakeholders to collectively choose between different policy options. This 
technique is used successfully in the prioritization of eradication programs for AI or Q-fever in the Nether-
lands (Beekman, et al. 2007). It allows stakeholders and policy makers to evaluate and compare different 
policy alternatives.  
The stakeholders were asked to assess the importance of the different CRSS components and rank the pos-
sible policy alternatives regarding these components. On their request, the participants were given the op-
portunity to consult their constituencies and send in their final scores and comments within a limited period 
after the workshop. The responses are in table 8.1 an 8.2. From Copa-Cogeca, A.V.E.C. and FESASS additional 
comments were received are included in Annex 8. 
 
8.1. Assessment of the importance of the different CRSS components  
The participants were asked to evaluate the relative emphasis of the three components in relation to each 
other. The proposed CRSS components were: 
1. The Bonus Malus system (BM) for direct costs; 
2. A Public Private Partnership (PPP) in each MS that covers the direct costs of a disease outbreak;  
3. Coverage of indirect costs 
This ranking was done by distributing 100 points among the three options. The results are in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Distribution of points among the different components of the CRSS by the representatives of 
the stakeholder organisations 
 
Both the representatives of the European farmers’ organisation (Copa-Cogeca) and FESASS put most empha-
sis on (partial) coverage of indirect costs for farmers as component of a cost and responsibility sharing 
scheme. In their opinion, indirect costs are important losses for the farms. Besides farmers are often faced 
with threats over which they have no control. The total indirect losses are related to decisions taken by the 
competent authorities.  
Furthermore, Copa-Cogeca and FESASS both give no points to the proposed Bonus Malus system between 
EU and MS’s. Their main reason is that the proposed BM is not sector-related. Livestock sectors within a MS 
might therefore not be credited for work already carried out in the area of biosecurity and disease preven-
tion, and instead bear the risk of lower compensations due to outbreaks in other sectors with less high stan-
dards of bio-security. Furthermore, the consequences of the proposed BM for farmers are not evaluated. 
Copa-Cogeca does not give any emphasis to Public Private Partnerships as a component of a new CRSS. In 
their opinion the decision to implement a PPP for coverage of direct costs should be voluntary for each MS. 
The representatives of the processing industry and trade (Clitravi, AVEC, and UECBV) consider the Public Pri-
vate Partnership the most important component of a new CRSS. They put less emphasis on coverage of indi-
rect costs for farmers or a Bonus Malus system between EU and MS. FVE argues that a BM system could be a 
stimulus for MS to put more emphasis on farms’ biosecurity.  
  
Component of CRSS Copa Cogeca Clitravi AVEC UECBV FESASS FVE 
The Bonus Malus system 
(BM) 
0 20 20 20 0 50 
Public Private Partner-
ship to cover direct costs 
(PPP) 
0 50 70 50 20 30 
Part of indirect costs 
covered 
100 30 10 30 80 20 
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8.2. Ranking of the different policy alternatives 
Combining the different components of the CRSS gives eight potential options. In Table 8.2 the different op-
tions are presented. Option A (no BM system, a voluntary PPP and no inclusion of direct costs) represents 
the present situation in the EU and option H (BM system in place, a compulsory PPP and coverage of indirect 
costs) is the most advanced system. Participants were asked to prioritize the different options, where the 
most preferred option gets rank 1. The ranking of the stakeholders is shown in Table 8.2.  
 
Table 8.2: Ranking of the different policy alternatives by the stakeholders 
 
* Rank 1 = the most preferred option; rank 8 = the least preferred option.  
Some representatives ranked all the options whereas others limited themselves to the option they consid-
ered acceptable.  
 
    Livestock sector Processors/ trade Others 
 BM PPP Coverage 
of part of 
indirect 
costs 
Copa 
Cogeca 
Clitravi AVEC UECBV FESASS FVE 
A No Voluntary Excluded - 7 8 7 -  
B No Voluntary Included 1 3 6 3 1  
C No Compulsory Excluded - 5 1 5 -  
D No Compulsory Included - 1 3 1 2  
E Yes Voluntary Excluded - 8 7 8 -  
F Yes Voluntary Included - 4 5 4 - 3 
G Yes Compulsory Excluded - 6 4 6 - 2 
H Yes Compulsory Included - 2 2 2 - 1 
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Table 8.2 shows that both the representatives Copa-Cogeca and FESASS are in favour of policy alternative B: 
no Bonus Malus system, voluntary possibility for each MS to decide whether or not to implement a public 
private partnership to cover direct losses and including covering of a part of the indirect costs for farmers. 
The representatives of the FEASS could as second best also accept the alternative with compulsory instead 
of voluntary PPP for coverage of direct costs, but note that in their opinion a PPP is not the right tool to 
share responsibilities and costs for disease outbreaks over which farmers have little or no control. The alter-
natives with a BM or those excluding compensation of indirect costs are not a feasible option for both Copa-
Cogeca and FESASS.  
The representatives of processing industry and trade (Clitravi, AVEC and UECBV) are in favour of the alterna-
tives with no Bonus Malus system between EU and MSs and a compulsory Public Private Partnership for 
coverage of direct losses. They differ in opinion on including or not including (part of) indirect losses in the 
CRSS. The second best alternative for Clitravi, AVEC and UECBV is alternative H which includes a BM system 
between EU and MS and includes coverage of certain indirect losses. This is the preferred option for FVE. 
 
8.3. The workshop: main additional comments and conclusion 
The views of the participants in the workshop about the importance of the different components of the pro-
posed CRSS and the ranking of related policy alternatives are shown above.  
The main additional comments of the workshop participants are summarised below: 
 Representatives of the processing industry note that direct costs do not only concern farmers: other 
parts in the chain might also have direct losses as a result of disease outbreak. This should be in-
cluded in a CRSS. 
 The proposed BM system only concerns the relationship between EU and MS. Representatives of 
the processing industry consider it necessary to look at a BM system at all levels. Business operators 
could by assessment of their government be placed in a risk category (BM on MS-farmer level). 
 Also take into account the risk that a Malus on MS level might be distributed immediately to the mi-
cro level (the farmers). MSs should not be allowed to do so, as reimbursement reduction can be due 
to their own failure. 
 Thresholds and maximums in reimbursement should not be fixed in certain amounts: it must be re-
lated to the number of animals in a MS or something comparable.  
 How to deal with farmers of MSs with already difficult financial situations? Will it not endanger giv-
ing notice of statutory diseases? 
 Implementation of a new CRSS should be carried out step by step. 
 Vaccination in case of statutory diseases could reduce direct and indirect costs immensely; the fea-
sibility depends on consequences for the food chain as a result of trade problems. 
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Overall it can be concluded that the five participating organisations in the workshop show diverse and com-
plementary views. The processing and trade industry is more in favour of the more advanced options for re-
consideration of the compensation system for animal diseases, whereas the representatives of farmers and 
breeders organisations are more conservative. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1. Conclusions 
The EU contributes financially to the prevention, eradication and control of livestock epidemics in each MS. 
In this report the results of the investigation regarding the different options for replacing the current EU 
rules for co-financing of emergency measures are described. Five different policy options are evaluated and 
the economic impact, likelihood, timescale, magnitude of direct and consequential/indirect costs and 
monetization of impacts are assessed. Special emphasis is given on the feasibility of an EU harmonized 
framework for a Cost and Responsibility Sharing Schemes (CRSS).  
Existing systems and mechanisms compensating animal disease losses 
EU co-financing is foreseen in the event of an epidemic livestock disease. The actual reimbursements from 
the Emergency Fund according to the current eligibility criteria in place in the period 1997- 2010 were 1,109 
million€, of which 88% was related to the major livestock diseases CSF, FMD and AI. Moreover, analysis re-
vealed that high risk areas were responsible for the majority of the EU contributions in the current system. 
Financing schemes related to the non-EU compensated part of animals that are compulsory culled and other 
costs related to the control and eradication costs differ between MS’s. While some MS’s finance the direct 
losses from the national budget, other MS’s have set up some form of statutory public-private financing 
system. These public-private financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure in which all farmers pay a 
levy (i.e. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and The Netherlands). The amount that is payable by the farmer 
depends mainly on whether or not there were major outbreaks in previous years. To share the risks 
between the national government and the sector proportional as well as non-proportional schemes exist. 
In some MS’s, a compensation scheme for consequential losses is implemented, either by means of private 
funding (e.g., a compulsory scheme in Romania), by means of public funding (Austria, Cyprus, Czech, Finland, 
France, Portugal, Sweden) or by a private-public scheme (Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania). A widely adopted EU 
private insurance scheme covering all epidemic diseases for all types of livestock is absent. Only a few 
private insurance schemes exist on the European market to cover the risk of consequential losses from 
livestock epidemics (e.g. Germany).  
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CVO’s opinion on the different policy options 
CVO’s in all MS’s agreed that it is vital that during an outbreak of a disease adequate compensation should 
be ensured. There was consensus to develop an EU harmonized framework for CRSS (Option 3). There was 
less agreement amongst the CVO’s in the required financial arrangement; one group of CVO’s suggested a 
substantial participation of farmers while others suggested a pure public funding structure. The opinions to 
include or exclude consequential losses differ between the CVO’s. Arguments in favour of including at least 
part of the consequential losses stipulate that during an outbreak farmers might suffer substantial costs due 
to a standstill period; especially in Densely Populated Livestock Areas farmers might face severe animal wel-
fare and technical problems in case of long-lasting epidemics. Arguments contra mostly include that the 
consequential losses are difficult to calculate and a substantial administrative burden is expected, and with 
respect to market loss the losses will be become too costly. 
 
PEST-analysis different policy options 
The PEST-analysis of current CRSS (Option 1) revealed that there is on all criteria room for improvement, 
hence considering a new CRSS is sensible. Option 3a (mandatory gradual introduction of harmonised 
scheme) offers on all included criteria the prospect of improvement, both compared to the default Option 1 
and to all other alternatives. Moreover, there are no indications that future developments would dramati-
cally endanger the performance or robustness of this option. Option 2 (public-private system) and Option 5 
(fully harmonised) could also be considered; they as well offer improvement although with less support from 
all stakeholders involved. Option 3b (voluntary harmonisation) and Option 4 (deregulation) either do not of-
fer the prospect of major improvements compared to the current CRSS, or have even the risk of decreased 
performance. 
 
Impact assessment proposed EU harmonized framework for a CRSS 
Although a compulsory gradual introduction of the CRSS by all MS’s respecting harmonised criteria set by 
the EU appears to be sound and preferred by MS’s (Option 3a), there are numerous modalities of such sys-
tem possible. The merit of the modalities should be that stakeholders are encouraged to implement more 
preventive systems and more effective eradication strategies. Investigated modalities of the CRSS in the en-
visaged system focus on:  
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1) a bonus element;  
2) a malus element;  
3) a reduction in reimbursement for large claims;  
4) a public-private-partnership (PPP) system. 
 
A historical analysis was performed to determine what would have been the budgetary consequences for 
the EU if the proposed CRSS would have been implemented with the aforementioned modalities. The his-
torical analysis revealed that the total costs for the veterinary fund of the EU would be substantially lower in 
the prospective situation compared to the present situation. The main reason for estimated differences is 
that MS’s with large outbreaks would receive a smaller reimbursement compared to the current situation. 
Moreover, in the new situation FMD is indemnified at the same level as other epidemics (default reim-
bursement of 50% instead of 60%). 
 
The impact of the implementation of a CRSS was also analysed by means of a normative modelling approach 
and the impact of the CRSS modalities are analysed jointly as well as separately. All MS’s will be rewarded 
with a higher reimbursement class if only the bonus element is taken into consideration. This system will be 
more advantageous for those MS’s with infrequent outbreaks and thus less claims from the Veterinary Fund. 
If only the malus element is taken into consideration all MS’s will be penalised, only to which extend de-
pends on their exposure. MS’s with relative many or substantial claims from the Veterinary Fund will end up 
in the lowest reimbursement class. A reduction for on-going large outbreaks will also reduce the total costs 
for the Veterinary Fund. MS’s with large claims will be reimbursed more often at lower levels. 
 
Note that to what extend each of the CRSS options would help to achieve the objectives pursued by the ini-
tiative is not the object of this study. The costs in the prospective situation will be overestimated since the 
effects of potential additional preventive measures due to the CRSS are not quantified in the current histori-
cal and normative analysis. 
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9.2. Recommendations  
In the envisaged CRSS the deficiencies of the current system should be avoided, or at least reduced. This 
holds particularly for issues such as limited incentives for prevention, distortions in favour of high risk areas, 
partial compensation in case of an outbreak (only direct losses), and complex community co-financing rules 
and the budget risk for the community.  
 
Based on the findings in this report four recommendations are formulated.  
 
Recommendation 1: Harmonising EU reimbursement rate. Council Decision 2009/470/EC allows for co-
financing 50% of the costs of compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter and related operational expenditure; 
however, for FMD a co-financing of 60% is allowed. Harmonising the EU co-financing to one default level will 
ensure a more consistent and coherent compensation scheme.  
Recommendation 2: Risk based EU compensation. A more comprehensive step is to reward and/or penalize 
the preventive measures taken by the MS’s by deviating from the default reimbursement rate. Such ap-
proach has usually a positive effect on claim statistics, as it stimulates to be more eager in preventing out-
breaks that would lead to the loss of bonus.  
The BM system rewards MS’s with low risk profiles by the fact that the percentage of the direct costs reim-
bursed is higher since the occurrence of outbreaks is less frequent. Also the difference in the drop in reim-
bursement class depending on the size of the outbreak differentiates between MS’s that have small out-
breaks compared to MS’s that have to cope with more substantial outbreaks.  
The CRSS program is relative easy to implement because of its simplicity. Moreover, it is also straight for-
ward to monitor the class status of each MS by the EU. We suggest starting at the present percentage cov-
ered by the EU (50% compensation): MS’s with a low incidence of disease outbreaks will gradually move up 
and the MS’s with a higher incidence will move down. 
If in case of a small outbreak there will not be a reduction in reimbursement class, there will be an incentive 
for MS's to timely report an outbreak. In order to obtain support by MS’s for this revision the range of the 
reimbursement rates should be limited (approximately 10% points). More extreme values will decrease the 
demands on the Veterinary fund on the long run (affecting the potential additional preventive measures 
taken) but will lack a wide-range support in all MS’s. 
In summary, it is recommended that EU compensation to the MS for epidemic livestock diseases should be-
come more risk based. This could be envisaged by introducing one or more incentive based modalities (i.e, 
bonus and malus elements, and/or reduction in reimbursement rate for large claims). 
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Recommendation 3: Share of responsibility and costs between public and private sector. First, a credible 
arrangement for sharing responsibility between government and relevant stakeholders has to be established 
before decisions on cost sharing can be properly debated and defined. Sharing responsibility should be tar-
geted such that the total risk is reduced by increasing the biosecurity and minimizing the effect of a possible 
outbreak. The envisaged PPP is a tool to provide incentives for farmers and thus stimulates behavioural 
changes for risk factors involved. The PPP should impose standards towards for example the maximum 
number of animal contacts with other farms, farm hygiene practices, the proper usage of hygiene barriers in 
place, reservation of e.g. 5% free places to cover temporary animal surpluses, and implementation of quality 
assurance schemes.  
Second, the PPP should manage a fund structure in which all farmers pay a levy to the compensation 
scheme. The PPP can stimulate their stakeholders to implement preventive measures by premium differen-
tiation to the fund and through the possibilities for MS to subsidize the implementation of preventive meas-
ures. Determining an appropriate base for cost sharing is a complex matter and it is unlikely that there will 
be a “one size fits all” solution but there is a need for a systematic approach. Therefore PPP’s are best organ-
ized in the different MS to be able to adequately implement national and regional differences but based on 
a EU set of basic principles and requirements.  
Costs and benefits of running the national PPP differ between MS’s. In MS’s with infrequent and marginal 
risks of large disease outbreaks, the transactions costs of implementing and maintaining a complex levy sys-
tem may be disproportionate to the possible benefits. Therefore a compulsory PPP for all MS’s will only be 
supported if the level of complexity of the PPP is risk based. MS with marginal risks would only be required 
to implement a PPP in which responsibility would be shared enforcing a kind of quality system and an ex 
post levy to cover the non-EU funded part of the costs in the unlikely event of an outbreak. If a mandatory 
PPP is not supported at EU level, a voluntary system should be accompanied by mechanisms to incentivise it. 
The PPP will take a relative long time before full establishment and thus a transition period must be fore-
seen to adapt to this new situation, especially for a MS in which at present the direct costs are fully borne by 
the government (10-15 years is the minimum period that should be considered); temporary support from EU 
might be needed (for example to finance initial costs). 
Recommendation 4: MS’s flexibility in expanding coverage by including part of the consequential/indirect 
losses. The substantial benefits of introducing coverage of these losses adjacent to the CRSS are as follows: 
 The uptake of a PPP by farmers could be improved by connecting the PPP with a coverage of (part 
of) the consequential/indirect losses (this coverage is outside the review of Decision 2009/470/EC 
for the CRSS, typically should be voluntary and could be a mutual or a commercial insurance). It 
seems appropriate to include this compensation for farms where all animals were culled as well as 
farms within surveillance and movement restriction zones.  
 It would facilitate the implementation of preventive measures since it opens the possibility of pre-
mium differentiation based on the implementation of such measures. 
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Coverage of the consequential/indirect losses is not a part of the proposed CRSS. However, possibilities to 
cover (part of) these costs can facilitate the introduction of a CRSS, especially those costs that are due to 
business interruption of farms in which animals are culled or farms in a surveillance or movement restriction 
zone. Hence, only farms located in the movement restriction zones should be eligible for compensation of 
(part of these) consequential/indirect losses. Premiums in such schemes paid by farmers should be risk de-
pendent. Support by MS or EU by subsidizing the premiums paid to this mutual could increase the participa-
tion of farmers to this fund. 
A major drawback to correctly determine the consequential/indirect losses is the fact that they are difficult 
to calculate and most of the time only can be estimated after the outbreak ended. A solution for this might 
be that beforehand a fixed sum per production unit (e.g. dairy cow, sow or pig place) per day is set by the 
farmer and the mutual or commercial insurance fund. We suggest to make arrangements for farms culled 
that are confronted with loss of income during the time the farm is not fully repopulated and in production 
and confronted with additional start-up costs. Also arrangements could be made for farms in a Surveillance 
or Movement restriction zone during the stand still period confronted with consequential/indirect losses, 
mainly due to the fact that they are not able to freely move animals or livestock products. It seems neither 
favourable nor feasible to compensate for losses due to trade restrictions. The reasons for this are that 
these costs cannot be determined explicitly and the whole sector in a MS is confronted with these losses at 
the same time, i.e. also farms outside the zones with movement restrictions. Insurance would mean that 
farmers in effect would pay for their own losses. Although in major market-disruptive outbreaks, farmers 
outside areas with movement restrictions might benefit from temporally higher prices. 
There is currently an on-going investigation as to whether art. 68 of Council Regulation 73/2009 (establish-
ing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and estab-
lishing certain support schemes for farmers) can be used to allow premium subsidy of farmers by MS. Note 
that in the current situation MS's may provide financial compensation to farmers for economic losses caused 
by the outbreak of animal diseases by way of financial contributions to mutual funds (Article 70, EU, 
COM(2008) 306). 
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Footnotes 
 
1 OJ L 155, 18.6.2009, p 30-45. 
2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:319:0001:0033:EN:PDF 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/strategy/cahpeval_en.htm 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/strategy/archives/main_report_part2_en.pdf 
5 The complete study can be found in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/strategy/final_report_en.htm Court of Auditors SPECIAL REPORT 
No 1/2000 on classical swine fever, Court of Auditors, SPECIAL 
6 REPORT No. 8/2004 on FMD. In the Report on FMD the court listed as factors contributing to a risk for the 
Community budget that Community legislation does not include incentives to encourage farmers to partici-
pate actively in prevention and control and farmers do not make a direct contribution to the Community 
funding for prevention and control arrangements. It also criticised the funding system, that has, however, 
been revised with Regulation 349/2005. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09536-
ad02.en08.pdf 
7 These 3 diseases are chosen because: 1) impact and involvement of the Veterinary fund has mainly related 
to these diseases, and recent models are available. 
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRES SENT TO THE CVO OF THE MS INCLUDING LETTER OF 
RECOMMENDATION BY DG SANCO 
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Questionnaire 
Development of a harmonised EU framework for cost and responsibility sharing schemes (CRSS) for ani-
mal diseases 
Background information on the project 
The purpose of this research is to assess the feasibility and the possible social, economic and environ-
mental impacts of the options that have already been identified for the review of the EU rules for co-
financing emergency measures taken by the Member States to control and eradicate animal disease out-
breaks. For this five different options are suggested. A general assessment on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these options shall be made. For options 3.a and 3.b an in-depth feasibility assessment shall be 
made (see below). 
In this project we evaluate different options for a CRSS. The identified options are: 
 Option 1: “No change scenario”, which preserves the existing legal framework for animal disease 
direct-losses compensation. 
 Option 2: EU co-financing rules are maintained, however a maximum percentage for public fi-
nancial contribution to the farmers is defined, thereby ensuring that they bear a minimum per-
centage of the direct costs (which could be insurable). 
 Option 3: Development of an EU harmonized framework for CRSS 
 Option 3.a: establishing an obligation for a gradual introduction of CRSS by all Member 
States respecting certain harmonized criteria established at EU level. 
 Option 3.b: establishing the possibility for individual MS to develop CRSS provided that 
these schemes comply with EU harmonized criteria while allowing others to maintain the 
option of getting EU co-financing according to the current rules. 
 Option 4: Deregulation. 
 Option 4.a: to limit EU intervention to cases of catastrophic events;  
 Option 4.b: to grant lump sum payments to the MS instead of co-financing. 
 Option 5: Establishment of a fully harmonised EU CRSS system managed by the Commission for 
compensating losses due to animal diseases. 
For option 3a and option 3b harmonised criteria at the EU level should be at least: 
 obligation of Member States to cover certain animal diseases considered as priorities at EU level 
by the CRSS with compulsory participation of livestock producers; 
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 objective of the CRSS, i.e. providing efficient transfer of animal health risk from farmers to a 
CRSS and inducing efficient on-farm risk management through differentiation of contributions 
and conditions of coverage; 
 basic principles for efficient schemes like conditions for incentive compatibility, covered risks 
and public financial support; 
 maximum threshold for public funding; 
 WTO compliance. 
EU financial contribution to the CRSS developed in the MS (option 3a and 3b) could be: 
 Peace-time support.  
 Co-financing of losses excluding business interruption costs (direct losses) 
Co-financing of direct losses could follow the lines of the current system of financial compensation. This 
public financial support could have the following three main pillars:  
 Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of the livestock numbers cov-
ered by a CRSS. 
 Support to the losses due to animals slaughtered as fixed percentage of the compensation paid 
to the operator. 
 Previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under 
Council Decision 2009/470/EC. This would be in contrast to the current situation where other di-
rect costs are co-financed on basis of the real expenses incurred, which may lead to inflated 
costs and complicated procedures. The flat rates would have to be defined at EU level in ad-
vance and could be related to the numbers of animals/operators affected etc. Definition of flat 
rates should take into account appropriate price indices to reflect reasonable differences be-
tween Member States. 
In addition to this option, co-financing consequential/indirect losses including business interruption costs is 
assessed, on whether it is possible/adequate or not, and if it is, how can this be done. 
If appropriate other ways of providing EU financial aid are proposed. 
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Principal animal diseases covered by the CRSS 
In this project the focus is on FMD, CSF and HPAI. 
Obviously, livestock epidemics like FMD, CSF an HPAI can have large economic consequences for farmers but 
also other various parties of the production chain in terms of direct and consequential losses: 
 
  Direct losses comprise the value of the animals culled under depopulation and welfare control 
measures and the costs of organisational aspects such as the monitoring of farms in restriction 
zones.  
 Consequential losses that arise at farm level can comprise one or more of the following catego-
ries:  
Business interruption: business interruption occurs because farm buildings become (partly) empty due to 
stamping-out and welfare slaughter or breeding prohibition, and stay empty until restriction zones are lifted. 
 
Losses related to established restriction zones: farms in restriction zones face (long) periods in which ani-
mals (e.g., finishing pigs and veal calves) and manure cannot be transported from the farm. These periods 
are characterised by animal welfare problems, extra feeding costs, and emergency measures for housing of 
pigs and storage of manure. Such losses will widely vary across farms and are therefore complicated to 
measure. Milk from dairy farms in restriction zones might be collected taking into consideration strict hygi-
enic measures. 
 
Additional repopulation costs: these losses include extra costs of animal health problems. 
 
Losses from emergency vaccination: given a situation, in which vaccinated animals are destroyed, losses 
might arise of the above categories (business interruption, repopulation costs). However, for reasons of so-
cial acceptability, the rendering of vaccinated animals is under debate. With future epidemics, meat and 
milk from vaccinated animals may be destined to the local market, which likely leads to extra costs and/or 
lower prices. Something similar may be applied to animals under welfare slaughter programs. 
 
Price effects: livestock epidemics can have a rather severe impact on prices, especially meat prices. The im-
pact depends on aspects such as the size of the epidemic (duration, size of restricted area), reactions of 
other countries (closure of borders, increased production) and whether vaccination is applied (which gener-
ally leads to long periods of export limitations).  
The direct losses are partly compensated by governments (national and European). Consequential losses are 
almost always completely borne by the farmers themselves if not insured privately. In some countries the 
consequential loss exposure is transferred by means of private insurance schemes. We want to evaluate the 
Financing scheme covering (part) of direct and consequential losses. 
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What do we need to know from you? 
Our present info on your country is: 
“No recent data” (for 15 countries like Lithuania for example) * 
I. Can you please update the previous information? 
* For data collected for 12 MS like: 
Austria: The Bundeslander (similar as in Germany) establish levies for the fund. 
Belgium: The government has set up a fund that it is used to finance various animal health and quality im-
provement measures. All funds are paid to the Administrative Unit for animal quality and health (part of the 
Ministry). The levy can vary depending on the level set by the government. The levy is differentiated on basis 
of species and farm size. With respect to pig production in addition the premium is differentiated between 
open or closed pig production. 
Denmark: The government pays only for the value of the animals which are compulsorily slaughtered. If a 
whole herd is slaughtered, a further 20% is paid to cover the loss of income from the herd. However the 
government does not pay for the commercial impact of movement restrictions or other controls. No statu-
tory or voluntary levies are operated to establish an emergency fund. 
Finland: The government compensates farmers and no statutory or voluntary levies are operated to estab-
lish an emergency fund. 
Germany: The German program is set up by national legislation but each Bundesland is responsible for run-
ning the program and draws up the detailed rules of the application. The scheme is compulsory. The pro-
gram is run by an administrative council that decides the level of the levy etc. The administrative council is 
made up of farmer and ministry representatives. The levy varies between species but more importantly is 
varied according to the needs of the fund. The compensation payments are made from the available funds 
and the Ministry of Agriculture will pay for the costs if the fund runs out of money. The input of the Ministry 
will however be repaid over the following years and this is usually why the levy increases after a disease 
outbreak. The levy is only used to co-finance the Community Veterinary measures following a disease out-
break. It therefore only pays for the slaughter of animals that have to be killed under EU Veterinary meas-
ures. The Lander and the levy fund each pay half of the remaining 50%. No compensation is paid to farmers 
in the surveillance zones.  
Greece: The government operates a compulsory agricultural insurance scheme via the Greek Agricultural In-
surance Organisation “ELGA”. ELGA has the objective of organising and implementing programmes of proac-
tive protection and insuring the production and assets of agricultural enterprises. More specifically, insur-
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ance with ELGA includes compulsory insurance against damage which is caused to for example animal assets 
of farmers. Persons who own stock-breeding or poultry or domestically produced products and by-products 
of animal origin shall be subject to insurance. ELGA is funded by an ‘income from special insurance contribu-
tions’ (of which the fee is 0.5% of the value of the sold livestock production) and this constitutes the major 
financial source.  
Italy: No government compensation is available other than for slaughtered animals. No statutory or volun-
tary levies exist. 
Luxembourg: The Luxembourg government pays compensation when animals are compulsorily slaughtered. 
There have been negotiations to introduce scheme that would have been paid for by farmers, government 
and farmers’ associations in equal shares. However, the scheme was never implemented. 
The Netherlands: Following the epidemic of CSF in 1997, the Dutch government has decided that the pro-
ducers must pay a larger proportion of the costs of any future epidemic and a system has now been put in 
place whereby pig producers will have cover for up to 227 million Euros per five years (the same holds for 
the cattle sector). The producers and the Ministry of Agriculture have agreed on a system where a bank 
guarantee is supplied and producers will have to pay the levy mainly after the epidemic. The amount of the 
levy will depend on the actual cost of the epidemic.  
Spain: No government compensation is available other than for slaughtered animals. No statutory or volun-
tary levies exist. 
Sweden: If a ‘production unit’ is closed during an epidemic of a notifiable disease the government can com-
pensate the farmer for the destruction of the animals, animal value, and decontamination and for produc-
tion losses. Compensation for notifiable diseases like Paratuberculosis is 100% for both animal value and de-
contamination costs. Compensation for Salmonella varies from 0% to 70% depending on the size of the live-
stock unit and whether the farmer is taking part in a control program. Veterinary costs and other costs 
caused by the epidemic is not compensated.  
United Kingdom: For FMD in cattle, sheep and pigs the government compensates destructed animals at 
100% of the market value. There is no levy of farmers. The same applies for CSF and Swine vesicular disease 
(SVD) in pigs. The UK government also pays some compensation for animals slaughtered due to Bovine Tu-
berculosis, Brucellosis and BSE in cattle. As far as poultry diseases are concerned, such as Avian influenza 
and Newcastle disease, the government only pays compensation for birds slaughtered which are non-
diseased (at 100% of their market value). For Aujeszky's disease in pigs the government will also pay 100% of 
the animal's market value. The only difference with Aujeszky's is that when the disease was in the country a 
levy was paid on all pigs at slaughter to cover the compensation costs. This levy is no longer collected but 
the legislation is in place to collect it again should the disease come in to the country again. 
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II. In addition, if not yet mentioned, basically we want to know: 
1. What are the current animal diseases compensation schemes in your country for compensation of direct 
losses: 
Are they: 
 private, 
 public-private or  
 public 
 is it a levy (compulsory) scheme or is it an /insurance (voluntary) scheme? 
 
2. Are there any arrangements made concerning compensation of consequential losses: 
 
Are they: 
 private, 
 public-private or  
 public;  
 is it a levy (compulsory) scheme or is it an /insurance (voluntary) scheme?  
 
3. What are recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes regarding animal diseases in your coun-
try? 
What is: 
 
 - % of farmers participating 
 - Type of coverage: (direct or consequential losses) 
 - Reason for (non) participating? 
4. What is your opinion on spending public money in preventing and controlling contagious animal disease? 
Please motivate? 
  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 125 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
III. Additional questions on the alternative options for a CRSS 
Please score your answer to the following questions concerning the different CRSS policy options:  
  
  - = (strongly) no /( strongly) disagree,  
 +/- = neutral, medium,  
 + = (strongly) yes / (strongly) agree) 
 
After each line with question you are elaborate on the issue. 
Please give your comments / opinion regarding the following open questions concerning option 3A and 
3B: 
 
9. What criteria regarding CRSS conforming to option 3a and 3b should at least be harmonised at an EU-
level? For instance: 
a. Categories of covered animal diseases/disease types? 
b. Participation of livestock farmers: compulsory or voluntary? 
c. The objective of the CRSSs: 
i. efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS? 
ii. Support of on-farm risk management? 
iii. Differentiation in financial contributions between cost sharing actors? 
iv. Risks and losses (direct/consequential) that can be covered by the CRSS? 
d. maximum threshold for public funding?  
e. WTO compliance? 
f. ….? 
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10. Should the EU financial contribution to CRSSs in Member States concern peace-time support or co-
financing of losses in times of crisis? What is your motivation? 
 
11. If EU financing support should be co-financing of losses, which losses should be compensated for?: 
a. only direct losses? 
b. also consequential losses like business interruptions? 
12. If direct losses will be financial compensated by the EU, what ways of support would you prefer and 
why? For instance: 
a. Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered 
by the CRSS? 
b. Compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator? 
c. Previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under 
Council Decision 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses)? How to es-
tablish these rates? 
d. Other ways of EU support? 
13. Regarding EU compensation of indirect losses:  
a. Is it feasible to do this? Are these losses determinable and measurable? 
b. How to guarantee losses are accidental and unintentional? How to prevent moral hazards? 
c. Can the frequency and probability of indirect losses be calculated? 
d. What arguments in favour of it / what are arguments against compensating indirect losses? 
e. How could it be implemented? 
14. Are there other ways of providing EU financial aid then in the options already mentioned? 
 
15. Do you have final remarks? 
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APPENDIX 2: RESPONSE OF THE MS ON EXISTING SYSTEMS AND COMPENSATING 
MECHANISMS IN THE EU MS 
1. Austria 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Public scheme. The legal basis for compensation due to disease eradication is the Austrian Animal Disease 
Act (ADA). The Federal Government has to pay compensation (100 %) if:  
 Equids, ruminants, pigs and poultry are to be killed due to official instruction; 
 Objects are destroyed after official instructed disinfection. 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
The Federal Government also has to pay compensation (100%) if a person lacks income due to ban of the 
farm in case of FMD or HPAI. 
Some (not all) Federal Provinces may give additional money to the farmers (Tierseuchenkassa). 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The legal basis for compensation due to official instructed slaughter is the Austrian Animal Health Act. The 
Federal Government has to pay compensation (75 % minus slaughter revenues) if: 
 Equids, ruminants, pigs or poultry are to be slaughtered due to official instruction (i.g. in the 
frame of eradication programs – ParaTBC, BVD, Salmonella,…); 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Some (not all) Federal Provinces may give additional money to the farmers (Tierseuchenkassa). 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
There is one compulsory insurance system (based on levies) in laying hens (Salmonella-program). 
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2. Belgium 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The current animal disease compensation scheme for direct losses is based on a compulsory levy scheme. 
The levies are paid directly to the Sanitary Fund. The origin of these financial resources is private; the use of 
this budget is public. (The percentage of the public financial contribution to the farmers is 0%, because the 
origin of the fund is 100% private. This means that the cost sharing of the farmers is 100 %.) 
The government has set the Sanitary Fund to finance various animal health and quality improvement meas-
ures. All funds are paid by the operators to the Administrative Unit for animal quality and health (part of the 
federal Ministry). The levy can vary depending on the level set by the government. The levy is differentiated 
on basis of species, farm size and other sanitary risk factors. With respect to pig production, in addition the 
premium is differentiated between open or closed pig production. 
This system is operational for the main sectors: cattle sector, pig sector, small ruminants (sheep, goat, cervi-
dae), poultry sector and dairy sector. For other (minor) species there is at present no such system (equidae, 
aquaculture, rabbits, bees, ..) for reason of an unfavourable cost/benefit ratio.  
100 % of the professional farmers participate (clarification: small farm units considered as hobby farmers are 
not participating e.g. poultry sector: less than 200 poultry is considered as a hobby flock).  
The compensation level of the current Belgian system differs according to the disease  
Epizootic diseases: FMD, CSF: 100% (with restrictions for healthy (100%), clinically illness (50%) or dead ani-
mals 0% )); except for AI : 90 %  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
There are no arrangements to compensate consequential losses. In some cases, consequential losses can be 
paid by the regional authorities and only if there is an EU regulated framework. Compensation of conse-
quential losses is a competence of the regional authorities (i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels). 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Enzootic diseases : Tuberculosis, brucellosis , leucosis 80-85 % ; Special cases with important public health 
risk : TSE, Rabies : 100% Poultry diseases: 70 % (Newcastle disease and Salmonella).  
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Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(not present) 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
If insurance schemes mean ‘private insurance’, then to the knowledge of the respondents such schemes are 
not existing / no information available.  
 
Description of the Veterinary Fund in Belgium 
 
Mechanisms of the national Sanitary Fund for animals 
 
Base of the animal health control 
 
The Animal health law for the control of animal diseases was published in 1987. This law has been modified 
since then several times but still forms the legal base for the control of animal diseases in Belgium. 
 
The objective of this law is to control animal diseases in order to promote public health and to main-
tain/improve the prosperity of the farmers.  
 
The list of diseases falling under the scoop of the animal health law is determined by Royal decree6 . For a 
disease occurring on this list a Royal decree can be taken containing all the elements of disease control for 
that specific disease (*).  
 
(*) These Royal decrees take also into account the dispositions of the European legislation concerning dis-
eases (e.g. EC directives AI, FMD). 
                                                 
 
6
 Royal decree of 25
th
 of April 1988, chapter III or notifiable diseases being diseases that are officially controlled  
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Remark:  
 
According to the animal health law, when one of the diseases of the OIE7 list present a sudden and unex-
pected increase in morbidity or mortality or because of its zoonotic impact, the Minister is authorised to 
take any control measure (by Ministerial decree) in cases of serious danger of contamination and to eradi-
cate the contamination. (E.g. for emerging and re-emerging diseases, sudden outbreak of zoonosis…)  
 
Sanitary Fund (creation and functioning of the budgetary Fund) 
 
The first steps to create a Sanitary Fund (budgetary Fund) were made in 1986, with a legal base in the above 
mentioned animal health law of 1987. A further consolidation of the legal base was drawn in the law of 
19988. The latter law forms nowadays the legal base for the sanitary Fund. It can finance the:  
 
 Compensation of farmers (owners) for their animals that have been culled, slaughtered or de-
stroyed by order (*) 
 
 Compensation for the destruction (by order) of animal products and materials suspect of con-
tamination (disease) 
 
 Compensation in case of destruction of contaminated products (e.g. PCB’s Dioxins…). (These 
compensations are re-claimable advances.) 
 
 Purchase of vaccines 
 
 Intervention fees to certified veterinarians for epidemiological surveillance programs: 
 Administrations costs vaccines (Bluetongue, salmonella) 
 Tuberculinations  
 Taking of blood samples for officially controlled diseases (Brucellosis, Leucosis…) 
                                                 
 
7
 Chapter 2.1.1.3 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code or Chapter 1.1.3 of the Aquatic Animals Health Code 
8
 Law of the 23
rd
 of March 1998 regarding the creation of the sanitary fund for the health and quality of animals and animals prod-
ucts 
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 Visits on the pig holdings for Aujeszky (Aujeszky control program) 
  
 Accompanying measures in the form of programs that are approved by the minister. 
 
(*)For certain diseases a « refaction coefficient R » is applied. This is a rebate depending on the disease: 
 
e.g.: 
 Newcastle disease this R= 70 % (poultry holders must vaccinate) 
 Avian influenza R=90% (vaccination not allowed, decision of the Council of Ministers of the 
25/04/2003) 
 Other: R=100% 
 
These coefficients have been established for a number of diseases with the intention to let the farmers take 
their part of the responsibility. 
For highly contagious diseases or with a high zoonotic potential a rebate factor is not desirable or advisable.  
 
The resources of the Sanitary Fund come from: 
 
 yearly mandatory contributions of livestock owners,  
 voluntary contributions or contractual contributions (contractual contributions are, for example 
used in the poultry sector for covering (a part of) vaccinations costs, the level of these are nego-
tiated with the poultry sector)  
 EC participation (co-financing) in the expenditures of the Sanitary fund: 
e.g.: (not exhaustive list) 
 Salmonella vaccines costs are at the expense of the Sanitary Fund, as part of a 
Salmonella control program yearly approved by the EC (co financing of 50% in 
vaccines costs and expenses for the compensation of owners of poultry that has 
been slaughtered to order.) 
 Other programs like Bluetongue control program (vaccines costs are at the ex-
penses of the EC, the administration costs at 50% with a threshold) 
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Stakeholders’ contributions 
 
The contributions are based on the livestock sanitary risks, estimated and reviewed, by the Ministry. The 
principal factors for fixing the contributions are: 
 
Sector Contributions according to  Legislation (Royal de-
cree) 
Cattle the number of animals held in a cattle herd during the reference 
period of one year 
2004 
Pig  the capacity of the farm (number of pork places) and type of 
farming system (closed or open system)  
Closed: piglets originating from own holding. 
Open: Fattening piglets coming from more than one other hold-
ing)  
1999 
Dairy cows the amount of milk produced  
 
2005 
Poultry the type of poultry keeping (breeding, laying, broilers…) and the 
capacity  
 
1997 
Small rumi-
nants 
to the number of ewes older than 6 months kept during a refer-
ence period 
 
2007 
 
The level of the contributions can be subject to variations. The level of the mandatory contributions depends 
amongst other on: 
 
 Reserves of the budgetary Fund, for the cattle, pig and dairy fund a strategic reserve must be 
maintained. The levels of these reserves were set by the government in December 1996. 
 Expenditures and revenues of the budgetary fund are not constant over time. (Variable co fi-
nancing of the EC, start of new programs, compensation sudden outbreaks of officially con-
trolled diseases…)  
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In relation to these elements, the mandatory contributions can be adapted if necessary, e.g.: 
 
 The contributions in the cattle and pig sector haven been lowered, to a level of 20 % in 2009 and 
60 % in 2010 (compared to the 100% level in 2008) to give headroom to the sector heavily 
touched by the economic crisis of 2009 -2010.  
 After the Avian influenza outbreak in 2003, the contributions in the poultry sector have been 
doubled for 5 consecutive years (2003 – 2007) to refund the reserve. (Paid compensation of 10,5 
millions euro to the poultry holders). 
 
Objective of the Sanitary Fund 
 
The budgetary fund for the health and quality of animals and animal products was created by the Law of 23 
March 1998, according to three basic principles namely: 
 
1) co-financing,  
2) co-responsibility and  
3) co-management by the producers.  
Organization of the sanitary fund 
The Fund is falling under the competence of the Minister of Public Health. 
The three principles are realized by the creation of an Advisory Board (Council of the fund) and 5 working 
groups within the Sanitary Fund. The council is composed of representatives of the public services, the dif-
ferent producers associations, representatives of other authorities (Federal Agency for the Safety of the 
Food Chain) and DGZ and ARSIA (disease control associations). The Board is a platform where financial as-
pects e.g. the level of the contributions, opportunity of disease control programs, the financial part of pro-
grams, but also important decisions about the future animal health policy are discussed. 
 
The council is an advisory organ; its recommendations are submitted to the Minister for final approval. 
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Within the Sanitary Fund we find 5 subsidiary funds (Cattle fund, Pig fund, Poultry fund, Dairy fund, Small 
ruminants Fund). Each subsidiary fund has its own working group with representatives of the sector and the 
authorities.  
 
In these working groups all kind of aspects related to the sector can be discussed. E.g. proposals for the im-
plementation of new disease control program, evaluation of the reserves of each fund, evaluation of the re-
sult of the implementation of control programs, value grid of animals…….The advices given by the working 
group are submitted to the Council of the Fund.  
 
In peace time, expenditures are spend for general expenditures (Personnel expenditures, expert fees, man-
agement expenditures for animal fund, management expenditures for services to third parties, external au-
dit, reimbursement of mandatory contributions) but a great part is destined for prevention (e.g. programs 
like the Bluetongue vaccination).  
In times of a major crisis (e.g. HPAI 2003, CSF), then an important part is used for the swift and adequate 
compensation of the value of culled animals according to the scale of the crisis. 
 Important remark: 
The Sanitary Fund does not cover indirect cost. Necessity slaughtering and other expenditures linked with 
the eradication (carcass destructions) are financed by the Ministry.  
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3. Bulgaria 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Terms and procedures for recouping livestock breeders are to comply with provisions of Chapter VI, Section 
II of the national Law on Veterinary Activities. These include information about:  
 evaluation of animals subject to culling, including the responsibilities and staffing of the com-
mission to do evaluation; 
 financial compensation (recouping) for the animals destroyed;  
 operational costs;  
 required documents to prove the costs incurred, etc.  
 
The national veterinary service (NVS) annual budget does not contain any funds foreseen for eradication of 
and compensation for epizootic outbreaks that might occur. If such would happen, funds would be reallo-
cated from the backup budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food or the central government budget 
under a special decision of the Council of Ministers (CoM). This is to lay down the terms and procedures ap-
plicable to effecting expenditures and reimbursing them as target one in the central government budget for 
the purposes related to coping with epizootic risks. Costs may be spent for compensating owners or compul-
sory culled animals or fallen stock due to any of the diseases referred to in the Order issued by the Minister 
of Agriculture and Food according to Art. 47(1) of LVA or enlisted in the list under Art. 120 of LVA.  
Funds of the central government budget and/or the NVS budget are the ones to be used for recouping own-
ers of: 
 animals that have died due one of the diseases specified in an Order issued by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Food in accordance with Art. 47(1) of LVA or included in the List referred to in 
Art. 120 of LVA; 
 animals culled for diagnostic purposes; 
 infected or contact animals culled for the purposes of disease eradication; 
 animals treated by immunological veterinary medicinal products (VMPs) and: 
 fallen dead due to unpredictable risk; 
 emergency slaughtered before the end of withdrawal period; 
 animals that have fallen dead or emergency slaughtered after a ban imposed by NVS; 
 germinal products, raw materials or food of animal origin, animal by-products and products de-
rived thereof, feed raw materials, feed additives, compound feed and equipment and tools de-
stroyed for the purposes of disease eradication. 
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Compensation may not be paid to owners of animals, which:  
 have not registered respective animal holding; 
 have not provided their animals to be identified (ear-tagged); 
 have not ensured conditions their animals to be subjected to mandatory measures provided for 
in the State Prophylactic Programme; 
 have not complied with prescriptive acts imposed by veterinary (competent) authorities; 
 have not complied with the requirements and measures to ensure bio-security of respective 
holding and animal breeding therein; 
 have violated ban(s) imposed by Orders issued by the Minister of Agriculture and Food or by 
NVS Director-General; 
 have not complied with the requirements for proper feeding of animals kept in respective ani-
mal holding. 
As an EU Member State, Bulgaria is eligible for financial co-financing provided by relevant community funds 
to support eradication of disease(s), if only the country have immediately implemented the minimum re-
quired measures foreseen in relevant EU legislation starting from the identification of the very first suspect 
case and on-going after the official confirmation of the disease.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
No compensation for consequential losses. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received) /not present 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
The schemes exist and are voluntary and only 1% of the farmers participate. Direct loses are covered. 
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4. Cyprus 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The current animal diseases compensation schemes in Cyprus are public. The farmers receive compensation 
for direct losses from the government. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
In case of an emergency situation, arrangements from the side of the government are made to compensate 
also consequential losses or at least a percentage of them. There is no insurance scheme in place.  
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Agricultural insurance schemes in Cyprus exist only for fruit and vegetables. No insurance schemes exist for 
animal husbandry. 
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5. Czech Republic 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
There is public compensation for selected diseases (according to the national legislation), with a full com-
pensation for direct losses and consequential losses. The compensation shall be provided in an extent of 
substantiated costs efficiently expended and the losses incurred. 
Livestock producers do not participate in the compensation system (full public compensation). 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Full public compensation of consequential losses. A special regulation is established for the payment of em-
ployees, who are out of work because of farm standstills due to diseases. They are getting compensation for 
loss of income (Wilkens, 2010). 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
There are private insurance schemes on voluntary basis. There is a possibility to levy up to 50 % of contribu-
tion from budget. The type of coverage (direct or consequential losses) depends on the arrangement of a 
concrete contract. 
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6. Denmark 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The compensation scheme is fully public. The government pays only for the value of the animals which are 
compulsorily slaughtered. If a whole herd is slaughtered, a further 20% is paid to cover the loss of income 
from the herd. No statutory or voluntary levies are operated to establish an emergency fund. In addition, 
the Danish government pays for the destruction of the culled animals, animal products, feed and other ma-
terial that have to be destroyed in connection with the decontamination of the affected premises. Also, all 
costs associated with both the preliminary and the final cleansing and disinfection and where screening and 
tests are necessary in connection with restocking and lifting of zones are paid by the government. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
The government does not pay for the commercial impact of movement restrictions or other controls. The 
Danish government covers 20 % of lost income during the period until restrictions are lifted for the affected 
farm.  
For the cattle and swine sector, the industry will, via a compulsory levy scheme, cover the remaining 80 % of 
lost income. The poultry sector has not made a similar arrangement. 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Within the current arrangement, where the Danish government pays all costs, the farmers have not had any 
incentives to go for insurance arrangements. Therefore, no farmers have insurance arrangements.  
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An attempt to establish an insurance scheme was made by the poultry sector in 2002, but a large outbreak 
of Newcastle disease made the insurance company to withdraw. 
The aquaculture sector has established an “all risk” insurance, which covers the direct losses in connection 
with mortalities caused by diseases or by contamination of the water, e.g. with slurry or escapes especially 
for net-cage production break e.g. down of the construction. However, there is a own risk of 20 % of the 
amount insured. 
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7. Estonia 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Currently, there is direct compensation for all the aspects considered in Council Decision 2009/470/EC. Pub-
lic services are covering compensations for dangerous contagious animal diseases (former list A)* and Bo-
vine brucellosis, Brucella melitensis infection, Bovine tuberculosis, Enzootic Bovine Leucosis, Anthrax, Rabies 
and TSE. 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
No (No information received/not present) 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Private compensation schemes: all other diseases. Voluntary insurance scheme can be used by farmers 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
The private insurance companies are not present in the sector. The government is willing for a compulsory 
participation of the producers at the CRSS, but not pushing to get consequential losses covered. 
The percentage of farmers participating is estimated to be low. There is only coverage of direct losses. the 
difficult economic situation is the reason for (non) participating. 
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8. Finland 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The government compensates farmers in relation to exotic diseases such as FMD, CSF or HPAI. For these 
diseases, the compensation scheme is 100% public for direct losses. No statutory or voluntary levies are op-
erated to establish an emergency fund. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
As regards exotic diseases such as FMD, CSF or HPAI, there is a possibility to compensate for loss of income 
to farmers caused directly by the measures taken by the authorities to control and eradicate the disease. In 
practice that means paying compensation if the farm is not allowed to buy or sell animals or products be-
cause of government measures. The compensation may be 100% of the losses or less and it comes from 
public funds. It may be paid to infected farms or to other farms affected by the measures, for example if 
they are situated in a protection zone. Compensation for consequential losses can also be paid to neighbour-
ing non-infected farms in restricted zones, thus reducing the incentive for irresponsible behaviour in relation 
to outbreaks of exotic diseases.  
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
As regards certain other non-exotic diseases subject to compulsory measures, such as BVD, the compensa-
tion for culled animals is 75% and there is no compensation for other costs such as cleaning and disinfection. 
The government does not compensate farmers for certain non-exotic diseases subject to compulsory meas-
ures such as salmonella. In case of salmonella in poultry, pigs or cattle, mandatory restrictions on the sale of 
live animals are put in place, but the government does not compensate farmers for measures to eradicate 
the disease. Instead, there is a voluntary insurance scheme for Salmonella. 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
As regards non-exotic diseases, there is no public compensation for indirect losses, but the voluntary insur-
ance scheme for salmonella described below also covers losses caused by the interruption of the produc-
tion.  
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Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
For eradication of Salmonella, there is a voluntary private insurance-based scheme which covers losses of 
culled animals and cleaning and disinfection, as well as certain losses due to business interruption.. The in-
surance is offered as a group insurance through slaughterhouses, dairies or egg-packing plants which makes 
the insurance feasible for producers. The fees are collected through these businesses by withholding the in-
surance fee from the price paid to the producer for meat, milk or eggs. The main reason why certain pro-
ducers do not have the insurance is that they are selling their products directly to the consumer. Individual 
insurances can be bought by such producers but they are more expensive.  
 
9. France 
See information in next appendix  
 
10. Germany 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The German program for statutory diseases is set up by national legislation, but each Bundesland is respon-
sible for running the program. The Bundeslander draws up the detailed rules of the application. The scheme 
is compulsory, also based on levies for the farmers. The program is run by an administrative council that de-
cides the level of the levy etc. The administrative council is made up of farmer and ministry representatives. 
The levy varies between species according to the needs of the fund. The compensation payments are made 
from the available funds to 100% and will be refinanced to 50% from the Federal State. Usually the levy in-
creases after a disease in order to refinance the outbreak. The levy is used to co-finance the Community 
Veterinary measures following a disease outbreak as well as testing, monitoring or preventive measures. No 
compensation is paid to farmers in the surveillance zones.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Public compensation of consequential losses and loss of revenues are not considered. Even directly affected 
farms do only receive the value of the killed and destroyed animals. 
In Germany, the private “Ertragsschadenversicherung” indemnifies farmers against the full range of conse-
quential losses as one of the coverage options, including those resulting from movement standstills. 
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OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Private insurance. See ‘Ertragenschadenversicherung’ below. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Only private: see ‘Ertragenschadenversicherung’ below. 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
As far as acceptance and market penetration is concerned, a comprehensive private livestock insurance 
scheme exists in Germany, includes loss of income and provides reliable protection against pests and dis-
eases. The “Ertragsschadenversicherung” covers: 
 
 loss of livestock and losses due to disturbed production; 
 decrease of the value of the herd; 
 losses due to business interruption and of transport and/or sales restrictions, due to: 
 accidents in the stock; 
 qualified pests and diseases (named by the German Tierseuchengesetz); 
 other infectious diseases; 
 loss of defined quality standard; 
 theft. 
 
Insured is the “Ertragsschaden” (loss of income, revenue), which means that the diminishing gross margin 
with respect to the proportional on-going costs is paid out to the farmer. An “as if situation” is simulated be-
tween the projected income without business interruption and the real situation with the incurred loss. The 
sum insured consists of the annual turnover minus proportional costs following the production9. Participa-
tion level of dairy cows is over 50%, cattle 30%, sows 42% and hogs 23%. Insurance for sheep is not avail-
                                                 
 
9
 See Wilkens/ Bruck Möller VVG Tierversicherung 9.Auflage #47-#53 to be published end of 2010. 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 145 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
able. Insurance for poultry is mainly offered by one special insurance company (R+V/VTV), offering coverage 
for broilers, layers and breeders. The market share of broilers amounts up to 60%. 
 
The following reasons for (non) participating in the private insurance scheme are mentioned:  
 Premiums are too high; it is difficult to communicate that even in disease free periods premiums 
have to be paid. The need for insurance depends on the risk assessment and risk management 
of single farms, taking into account the kind of production, equity capital cover and the man-
agement. The insurance premiums and indemnification payments will be balanced against the 
remaining business risk.  
 Coverage inappropriate for small farms;  
 Expiring farms do not need insurance coverage 
 Livestock is no main pillar for sideline farms 
Due to the structural change, the residual farms will expand the input of committed assets and the degree of 
specialization will increase so that the requirement for insurance will increase as well. 
 
A problem of the existing private insurance system is that after an outbreak of a major disease in another EU 
MS or in the vicinity, the reinsurance market is no longer prepared to prolong the reinsurance contracts 
(Wilkens, 2010). 
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11. Greece 
No information received from Greek authorities 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases in Greece 
According to Wilkens (2010) the government operates a compulsory agricultural insurance scheme via the 
Greek Agricultural Insurance Organisation “ELGA”. ELGA has the objective of organising and implementing 
programmes of proactive protection and insuring the production and assets of agricultural enterprises. 
More specifically, insurance with ELGA includes compulsory insurance against damage which is caused to for 
example animal assets of farmers. Persons who own breeding stock or poultry or domestically produced 
products and by-products of animal origin shall be subject to insurance. ELGA is funded by an ‘income from 
special insurance contributions’ (of which the fee is 0.5% of the value of the sold livestock production) and 
this constitutes the major financial source.  
 
12. Hungary 
(No information received from Hungarian Authorities) 
 
13. Ireland 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
For FMD, CSF & AI, direct losses are paid from public funding based on on-farm valuation of animals. A simi-
lar compensation scheme applies for TB eradication, but the programme is part-funded by the farmers (indi-
rect levy for TB). There is also public funding for other notifiable diseases (Irish Class A).  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
No public or private compensation for consequential losses. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
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Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Public funding for compensation of direct losses due to Irish class A diseases (notifiable). 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
No public or private compensation for consequential losses. 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
None 
 
14. Italy 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Government compensation complies with the principles listed in the Council Decision 2009/470/EC. More-
over, there is a voluntary insurance system regulated by an annual plan (Agricultural Insurance Annual Plan 
according to D. Lgs n.102 del 29 marzo 2004) that cover three risk (caused by major diseases FMD, brucello-
sis, pleuropneumonia, tuberculosis, leucosis): direct cost (not covered by other government compensation), 
disposal costs and consequential cost. The insurance system receives public support by a national fund (Na-
tional Solidarity Fund).  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Voluntary insurance system for compensation of, among others, consequential losses of notifiable (and 
other major) diseases, supported by public funding. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
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Voluntary insurance scheme for compensation of, among others, direct losses due to major diseases like 
pleuropneumonia. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Voluntary insurance scheme also covers consequential losses for major diseases like pleuropneumonia. 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
The 2009 insurance campaign was the fourth year of implementation of public support for farmers’ insur-
ance policies. Indeed, as was done in three years 2006/2008, using the maximum contribution of 50% of the 
premium, operators of the livestock sector have secured their livestock against the damage, not covered by 
other government compensation, caused by major diseases (FMD, brucellosis, pleuropneumonia, tuberculo-
sis, leucosis).  
After two insurance campaigns characterized by insurance subsidized coverage intended exclusively for cat-
tle farms, in 2008 for the first time facilitated covers for pig farms were introduced and 2009 has seen the 
consolidation of these policies. In particular, the volumes are represented by major insurance contracts cov-
ering dairy cattle (91%), followed by pigs (5%), beef cattle (3%) and, finally, cattle fattening (1%). While the 
annual plan providing insurance benefits for other livestock (sheep and goats, poultry) and relative animal 
diseases, those hedges have not yet found concrete facilitated implementation.  
Over 50% of the total value of insured property regarding cows lies in the Lombardy region, where there is 
the highest percentage of farms with more than 100 cattle. Therefore, large farms are more likely to con-
tract insurance. 
 
The following reasons for (non) participation are mentioned: 
 Strong confidence in the public helps; 
 Lack of budget; 
 Complexity of contract procedures of insurance premium (farmers can trade only if as-
sociated); 
 The insurance contract is more favourable for herds with large number of animals. 
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15. Latvia 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The public services provide compensation for direct losses caused by FMD, HPAI, and CSF. 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
There is public-private cooperation in compensation of consequential losses. [no more detailed information 
given] 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
 (No information received/not present) 
 
16. Lithuania 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Public-private compensation of direct losses. 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Public-private compensation of consequential losses. 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
No information 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
No information 
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Remarks by authors:  
The response of the Lithuanian government was rather brief. However the following website gave the fol-
lowing information. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/external/insurance/annex16_en.pdf  
There is agricultural insurance available for Lithuanian farmers, including animal insurance.  
Animal insurance was started in 1991 and is provided for livestock, horses, sheep, goats, pigs; several com-
panies also include bees, birds, fishes, etc. These animals can be insured of animal loss from: 
 
 Non-communicable diseases (including forced slaughters if due to used 
 medicaments and sticking animal can’t be sold for slaughter) 
 Infectious diseases (including forced slaughters); 
 Natural forces or accidents: lightning, storm, blizzard, hail, rainfall, fire, electric current voltage, 
sunstroke, choke, self-strangulation, wild animals’ attack, etc. (including forced slaughters if due to 
the before mentioned natural forces an animal has suffered an injury which will necessarily end in 
death); 
 Theft or vandalism. 
Several companies also offer insurance of healing expenses, comprising expenses for medicaments; veteri-
narian healing, diagnostic, laboratorial analysis; fee for the reference issued by the veterinarian. Animals can 
be insured regarding: market, residual or pedigree value.  
There is partial compensation of insurance premiums by the government. Provided since 1992. The objec-
tive is to support voluntary insurance, which is very low, and together to decrease state expense for support 
of the aggrieved. Compensations reach up to 50%. 
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17. Luxembourg 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
There is public compensation of direct losses.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
There is public compensation of consequential losses. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Voluntary insurance of direct and consequential losses, 2% of farmers participating. Reasons for non-
participation: high costs and public compensation of direct and consequential losses. 
 
According to Wilkens (2010) Luxembourg has adopted the German private insurance scheme for consequen-
tial losses and the state supports the payment of the farmers paid premiums with 50%. 
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17. Malta 
(No information received from Maltese Authorities) 
 
18. Netherlands 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
It is a combined public-private scheme, based on levies (compulsory). Producer contribution to direct costs 
of livestock epidemics is operated through Livestock Veterinary Fund (LVF). The current procedures for this 
fund were developed following the devastating epidemic of Classical Swine Fever 1997/98, when the gov-
ernment incurred large expenses in control measures. The LVF effectively sets the maximum amounts of 
producer contributions to cover the costs of veterinary actions in the case of a disease outbreak. Any spend-
ing required beyond this limit is covered by the Dutch government and the EU funds (through contributions 
from the EU Veterinary Fund). For example, in the CSF epidemic of 1997/98, producers contributed ap-
proximately EUR 20 million, or 0.1% of the total cost, the share of the EU was about 50% (but taking into ac-
count deductions, e.g. due to the perceived overcompensation of affected farms, it was generally reduced to 
about 30-40% of total costs), while the Dutch government covered the remaining part.  
The LVFs are accumulated for all main livestock types: pigs, cattle, poultry, and sheep and goats. The contri-
butions of producers to these funds are raised through levies per slaughtered/exported animal, or per units 
of milk sold in the milk sector. The size of the funds, and consequently the levy amounts, are based on a sci-
entific risk assessment and the evaluation of the financial cost of the control measures. However, the defini-
tive size of contributions is also subject to negotiations between the government and the industry. Cur-
rently, the assessment of the Fund amounts considers mainly the risks of major diseases FMD, CSF and AI. In 
principle, in the event of other large epidemics, additional assessment should be made and additional levies 
imposed. The combination of measures that are applied to control epidemics (scope of culling, recourse to 
preventive vaccination, etc.) is a factor in determining budget assumptions. For example, the difference in 
control strategies can explain the different amounts of funds for each of the five-year periods since 2000. 
For the period 2010-15 almost all maxima were decreased. It has also been agreed that the maxima are re-
considered each year depending on inflation and number of farms. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Several insurance products were introduced in recent years to cover consequential losses resulting from 
livestock epidemics (Avipol, Porcopol). In addition, e.g. cattle farmers can commercially insure their conse-
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quential losses as part of their catastrophe insurance. This is a basic type of cover: if a herd is destroyed be-
cause of a FMD epidemic, the indemnity includes 15% of the insured value of the catastrophe insurance. 
There is no deductible and no actual loss assessment. Apart from these products related to epidemic dis-
eases, Avipol provides insurance against some non-epidemic poultry diseases. 
Following FMD and AI outbreaks, emergency funds were created by the government for farmers in distress. 
Those who were severely affected by the control measures and the consequences of livestock epidemics 
could apply for assistance and, after fulfilling a number of criteria, receive the aid.  
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Recently, the government stimulates private risk management initiatives to cover consequential losses 
within the framework of article 68 of the Common Agricultural Policy. These sector initiatives focus e.g. on 
the devaluation of hatching eggs during AI outbreaks or possible devaluation of vaccinated animals or their 
products after application of (compulsory) vaccination to control animal diseases. 
  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 154 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
19. Poland 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The current animal diseases compensation schemes for compensation of direct losses are strictly public 
(compensation of all direct losses from public funds). At present time, farmers do not contribute to the costs 
associated with the eradication of infectious animal diseases.  
  
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
There are no arrangements concerning compensation of consequential losses caused by outbreaks of major 
contagious animal diseases. Compensation for farmers in purpose to eradicate infectious diseases are cov-
ered by the state budget and do not include lost profits related to their business. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
There are public schemes for compensation of direct losses due to statutory diseases.  
There are public schemes for compensation of consequential losses. [No further information given] 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
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(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
(No information received/not present) 
 
20. Portugal 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
There are public schemes for compensation of direct losses due to statutory diseases.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
There are public schemes for compensation of consequential losses. [No further information given] 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
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(No information received) 
 
21. Romania 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Public compensation of direct losses. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Private compensation of consequential losses. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Insurance activities (direct and consequential losses) developed especially for grains and agricultural land, 
less for animals. Less than 3% participation of livestock plants. 
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22. Slovakia 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The current animal diseases compensation schemes in Slovakia for compensation of direct losses is an insur-
ance (voluntary) scheme.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
The insurance (voluntary) scheme also compensates for consequential losses.  
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
(No information received/not present) 
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23. Slovenia 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Expenses incurred in the suppression and eradication of diseases of the former A list - OIE at infected hold-
ings are covered from the National Budget of the Republic of Slovenia (compensation for animals, objects 
and raw materials, destroyed feed, cleaning and disinfection, removal of dead animal carcasses,…).  
In addition, compensations for killed or slaughtered animals, and for objects and raw materials, which have 
been injured, damaged or destroyed on account of measures instituted in case of the following diseases (in 
addition to the former A list - OIE) are covered from the National Budget of the Republic of Slovenia: Porcine 
Enteroviral Encephalomyelitis (Teschen Disease), Venezuelan Encephalomyelitis of Equidae (VEE), Aujeszky’s 
Disease, TSEs, Brucellosis (excluding B. ovis), American Foul Brood, Enzootic Bovine Leukosis (EBL) and Bo-
vine Tuberculosis (direct losses). 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Indirect losses cannot be covered from the National Budget; however, in particular cases, the State may 
adopt ad hoc measures to aid the affected entities (e.g. in case of AI, CSF). 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
In case of all other diseases, funds may be obtained under the Removal of Consequences of Natural Disas-
ters Act, provided that the loss is greater than 0.3 tenth of a percent of the planned incomings of the Na-
tional Budget. 
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
In principle, the State neither covers any indirect losses, nor offers any insurance coverage. 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Animal diseases (of the former A list - OIE) are not part of insurance schemes. 
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However, up to 30 % of the amount, the State does co-finance insurance premiums for insurable animal dis-
eases. Approximately 20 % of farmers are participating. Only coverage of direct losses. Reason for (non) par-
ticipating: favourable epizootiological situation, insurance scheme that would include all the interested par-
ties does not exist at national level. 
 
24. Spain 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
Currently, there is compensation for all the aspects considered in Council Decision 2009/470/EC. In addition, 
there is a voluntary insurance scheme for Brucellosis (Bovine, ovine and caprine), Bovine Tuberculosis, Enzo-
otic bovine leukosis, Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, Salmonella, Aujeszky, BSE, Foot and mouth dis-
ease, Classical swine fever, African horse sickness, West Nile fever, Newcastle Disease, Avian Influenza 
(Highly and Low pathogenic). This insurance scheme may be supported by public funds.  
The insurance scheme is a compensation system for indirect and direct consequences of animal diseases. 
Premiums are subsidized by the government. Recruitment is voluntary. The indemnity insurance covers di-
rect impact on the value of animals to the market price (mainly by the genetic merit of animals), taking into 
account the compensation awarded by the government. Therefore, the sum of insurance compensation and 
the government does not exceed the market value.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
The voluntary insurance scheme (by Spanish Agricultural Insurance System) also compensates for conse-
quential losses due to animal diseases. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The voluntary insurance scheme (by Spanish Agricultural Insurance System) compensates for direct losses 
due to animal diseases. 
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The voluntary insurance scheme (by Spanish Agricultural Insurance System) also compensates for conse-
quential losses due to animal diseases. 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
Every year, during the months of September, October and November, the compensation of insurance are 
reviewed in order not to overcompensate, and the effects of this analysis are transferred to next year. Each 
disease has its consequences, direct and indirect, so insurance is designed in accordance with the nature of 
the losses and the existence of "spaces severance". 
 
Percentages of farmers participating in the voluntary insurance scheme: dairy cattle 60%; beef cattle 10-
15%; ovine 10%. For porcine, equine and avian species: insurance of these species were adopted two years 
ago. There is still very low recruitment, but the existence of insurance guarantees against animal diseases is 
driving the interest of farmers. 
 
Compensation by the insurance scheme for direct losses (mainly by the genetic merit of animals) and conse-
quential losses (mainly by immobilization of farming, health gaps). Regarding Salmonella, for example, farm-
ers are compensated if the eggs of a positive farm should be sent to the egg processing industry (egg prod-
ucts). Each disease has its consequences, direct and indirect, so insurance is designed in accordance with the 
nature of the losses and the existence of "spaces severance". 
 
The participating is voluntary. The lack of recruitment is due to: 
 Farmers believe the government will always help; 
 Farmers have no sense of risk, primarily in epizootic disease (FMD, etc); 
 Lack of liquidity; 
 Do not know the existence of insurance. 
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25. Sweden 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The compensation for statutory diseases is regulated by the Law on Epizootic diseases regarding serious 
animal diseases like Newcastle Disease, Avian Influenza and Foot and Mouth Disease. 
Compensation is paid to the animal owner after he/she has applied for compensation to the Board of Agri-
culture. Costs that entitle to compensation are the value of the animals, loss of production as well as sanita-
tion costs. 
 
For contagious diseases, the level of compensation is 100 % (except for loss of production where the com-
pensation is 50 %). Some production types like broiler production, which are subject to a higher risk of infec-
tion, are excluded from the state compensation measures.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Full compensation for production loss is paid for certain serious diseases: FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD and TSEs. The 
compensation for loss of production due to other contagious diseases is 50%. Only production losses directly 
caused by authority decisions are compensated, not for example losses due to the disease itself or the im-
pact of fear of disease on for example farm tourism. Broiler production is excluded from the state compen-
sation. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
The compensation is regulated by Law on Zoonotic diseases regarding salmonella. 
Compensation is paid to the animal owner after he/she has applied for compensation to the Board of Agri-
culture. Costs that entitle to compensation are the value of the animals, loss of production as well as sanita-
tion costs. For Salmonella, the compensation is 70 % if the holding is affiliated and 50 % if the holding is not 
affiliated to one of the voluntary control programmes for salmonella. This programme is administered by the 
industry, but approved by the authorities. The rules aim at reducing the risk of salmonella infection and fa-
cilitating decontamination in case of outbreaks. 
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Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
Loss of production due to salmonella control measures is also compensated for.  
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
There are private insurance policies which provide coverage beyond the state compensation. 
The most comprehensive schemes are those for broilers, where no governmental financing exists in case of 
disease outbreaks. The broiler association has a special agreement with an insurance company where a 
farmer may only join if he has a high level of biosecurity and is affiliated to certain surveillance schemes. 
Farmers who cannot or do not want to be parts of such schemes are referred to other more expensive in-
surances.  
There is also a fairly similar scheme for laying hens, even though they get some governmental financial sup-
port in case of outbreaks. For laying hens, there is a special solution for outdoor farming, with a higher fee 
but the same level of payment in case of an outbreak.  
 
About 97% of the broiler farms and 80% of the laying hen farms are affiliated.  
The insurance scheme for broilers covers the value of the dead or killed animals and costs for destruction of 
carcasses. The insurance for laying hens covers:  
 for diseases without public financing (salmonella) the value of animals, cleaning of premises and 
productions loss for a maximum of 12 months,  
 b) for diseases with public financing it covers the part of production loss (50%) that is not cov-
ered by public funds.  
Reasons for (non) participation in insurance schemes are: old stables, difficult to disinfect and giving poor 
protection against rodents and wild birds, small scale farms, and outdoor broiler farms.  
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26. United Kingdom 
STATUTORY DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
United Kingdom: For FMD in cattle, sheep and pigs the government compensates destructed animals at 
100% of the market value. There is no levy of farmers. The UK government pays some compensation for 
animals slaughtered due to Bovine Tuberculosis, Brucellosis and BSE in cattle as well as many other diseases. 
As far as poultry diseases are concerned, such as Avian influenza and Newcastle Disease, the government 
only pays compensation for birds slaughtered which are non-diseased (at 100% of their market value).  
The UK government pays compensation for sheep and goats slaughtered due to scrapie; and salmonella in 
poultry/turkeys for which the government has statutory control plans. For Brucellosis, compensation is also 
payable in the event of animals being compulsorily slaughtered due to Enzootic Bovine Leukosis and Salmo-
nella. The government pays some compensation for bovine tuberculosis (and BSE, EBL, and Brucellosis) is 
paid; primarily this is determined by table valuations using average sales prices for 47 different cattle cate-
gories.  
 
The Scottish Government currently pays (through the GB animal health and welfare budgets) compensation 
at market value for those animals that are destroyed. Scotland generally also pays (through the same budg-
ets) the costs associated with cleansing and disinfection, and transport and disposal (this is disease specific).  
 
In Northern Ireland for FMD in cattle, sheep and pigs, the government compensates destructed animals as 
follows: affected animals are paid at the value immediately before it became affected; in every other case, 
animals are paid at the value of the animal immediately before slaughter. As far as poultry diseases are con-
cerned, such as Avian influenza and Newcastle disease, the government pays compensation at the value of 
the poultry immediately before slaughter. No compensation is paid for Aujeskzy’s Disease in pigs.  
 
In Wales, the UK position applies in general terms, but there are differences in respect of, for example, com-
pensation on Bovine TB, table evaluations in England versus market valuations in Wales (Welsh Assembly 
Government). 
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The UK government does not pay compensation for consequential losses. However, there may be private 
schemes available to farmers in the event that such losses are incurred. 
 
The Scottish Government also mentioned that there are currently no standing arrangements for compensa-
tion payments for consequential losses. But, public money has been used in the past to support industry. For 
example, during FMD 2007, a sheep welfare support package was established to address urgent animal wel-
fare problems facing light lambs that were normally exported at that time of year. A fixed rate was paid for 
each lamb sent to slaughter. 
 
OTHER DISEASES 
Compensation schemes for direct losses 
For Aujeszky's disease in pigs the UK government will pay market value immediately before slaughter, but up 
to a certain maximum price. The UK government pays compensation for salmonella in poultry/turkeys for 
which the government has statutory control plans.  
 
Compensation schemes for consequential losses 
(No information received/not present) 
 
Recent developments in agricultural insurance schemes for animal diseases 
None in the United Kingdom, as far as is known. Insurance is down to individual livestock keepers, and the 
CVO has no information on the insurance take-up. Insurance is normally available, but can be subject to high 
premiums depending on location. There is insurance available to cover TB, but the uptake is variable and the 
type of animal covered tends to be the higher value animals, where the compensation paid under the table 
valuations may not cover the value the farmer attaches to the animal. Otherwise premium levels in the 
higher risk areas may not make this an attractive option. Some cover is limited (to 25% of the market value 
of the animal) which harks back to the time when the Government paid 75% of the value of the animal, so 
this made up the remainder of the value. 
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In Northern Ireland, insurance for consequential losses is available, but the compensation rates probably 
mean that only a proportion of Northern Ireland farmers will secure such insurance. 
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APPENDIX 3: EVALUATION BY THE INDIVIDUAL MS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Austria 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
The following should be harmonised: categories of covered animal diseases/disease types; compulsory par-
ticipation of livestock farmers; the objective of the CRSSs, including: efficient risk transfer from farmers to 
CRSS; support of on-farm risk management; differentiation in financial contributions between cost sharing 
actors; risks and losses (direct/consequential) that can be covered by the CRSS; as well as WTO compliance. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
EU financial contribution also in peace-time as a benefit for exercises made well in the past 
Compensation for which losses 
Compensation for direct losses and consequential losses. 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS. 
Previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). These rates should be established 
by use of average market price plus additional fees (i.e. for mountain farming, breeding program. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
EU compensation of indirect losses is desirable and motivating, but hard to define and quite incalculable. 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
(No information) 
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2. Belgium 
 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Harmonisation of categories of covered animal diseases/disease types: 
 Epizootic diseases: e.g. FMD, CSF, ASF, AI, NCD. 
 Diseases with an important zoonotic risk: e.g. Rabies, BSE, Tuberculosis, Brucellosis, Salmo-
nellosis. 
 Other diseases with an impact on farm level and or covered by official national programs: 
e.g. Aujeszky, IBR, BVD, Paratuberculosis. 
Preferably compulsory participation of livestock farmers.  
The objective of the CRSSs should be an efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, but also proportionate 
risk transfer to al cost sharing actors. Support of on-farm risk management. Differentiation in financial con-
tributions between cost sharing actors. Direct losses should be covered by the CRSS. Concerning indirect 
losses (in Belgium the competence of the Regions): in Belgium there has been no real discussion whether 
consequential losses should be taken on board of the CRSS. Taking into account the nature and categories of 
consequential losses, it can be expected that the costs of consequential losses are far more important than 
the direct losses.  
One particular category of consequential losses that cannot be neglected are emergency situations due to 
stand-still. This standstill can cause in a short term immense welfare and technical problems on the farm, 
depending on the species (pigs, poultry) and category (piglets, fattening pigs, day old chicks, broilers, raring 
poultry).  
There also should be a harmonized maximum threshold for public funding. WTO compliance if possible 
within the EU objectives. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
It should concern peace time support and the co-financing of losses in times of crises. Peace time support 
will support prevention, control and surveillance programs. Nevertheless, even with this support, it will not 
always be possible to prevent outbreaks of highly contagious diseases. For this reason, the two forms of 
support are highly desirable.  
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Compensation for which losses 
See above (harmonisation of criteria). 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
(Question was found to be not so clear) 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Compensation of indirect losses is probably feasible. It is necessary to clarify first if this question concerns 
DG SANCO or DG SANCO and DG AGRI in order to have a clear view on the competences. The indirect losses 
are probably determinable and measurable.  
Outbreaks and losses are a risk linked to farming. An outbreak of an epizootic disease can have many causes. 
It is up to the government to ensure that there is adequate legislation, control and penalty policy. Indirect 
losses are normally the result of measures taken by the authorities in relation to the disease control and 
eradication measures. Some indirect losses can be determined in an objective way. Other indirect losses 
such as price effects or losses due to emergency vaccination are more difficult to control, but it is almost im-
possible to prove the unintentional character of these indirect losses.  
A good communication between the government and the competent authorities and all stakeholders of the 
food chain as a proactive action should prevent moral hazards.  
Arguments in favour of compensation of indirect losses: it supports the sustainability of the farms, also in 
the period after an outbreak of an epizootic disease. Arguments contra: taking into account the nature and 
categories of consequential losses, it can be expected that the costs of consequential losses are far more 
important than the direct losses. 
Implementation of compensation of indirect losses could be realised with an EU regulated legal framework. 
There is need for a adequate budget with a proportionate public/ private and EU shared financial responsi-
bility.  
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Via the CAP budget, rural development budget. Also EU financial aid provided that EU can accept national fi-
nancing with a budget of private origin used as a public budget.  
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3. Bulgaria 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
All mentioned criteria should be harmonised on EU-level, e.g. categories of disease types, compulsory or 
voluntary participation of livestock farmers, the objective of the CRSS, maximum threshold for public fund-
ing and WTO compliance.  
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
The EU financial contribution to CRSSs in Member States should concern both peace-time support and co-
financing of losses in times of crisis. 
Compensation for which losses 
Direct loses should be compensated. 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
The following should be financially compensated by the EU: a) support to prevention and surveillance pro-
grams and b) compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator.  
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
No compensation of indirect losses. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No 
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4. Cyprus 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Harmonisation of criteria regarding categories of disease types and voluntary participation of livestock 
farmers is needed. No harmonisation needed regarding maximum thresholds for public contribution and 
WTO compliance.  
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Also peace-time support, which will assist in the prevention of disease outbreaks. 
Compensation for which losses 
Compensation for direct losses and also for consequential losses like business interruptions, but only under 
conditions, e.g. precautionary biosecurity measures.  
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Preferred is support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered 
by the CRSS. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
No answer 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
 
5. Czech republic 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conforming to option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised are: categories of 
disease types (diseases with zoonotic potential and cross-border diseases), compulsory participation of live-
stock farmers, and 100% maximum threshold for public funding, WTO compliance. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
No answer 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 171 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
Compensation for which losses 
Also compensation of consequential losses. 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
a) support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on the basis of livestock numbers covered by the 
CRSS and b) compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Consequential losses are considered to be determinable and measurable.  
Regional Veterinary Administrations (RVAs) are responsible for guaranteeing of these losses in the Czech 
Republic. The Ministry of Agriculture provides compensation upon the request of a farmer, with the confir-
mation by the RVA concerning the validity of submitted data. 
Arguments for compensation: problems with business continuation. Arguments against compensation: diffi-
cult evidence of these losses, problems in the determination of the amount of compensation. The respon-
dent is against the compensation of indirect losses. The farmers should have voluntary insurance to cover 
the consequential losses.  
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
 
6. Denmark 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
It is important to ensure conformity with respect to the categories of animal diseases that may be compen-
sated. Participation of the farmers should be compulsory. It can be discussed whether or not to include the 
hobby sector. If the system is introduced as a voluntary measure the effect of transferring a higher degree of 
the responsibility and costs to the industry is lost in all those countries not having established industry 
funded emergency arrangements will choosing status quo. A voluntary system will maintain the distortion of 
competition which is present in the existing system. Therefore, option 3b is not a proper solution. 
As we have understood the objectives of the CRSS, it is to transfer the risk from the “national budgets” to 
the farmers and not a transfer of the risk from the farmers to a “system”, CRSS.  
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Option 3a will enable a development of a system where the individual farmer is responsible for reducing the 
risk of introduction of diseases to his livestock. In order to remunerate the farmer’s positive initiatives on in-
creasing the on-farm biosecurity, he should contribute less to a common veterinary emergency fund com-
pared to farmers having a “high risk” production. Economic incentive is normally the most efficient way of 
changing people’s behaviour. 
The economic structure in the compensation system should effectively support farmers working for imple-
menting risk mitigating measures. A simple and harmonised risk classification system should be developed. 
The Belgian system with a reduced fee to the veterinary fund from farmers having one-to-one trade would 
probably regulate the individual farmer’s trade patterns. 
A harmonisation of the compensation for the direct and consequential losses is essential in order to prevent 
distortion of competition within the Member States.  
Maximum threshold for public funding depends of the interpretation of public funds. The German, Dutch 
and Belgian system is build up as a “public fund” with a superior public control, although established by pri-
vate means. In the Netherlands, thresholds have been established for the contribution of the veterinary 
fund. It may be relevant to establish harmonized thresholds, as worst-case-scenarios of disease outbreaks 
may undermine the economical basis for the affected animal sector. In the Netherlands an over limit for 
payment from the different sector’s veterinary emergency funds exists and costs beyond this limit is covered 
by national means. This would be a way to go. 
If public funding is meant as national and EU funding, a maximum threshold would probably result in prob-
lems with effective disease control. Who is taking over when the limit is reached? If farmers affected with a 
disease late in an animal health crisis are not sure of being compensated, they may tend to be more reluc-
tant to report suspicions or outbreaks which in the end may prolong the crisis. 
Regarding WTO compliance, it is our impression that all the already existing systems for compensation of 
disease outbreaks in EU are in compliance with the WTO rules and as a new harmonized system will be 
based on the existing systems – probably a mixture – it is difficult to see that it suddenly should be in incom-
pliance with WTO. 
It is important with a framework of harmonized criteria whether it is left to the individual Member States to 
establish an industry financed emergency fund – either a veterinary fund or a kind of insurance arrangement 
like the German “Tierseuchenkasse”. The harmonized framework should include clear rules for the balance 
of the public and the industrial contributions and on a specification of the eligible costs in order to avoid dis-
tortion on competition. 
  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 173 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
If peace-time support covers disease eradication programmes and co-financing of crisis covers all disease 
outbreaks of prioritized diseases our proposal would be the following. There is a number of on-going eradi-
cation programmes in some Member States, which shows important progresses. Stopping the support here 
and now would in worse case result in already invested money would be lost. Therefore, if support to animal 
disease eradication programmes should be discontinued, there should be a proper transitional period e.g. 5 
years. If such programmes should be continued on national basis via funding from industry or combined in-
dustry-national funding, harmonized rules should be established on the degree of national public engage-
ment. A stop of EU co-financing of such programmes with a proper transitional period should encourage 
Member States with such programmes to increase the efforts to collaborate with the industry in order to 
finalise those programmes within a limited time frame. 
For certain diseases like rabies (important zoonosis), where EU co-financing has been granted for vaccina-
tion programmes of wildlife in countries bordering areas with endemic rabies e.g. the new Member States in 
east, a system of full Community funding (without national co-financing) of such programmes should be es-
tablished in order to prevent the disease to spread further into the Community. The same for vaccination 
campaigns in third countries and neighbouring EU countries against e.g. FMD or bluetongue, in order to pre-
vent the spread to the Community. Support to such programmes should continue. 
As EU via co-financing of disease eradication programmes has reached a relatively high animal health level, 
it would be amiss to transfer the responsibility of finalising such programmes on national basis as it is of the 
interest of the whole Community to avoid the introduction of those diseases. The EU co-financing of disease 
outbreaks of prioritised diseases should be maintained, but in a less complicated (less bureaucratic) way 
than today. Eradication of the serious contagious diseases is crucial for the international trade and, there-
fore, for the economy of the Community. 
Compensation for which losses 
EU co-financing should ideally only be focusing on direct losses.  
In case of disease outbreaks, unaffected farms within the 3 km protection zone will be placed under serious 
restrictions, especially movement restrictions, which may result in great losses. Farmers “caught” within the 
zone do not receive any compensation for indirect losses, which may give serious economic problems. 
Therefore, such farmers could tempt to get their herd infected as they would from an economical point of 
view be better off with the compensation for the value of the culled animals. This problem should be ad-
dressed when considering the limitations on the coverage of the co-financing. Such losses might be covered 
by national industry sponsored emergency funds as a harmonized solution. 
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Ways of EU support for direct losses 
In our view direct losses are losses directly connected to disease eradication. We regard support to preven-
tive measures and surveillance programmes as being peace-time support. 
Preventive measures e.g. development of biosecurity measures on farm level is the cornerstone in the new 
animal health strategy and should therefore be supported. A support based on the livestock number might 
be an un-bureaucratic way of administrating such a system. Then the individual Member States should be 
responsible for distributing the support. The distribution of the support should be based on harmonised 
guidelines.  
Compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator 
is the way it has been administered until now with an EU-compensation of 50 % and it is relatively easy to 
handle. The specific percentage for future co-financing should be discussed. 
A flat rate for all other losses would be an ideal solution. The existing system is extremely labourious for 
both the Commission and the Member States, so a flat rate would be an excellent progress. The rate could 
be established as a fixed percentage of the value of the culled animals calculated based on a scrutiny of the 
average costs of other losses of former disease outbreaks. By this way it is only the documentation for the 
valuation of the animals that is needed, making the system very simple, so that all the accounting can be fi-
nalized shortly after the valuation of the price of the animals.  
The general Danish opinion is that the EU support to the agricultural sector should be reduced as much as 
possible. Therefore, the above mentioned factors should be sufficient. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
It will be very difficult reaching a uniform estimation of compensation of indirect losses as it may vary sig-
nificantly between the Member States due to different level of prices and different development of the live-
stock sector. It will probably create problems to get an objective estimation of the indirect losses, unless a 
special calculation model is developed. This will create a very bureaucratic system which inevitably will 
cause endless discussions. A flat rate compensation scheme might be used. 
It is difficult to determine whether a loss is accidental and unintentional or deliberate. In many cases it may 
not be decided without a legal dispute. A prevention of fraud may require a very intensive scrutiny of all 
documentation, which is difficult to justify as the costs for the scrutiny may surpass the compensation. 
It must be expected that all farmers having experienced a disease outbreak will have indirect losses, so by 
using the material on disease outbreaks present in the Commission the frequency and probability may be 
calculated. In most cases where restriction zones have been established, farmers within the zone may have 
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experienced indirect losses. The number of farms within these zones also appears in the material reported 
to the Commission in connection with the disease outbreaks. 
In favour of compensation of indirect losses: The only case where coverage of indirect losses could be rele-
vant is in compensation for indirect losses for farms caught by the movement restrictions within 3 km zones. 
In longer crisis situations such farmers could benefit of getting their livestock infected with the disease as 
they in such a case will be economically compensated within a short time window, while by remaining under 
restrictions they have to cover their losses for a long period themselves. This is the only case where cover-
age of indirect losses could be relevant in order to prevent the temptation. An alternative could be to offer 
such farmers loans on favourable conditions. It may be a better solution. 
Against compensation of indirect losses: In other cases, it will be very difficult to estimate indirect losses in 
an objective way and the document control that has to follow will be very time consuming and bureaucratic. 
If coverage of indirect losses should take place, it might be better given as loans on favourable conditions. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Parts of the direct agriculture subsidies may be transformed to subsidies in connection with investments in 
improved biosecurity. 
 
Final remarks 
Main issues: 
 Only outbreaks of prioritised diseases should be co-financed. 
 Except for certain zoonoses and highly contagious diseases, co-financing of surveillance and eradica-
tion programmes should be phased out. 
 The compensation system should be simple and where possible exchanged with flat rate solutions. 
 A form of industry sponsored emergency fund (Tierseuchenkasse or veterinary fund) should be 
compulsory in all Member States.  
 Levels for compensation should be specified for EU, national and industry funding with emphasis on 
the industrial compensation. 
 Only the value of the culled animals, destruction of material and animal products and the prelimi-
nary cleaning and disinfection should be compensated by public funding (EU and national). 
 Harmonized rules should be established for the elements and the amounts compensated. 
 Distortion of competition should be avoided. 
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7. Estonia 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gories of covered animal diseases/disease types, compulsory participation of livestock farmers, differentia-
tion in financial contributions between cost sharing actors, risks and losses (direct/consequential) that can 
be covered by the CRSS, maximum threshold for public funding, WTO compliance. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
No answer 
Compensation for which losses 
No compensation for consequential losses. 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS, 
compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator, 
previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Compensation of indirect losses is not feasible. 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No 
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8. Finland 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
It is self-evident that any CRSS must be compliant with the WTO rules, so there is no need to specify that 
separately in veterinary legislation. If anything needs to be harmonised at EU level, that could be a general 
requirement that CRSS must include some incentives for on-farm risk management and a maximum thresh-
old for public funding of certain animal diseases covered by EU-legislation. Otherwise it is better to maintain 
maximum flexibility. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Since the overall legal systems and farming communities are so different in different Member States, it may 
not be wise to introduce EU financial contributions directly to CRSSs in Member States. That might lead to a 
very complicated and bureaucratic system with huge administrative costs. Instead, EU should continue to 
co-finance certain specified losses (at a minimum catastrophic event) as before, and in addition direct sup-
port for on-farm bio-security measures could be provided through the well established CAP-system.  
 
Compensation for which losses 
The EU financing support could be limited to direct losses. There are good reasons to provide compensation 
also for business interruptions, but since that is a more complicated matter it may be better to leave that to 
Member States or CRSSs.  
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
 The simplest way to provide EU support would be to establish flat rates based on number of animals killed. 
That flat rate could also cover costs for cleaning and disinfection. The rates could be established based on 
the average compensation paid until now, and would in any case be lower than the total costs (the rest 
would come from the Member State budget or CRSSs). Such a system would be simple and save a lot of ad-
ministrative costs.  
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Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Bans on movement of animals or products to or from farms can cause huge losses, which sometimes far ex-
ceed the losses caused by the culling of animals. When restriction zones (protection and surveillance zones) 
are established around an outbreak, all the farms in the area suffer from these losses, although only one 
may be infected. If only the infected farm gets compensation, that leads to a moral hazard for the other 
farms which remain free of disease. For that reason, compensation for the business interruption caused by 
the movement bans should be paid to all farms within the zone. Such compensations are feasible as long as 
the zones remain fairly small (3 and 10 km), but if the whole territory is covered by movement bans, com-
pensation may no longer be feasible. The size of such losses can be calculated based on the previous income 
of the farms, and the frequency and probability of them can be estimated as easily as direct losses. The 
compensation need not necessarily be 100%, but some compensation should be paid.  
As such compensations are slightly more complicated to calculate than compensation for culled animals, it 
may not be advisable to use EU funds for that. However, Member States should have the right to pay such 
compensations, if deemed necessary, or they could come from CRSSs. In Finland, compensation for business 
interruption in relation to exotic diseases are paid from public funds to infected farms as well as other farms 
affected by the movement bans. In the case of salmonella and certain other non-exotic diseases, the volun-
tary group insurance pays compensation for business interruption in the infected farms.  
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Direct support for bio-security programmes on farms could be provided through the CAP, as is already pro-
vided for measures preserving the environment and animal welfare.  
A suitable way of addressing the losses of slaughterhouses, dairies, egg-packing plants and similar enter-
prises situated in restriction zones should be developed.  
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9. France 
Answer of the French authorities to the questionnaire “European veterinary Funds” 
For submission to IBF International Consulting  
Consulting agency elected by European commission (DG SANCO) 
 
Answer to the questionnaire 
It was privileged a written and argued answer to the questionnaire of the consulting agency in order to clar-
ify the French orientations and positions resulting from the Sanitary General Meeting, while positioning, 
when that is possible the various options of the questionnaire. 
I - Information brought up to date about France 
 
In 2009, France was given a co financing of 37.15 M€ under the “European Veterinary Funds” (EVF) (decision 
2009/470/CE), broken down as follows:  
 0.67 M€ for Classical Swine-Fever (CSF)  
 0.14 M€ for Avian Influenza (AI)  
 10 M€ for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) / Bovine SE 
 25 M€ for Bluetongue (B), corresponding to a first section  
 1.34 M€ for zoonotic salmonellas  
 
These five actions are part of the framework of the annual programs of control, eradication and surveillance 
co financed under chapter III of the Decision 2009/470/CE. 
 
The Decision also envisages the possibility of financing emergency interventions. The use of this procedure 
remains low. However it was used last years for some animal diseases’ outbreaks. As regards Bluetongue, 
following the appearance of the serotypes 1 and 8 in France in 2007, an emergency vaccination plan was 
approved by the Commission in 2007 and 2008 by Decision 2008/655 for an amount of 27 M€ of which 21.1 
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M€ have effectively been refunded by now. As per the fight against poultry diseases, a request for co financ-
ing was put forward due to an outbreak of Newcastle disease in 2006 and 3 outbreaks of Low Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza in 2009. None of these procedures succeeded.  
 
Besides, the Community decision 2010/712/UE of November 23, 2010 approved the requests for Commu-
nity co financing proposed by France under the programs of surveillance, eradication and control against 
Bluetongue, zoonotic salmonellas, CSF, AI and TSE planned in 201110. 
 
II - Devices of compensation 
 
1. Direct losses 
 
The direct losses represent the immediate financial repercussions for stockbreeders such as the slaughter of 
animals or the destruction of contaminated products resulting from the confirmation of a legally notifiable 
(considered contagious) disease in their breeding. 
 
Some of these direct losses are eligible with co financing under the European Veterinary Funds within the 
framework of annual eradication programs (slaughter / stamping out for salmonellas, ESB or scrapie) or pos-
sible emergency interventions.  
 
As regards disease control legislation (sanitary policy), compensation for direct losses is primarily public. 
Thus the budgetary program “food safety and quality” (program 206) of the ministry in charge of agriculture, 
deals with, pursuant to the provisions of the rural code and maritime fishing, and the texts of application of 
the latter11, the following expenditures:  
 the cost of slaughter of animals  
 the costs of expertise on the value of the animals slaughtered 
 - the compensation for the objective (real) commercial value of the animals slaughtered 
                                                 
 
10 The ceiling of the Community co-financing associated with these programs is of 25.79 M€. 
11
 In particular the decree of March 30, 2001 modified. 
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 - the expenses directly related to the renewal of livestock
12
  
 - the cost of destruction of livestock products and food 
 - the compensation for the commercial value of livestock products and food destroyed 
On direct losses and other compulsory expenditures, co financing under the EVF relates to: 
 
* for emergency13 interventions 
 the compensation of the slaughter of animals 
  the compensation of the destruction of animals (carcass disposal) 
  the compensation of the destruction, if necessary, of animals’ products 
 the compensation of the destruction of food and material contaminated
14  
 the cleaning, the desinsectization and the disinfection of the exploitation and the material  
 the supply of vaccines  
 the execution of vaccination 
 
* for the national programs of control, eradication and surveillance of animal diseases and zoonoses15 
According to the diseases/zoonoses and associated16 costs or measurements:  
 purchases of traps, soft foods and vaccines  
 expenses of supply and distribution of traps, soft foods and vaccines  
                                                 
 
12
 Include medical expenses of introduction, forwarding and transport costs, expenses of disinfection of breeding buildings, addi-
tional requirements in repopulation, temporary deficit of production resulting from the slaughter of animals. 
13
 Chapter II, section 2 of the decision 2009/470/CE 
14
 Materials present on the exploitation, insofar as they cannot be disinfected. 
15
 Chapter III of the decision 2009/470/CE. Diseases and zoonoses mentioned in the appendix I of the aforesaid decision. 
16
 Are presented here only the costs relating to the diseases for which a Community request for cofinancing was made by French au-
thorities (bluetongue, salmonellose, classical swine-fever, TSE, avian influenza). 
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 operations of vaccination (administration of vaccines)  
 analyses17  
  the serotypage of isolates 
  the value of slaughtered animals and of destroyed livestock products  
 virological and serological tests  
 samplings 
 
NB: The cost of vaccinations, detections (screenings), entomological surveillance constitute obligatory ex-
penditures which can be comparable to a direct cost of the control against a disease. 
 
As regards legally notifiable (considered contagious) diseases, if preventive and surveillance measures de-
pend in major part of professionals, with regard to control measures, the role of the State is major. National 
public finances thus cover a big part of direct losses associated with control. For some diseases (TSE, salmo-
nellas), a Community participation is obtained via the co financed annual programs. 
 
Professionals can nevertheless take part to some extent in the assumption of responsibility of these losses. 
This participation can take the form of an individual assumption of responsibility of the stockbreeder or the 
intervention of professional18 solidarity funds, which can cover - if necessary in complement of public allow-
ances - certain costs of control against diseases (vaccines, slaughter…). 
 
2. “Indirect” losses 
 
Are regarded as “indirect losses” the losses (losses of profits or additional costs) resulting directly from the 
disease or a modification of the lawful or economic environment consecutive to the disease’s outbreak. 
Among these losses are the animals mortality, the zootechnical performances fall, the immobilization (food, 
                                                 
 
17
 Analyses of laboratory for purposes of the virological, serological and entomological surveillance, bacteriological analyses, geno-
typic analyses,… 
18
 It is here in particular made reference to “hard blows” funds and “Bluetongue” funds instituted by the National federation of the 
groupings of sanitary defense (FNGDS) or by its departmental groupings. 
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care) costs of animals following an administrative decision of prohibition of movement/circulation or 
sale/marketing of the animals, costs related to commercial downgrading of the products put on the market. 
 
Part of these losses is the subject of public finance ensured by program 154 of the ministry in charge of agri-
culture. This financing consists of the assumption of responsibility of exceptional crisis measures, if neces-
sary in counterpart of the particular measures taken by the European Union (cf below), in particular under 
the assistances of the mode “of minimis” (minimum?). Nevertheless, this government aid covers badly or in 
exceptional circumstances these costs, even not at all for some of them (lower zootechnical performances, 
commercial downgrading,…) ; the assumption of responsibility of these costs being then only born by pro-
fessionals or through devices/mechanisms of professional19 solidarity. 
 
The European Union intervenes for its part through the provisions of articles 44 and 45 of the regulation 
named « single OCM »20, which envisage exceptional measures of markets support in the event of serious 
disturbances on the Community market (meats and poultries sector) or of loss of confidence of consumers 
(poultry sector). 
 
Within the framework of the agreement on the results of the PAC (Politique Agricole Commune (or Common 
Agricultural Policy) and pursuant to article 71 of (EC) Regulation n° 73/2009, France notified (August 2009) 
to the European commission its intention to set up in 2011 the device of mutualisation (shared) funds. This 
device, which aims at a better cover of the “economic losses” consecutive to an animal or vegetable disease 
or to an environmental incident, leads to a sharing of financings between the professionals (35%), the Mem-
ber States and the European Union (65% including 75% of Community co-financing on behalf of the State). 
 
 
3. The insurancial systems of the agricultural sanitary hazards 
 
The General sanitary meeting (Etats Généraux du Sanitaire - EGS) joined together during the first quarter of 
2010 all the actors of the sanitary policy (administration, trade unions, scientists,…) in order to reach a col-
lective and shared vision of the national sanitary device, in a deep change context. Group 4 was dedicated to 
the questions of financing and mutualisation (sharing fund). 
                                                 
 
19
 It can be quoted here the “foot-and-mouth disease” funds of the FNGDS, which ensures a contractual compensation by animal in 
the event of the blocking of exploitations following an outbreak. 
20
 Regulation (EC) n° 1234/2007 of the Council of October 22, 2007. 
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Within this work group, the place and the role of the insurance companies in the agricultural world were ex-
amined, more particularly on sanitary questions. It was thus noted that the principal losses are currently 
covered either by the State21 or by mechanisms of professional solidarity (or by cofinancing between these 2 
actors). 
The insurance consequently appears likely to intervene primarily in complement of the compensations given 
by the various established devices.  
In the animal field the presence of products of insurance is different due to the fact that it is meant to cover 
losses due to a legally notifiable (considered contagious) disease (Maladie Réputée Contagieuse or MRC) or 
not. 
No product of insurance exists to cover direct losses due to legally notifiable (considered contagious) disease 
(Maladie Réputée Contagieuse or MRC). The existing contracts of insurance cover only direct losses consecu-
tive to other sanitary risks, such as accidents, fires, etc 
Concerning indirect losses, some products of insurance exist in the event of legally notifiable (considered 
contagious) disease (Maladie Réputée Contagieuse or MRC), in particular to cover complementary compen-
sations related for example to the immobilizations of animals within an farm. On the other hand, the offer of 
insurance products is more important relating to indirect losses consecutive with other sanitary risks. 
In practice, even if the insurance products exist on part of the above-mentioned losses, not or partially cov-
ered by public or professional compensations, they remain little subscribed by the farmers22. 
The absence of insurance products allowing to cover the indirect losses of a sanitary incident and in particu-
lar consecutive to a legally notifiable disease (considered contagious - MRC), can be explained by the diffi-
culty to ensure this type of risk hardly to evaluate (or to define as a model or type) and by the big part of 
public compensation in the field of legally notifiable diseases. 
Opinion on the public expenditure in terms of prevention and surveillance of animal diseases? Motivations? 
Today preventive measures concern professionals.  
During the General sanitary meeting, it was confirmed that the prevention, namely all measurements and 
actions contributing to avoid the appearance or to reduce the occurrence of diseases within livestock, was 
to remain under the responsibility of the professional world (cf below).  
                                                 
 
21
 If necessary, on the basis of exceptional mechanisms (ex: assumption of responsibility of Bluetongue mortality). 
22
 As example, 3% of the stockbreeders would benefit from a “animals mortality” contract, source: French federation of the insur-
ance companies (FFSA). 
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The State has primarily in this field an inciting role, in particular by encouraging the installation of guides of 
good practices within the professional23 sectors. 
The State can in addition condition the payment of government aid to the implementation of these good 
practices. 
In addition, to date, the assumption of responsibility of diseases surveillance is shared between the State 
and the professionals. One of the principal conclusions of the General sanitary meeting consisted in planning 
the installation of an epidemiosurveillance platform in the animal sector, joining together all the public and 
private actors. This mechanism aims to improve the collection and exploitation of surveillance data, animate 
surveillance networks, ensure the diffusion of epidemiological information and finally coordinate the pooling 
of information resulting from international health monitoring. 
 
In any event, public expenditures (Member State and European Union) allocated to animal diseases preven-
tion and surveillance constitute effective means of ensuring follow-up of livestock sanitary status, of acting 
upstream to the outbreaks and sanitary crises declaration and thus take part in the farms economic viability. 
The disengagement of public authorities of this policy would undoubtedly cause a less control of diseases’ 
outbreaks detection, a greater propagation of the latters and, finally, an increased cost for the actors con-
cerned with the risk management in the name of protection of public health (zoonoses) and animal health. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
The elements provided by the consulting agency appear to us insufficient to take position on the various op-
tions presented in the questionnaire. Consequently, it was privileged a written answer to the great sets of 
themes suggested in the questionnaire, instead of the exhaustive filling of the questionnaire. However, as 
far as possible, comments are emitted on certain of these options, if necessary according to the sets of 
themes approached. 
 
1. Judgement of the scenarios/options in comparison with the orientation to prevention and incentive 
 
                                                 
 
23
 In the poultry sector, as regards fight against the salmonellas, the sanitary charter conditions the State participation of the com-
pensation for control costs in the respect of the provisions of this charter and of a compulsory control program. 
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It is advisable here to consider the biosecurity, at borders, in breeding and throughout the food chain of 
production and marketing of animals and livestock products, as an integral part of prevention and fight 
against diseases. For this purpose, it appears desirable that these issues are integrated in the future “animal 
health law”; and, if necessary, that a coherence with the provisions of the package hygiene is ensured, which 
gives already a report on good manufacture, hygiene, and agricultural practices. 
At this stage, it is necessary to recall that the responsibility for the definition and the implementation of 
measurements of biosecurity concerns the operators (on an individual or collective level). The State, which 
must be able to create a minimum base by lawful way, must moreover have an inciting role, and encourage 
the installation of guides of good practices within professional sectors, which must result in a lightening of 
constraints and controls weighing on breedings. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that these measure-
ments will be effective only if they are validated scientifically, adapted to each sector and production mode 
and treated on a hierarchical basis according to their importance and the awaited level of protection. 
In addition, it is advisable to recall that the Community strategy of animal health plans to support measures 
of biosecurity in farms, pursuant to the quote “prevention is better than cure” 24. 
The current device (option 1) undoubtedly remains perfectible in terms of prevention, insofar as the finan-
cial indemnisation of the national and Community authorities is not conditioned with the obligatory and ef-
fective installation by professionals of preventive/biosecurity measures. The definition, at community level, 
of a framework or regulations on the matter (option 3a) could be likely to make evolve/move practices in 
this field. 
 
2. Judgement of the scenarios/options in view with the balance of distribution of costs and responsibilities 
between Community institutions, national authorities and agricultural professionals 
 
A cycle of national reflexion called “General sanitary meeting” (January-April 2010), joining together all the 
actors of animal and vegetable health in a common debate on the assessment and prospects for the French 
sanitary mechanism, made possible to release broad outlines and development tracks for an evolution of 
this device. 
One of the strong orientations which came out from this collective reflexion exercise consists in envisaging 
an assumption of responsibility of the costs of sanitary policy according to the sanitary and economic stakes 
                                                 
 
24
 See the communication of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee Euro-
pean and the Committee of the areas, COM 539 (2007). 
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inherent in the diseases. Thus, in order to optimize the efficiency of public intervention, the State action 
would be differentiated according to the consequences of dangers or sanitary events on public health or on 
the economy of sectors involved; the principle being retained of a modulation of the degree of the State in-
tervention according to a work of categorization of diseases - to be finalized25-. 
This orientation falls under a constrained budgetary context of Member States and European Union, which 
implies to focus means and actions of official services on the sets of themes of public and general interest. 
The application of this principle to animal health and control against diseases will thus have to result in a 
concentration of means and actions of competent authorities of Member States and Commission only on 
animal diseases which concern general interest, either in the field of public health, because of their zoonotic 
character, or in the economic domain. 
In parallel, the control of other diseases, which is of interest on a purely collective or individual basis for 
stockbreeders, without bearing a general interest for human health or for the breeding economic equilib-
rium, remains a challenge for professional sectors anxious to improve the quality and profitability of their 
livestock and livestock products. 
The Commission, within the framework of the Community strategy of animal health26, wants to lead its ac-
tion on a categorization of threats related to animal diseases, based on scientific database and on risks 
evaluation. 
In addition, a Community harmonization on a common base could prove to be necessary in the distribution 
of responsibilities and costs to guarantee the effectiveness and speed of the sanitary interventions, their 
proportionality and equity between recipients/beneficiaries (option 3a). Beyond this base, it would be ad-
visable however to leave to Member States which wish it, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, the pos-
sibility of intervening on complementary devices. In this respect, option 5 appears too constraining to us. 
On the contrary, in a constrained budgetary context for public finances and a difficult economic context for 
certain agricultural sectors, the Community disengagement induced by the options 4a or 4b (according to 
our interpretation, in spite of the brief character of the information relative to options) could lead to gener-
ate serious socio-economic difficulties for part of the agricultural world. 
  
                                                 
 
25
 The categorization of diseases must be related to the interest associated with diseases: general /public interest, collective interest, 
private interest. 
26
 Cf communication of the above-mentioned Commission. 
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3. Judgement of the scenarios/options taking into consideration their effective and sparing nature 
 
The wish expressed by the Community authorities to stress biosecurity and prevention of diseases, such as it 
arises from the current discussions on the revision of the animal health policy, must make possible to rein-
force the efficiency of the system. At national level, in the same way, the General sanitary meeting allowed 
to underline the interest for professionals to begin in a biosecurity and prevention policy, in the objective of 
a reduction of occurrence of disease outbreaks. 
 
4. Judgement of the scenarios/options in view with the simplicity and the clearness of the Community rules of 
co-financing of the reductions / losses of animal diseases 
 
On the basis of France experiment in the requests for Community co-financing under the European Veteri-
nary Funds, it could be desirable to determine with more precision in the Community decisions the costs or 
expenditures eligible to co-financing. This request aims to avoid the possible dissensions between Member 
States and the European commission on the calculation of the costs giving right to co-financing and on the 
amounts paid by the Commission departments. The shift between the sums awaited by Member States un-
der co-financing and the really versed sums can, in certain cases, weaken financial resources and capacities 
of action of the Member State in terms of financing the (its) sanitary policy. 
 
5. Judgement of the scenarios/options taking into consideration risk of distortion between Member States 
and areas 
 
The best means of avoiding risks of distortion between Member States and areas of the European Commu-
nity consists, without any doubt, in determining, at community level, an applicable groundwork in all Mem-
ber States. This groundwork will have in particular to define the great rules relating to the Community co-
financing in order to ensure equity between States (option 3a). 
The objective which must be continued is to avoid any risk of financial support to a Member State which 
would not engage in an effective and scientifically recognized policy of control of risks as defined by the cur-
rent Community strategy. 
 
6. Judgement of the scenarios/options in respect to the minimization of risks for the national and Community 
budgets 
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The participation of professionals to the costs supported up to now by public authorities would mechanically 
cause to generate budgetary economies for the national and Community authorities, appreciable in a con-
strained budgetary context. However, it appears necessary to recall that a setting with too important contri-
bution of professionals to this policy would be likely to cause serious difficulties in the management of sani-
tary / health hazards. 
It is consequently advisable to determine a right balance between a durable and financially viable distribu-
tion of costs of the sanitary policy and a creditable objective of public expenditures control. 
It appears in all the cases necessary to show measure to the nature and the calendar of the evolutions of the 
device / mechanism of community financing in order to obtain a progressive investment and an increased 
responsibility of stockbreeders in the fight against animal diseases, while avoiding a too brutal disengage-
ment which would have as a perverse effect to lead to a fall of the sanitary level and thus in the long term a 
supplement of loads for the actors of the sanitary policy. 
Lastly, for recall, professionals (FESSAS) clearly expressed their dissension on any public disengagement (in 
particular Community) at the time of major sanitary crises. Reacting to the new strategy of animal health for 
the European Union, they recommend urgently maintaining and reinforcing means allocated to the emer-
gency veterinary funds. 
 
7. Judgement of the scenarii/options with regards to the durability/sustainability of the agricultural trade 
within the European Union 
 
The sustainability of the agricultural trade within the European Union supposes to preserve within the 
Community space, a good sanitary state of livestock and the most homogeneous possible, which supposes a 
strong and collective action of all actors of the sanitary policy for prevention, monitoring and control against 
diseases. 
The evolution in the long term of the condition of exchanges of live animals aiming at a simplification of the 
current certification system can be considered only in this case. 
As indicated previously, it is advisable to recall that any disengagement of public authorities in the sanitary 
policy (animal health) could have as an incidence a less control of health / sanitary hazards and possible dif-
ficulties for farmers to ensure the assumption of responsibility of the costs of this policy, in a delicate eco-
nomic context for animal sectors (options 4a and 4b). 
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8. Judgement of the scenarii/options taking into consideration their coherence/conformity with the objec-
tives of the Community policies, international engagements of the EU 
 
The device of shared costs and responsibilities which will be retained will have to take into account the ori-
entations taken at community level as for the revision of the device of animal health, on the basis of the 
work of revision of this mode, currently under discussion. 
 
Comments/opinion on the open-ended questions (option 3A and 3B) 
 
Questions 9 to 15, which refer to the options 3a and 3b of the questionnaire, cannot be the subject of an an-
swer from the French authorities, taking into consideration the brief and incomplete nature of information 
delivered concerning the various options considered. Complements would be in particular necessary on the 
field of intervention of the “CRSS” (direct losses and/or indirect losses), the calendar and the methods of in-
stallation of this device/mechanism, the levels of compensation under consideration for the costs covered 
by this device, for the diseases covered by this mechanism.  
 
We would be grateful if you could communicate us with specifications on these 2 options.  
 
At this stage, and taking into account transmitted information, the option 3a appears nevertheless to ap-
proach more closely to the work carried out in France during and following the General sanitary meeting. 
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10. Germany 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Only high contagious diseases should be covered. Compulsory participation of livestock farmers. 
Differentiation in financial contributions between farmers and public. Maximum threshold for public funding 
should not be up to 50 %, but 50 %. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Losses in times of crisis, because even the best biosecurity system will not be able to prevent the introduc-
tion of highly contagious diseases on farms. The financial impact in times of crises for effectively combating 
animal diseases must be absorbed at least partially; a peace time support is not calculable. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
Only direct losses should be compensated. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS. 
Compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator. 
Previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Impossible to calculate indirect losses. Furthermore indirect losses are dependent on influencing factors of 
the individual farm, which the farmer best could manage and control according to his own risk management. 
Private insurance possibilities are existing, with which the public should not compete with. Compensation of 
indirect costs should only be implemented through voluntary private insurances. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No.  
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11. Greece 
(No information received) 
 
12. Hungary  
(No information received) 
 
13. Ireland 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Harmonised criteria should include: categories of covered animal diseases/disease types, compulsory par-
ticipation of livestock farmers, the objective of the CRSSs, a maximum threshold for public funding and WTO 
compliance. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Peace-time measures linked to Single Farm Payment & co-financing at time of crisis. 
Compensation for which losses 
No compensation of consequential losses.  
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Some support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the 
CRSS and compensation for losses due to animals killed, as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the 
operator. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Very difficult to determine & especially to audit compensation for consequential losses. Ireland is not in fa-
vour of this due to administrative difficulties. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
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14. Italy 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Categories of covered animal diseases/disease types should certainly be harmonised, as well as the partici-
pation of livestock farmers (compulsory or voluntary). Further harmoniation of the objective of the CRSS, 
e.g. an efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk management, differentiation in 
financial contributions between cost sharing actors and harmonisation of risks and losses (di-
rect/consequential) that can be covered by the CRSS.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Both peace-time support and support in times of crises: the balance should be linked to the disease catego-
rization. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
Compensation for both direct and consequential losses, depended on case-evaluation. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS 
as well as compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the 
operator. 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Indirect costs should be compensated, but a cost-efficient analysis of the measures necessary to do that 
should be performed. An effective Risk communication is important. Compensation of indirect costs could 
be implemented through subsidizing insurance premiums in order to balance the cost-responsibility be-
tween farmer and government. 
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Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No.  
 
Final remarks 
Option 3a could be the feasible scenario, but the Italian CVO strongly highlights that public support for direct 
cost of contagious animal disease is an indispensable tool for the success of eradication programmers. 
 
15. Latvia 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conforming to option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: 
voluntary participation of livestock farmers, efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, maximum threshold 
for public funding of 80 %.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
The more important financial contribution is in times of crises. 
Compensation for which losses 
Also compensation for consequential losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS 
and compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the op-
erator. Other losses will be difficult to establish. 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
These costs are difficult to determine and measure. 
Often these costs are very high compared to the value of culled animals. 
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Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
 
16. Lithuania 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: previ-
ous list A diseases, compulsory participation of livestock farmers, the objectives of the CRSS, like efficient 
risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk management, differentiation in financial contri-
butions between cost sharing actors, and WTO compliance.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
No answer 
 
Compensation for which losses 
No compensation of consequential losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS. 
Compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator. 
Previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
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17. Luxembourg 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
No answer 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Financing for preventive measures in peace-time is not in line with EU. This should be organized on MS-level. 
In time of crises, EU financing is correct to avoid the spread of animal diseases. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
EU-compensation only for direct losses. Consequential losses should be compensated for by the MS.  
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS. 
Compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator.  
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Indirect losses are difficult to evaluate. The frequency and probability of indierct losses can only be esti-
mated by rural economics.  
Direct losses have to be compensated, to allow a new beginning of the activities. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
[Questionnaire difficult to interpret] 
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18. Malta  
(No information received) 
 
19. Netherlands 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Harmonization of covered diseases as well as the risks and losses covered (direct and/or consequential) is 
preferred, also from a level playing point of view. From our experience compulsory participation is needed in 
the commercial sector in order for our system to work. Setting a maximum to public funding (depending on 
how it is meant here) is risky with respect to effective disease control once the threshold is reached. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Both. Support of measures in peace time could and should support reduction of co-financing during crisis. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
In principal only compensation of direct losses, in order to avoid undesirable behaviour of farmers and avoid 
creating a precedent with other (non-agricultural) sectors. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
It’s important to have clear criteria which are easy to work with and limit administration and control actions. 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
In principal only compensation of direct losses. There could, however, be situations in which compensation 
for consequential losses is justified, e.g. when compensating consequential losses might contribute to reduc-
ing the overall direct costs. However, it will be very difficult to reach a uniform estimation of the height of 
compensation among (and even within) member states. 
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Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Stimulating private initiatives to deal with (veterinary) risks in agriculture. 
 
Final remarks 
The Netherlands would be interested to have broader discussions on these issues with the Cie and other MS. 
 
20. Poland 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Categories of covered animal diseases/disease types should e harmonised. Voluntary participation of farm-
ers in the 1st phase of introduction of CRSS, gradually becoming compulsory. The objective of the CRSSs 
should be: an efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk management, differentia-
tion in financial contributions between cost sharing actors, risks and losses (direct/consequential) that can 
be covered by the CRSS, maximum threshold for public funding. WTO compliance is a prerequisite. 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
The EU financial contribution to CRSSs should concern both ways of support. Peace-time support decreases 
the risk of a contagious disease occurrence in a MS (therefore reducing the cost born by that MS), while fi-
nancing of losses in times of crisis ensures, that the actions connected with disease eradication are decisive, 
efficient and effective and that the disease shall be eradicated at the lowest possible cost. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
EU should only compensate for direct losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
EU support should concern compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the com-
pensation paid to the operator. This option is effectively exercised in this moment, and proved itself to be 
reliable and convenient 
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Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Introduction of compensation of indirect losses would be very difficult and at this stage - unfeasible. The 
main concern would be the lack of possibility of calculating in an accurate way the indirect costs, which 
would force to using (probably very complicated) counting algorithms, which would in turn be based on 
mean values harmonized on EU level (and therefore not accurate for some MS) or accurate only for an indi-
vidual MS (and therefore not harmonized between MS). Introducing compensation of indirect losses could 
also lead to financial abuses and possible fraud that would be hard to detect. Consequently the administra-
tive burden caused by the obligation to control proper implementation of indirect costs compensation, 
could lead to the necessity of establishing a completely new authority. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
The current rules are a good basis for developing new ones, but - as the option 3b is also very interesting 
and beneficial for the EU as a whole - we could take into consideration an option that combines the above 
mentioned ones - establishing the possibility for individual MS to develop CRSS provided that these schemes 
comply with EU harmonized criteria while allowing others to choose the option of getting EU co-financing 
according to the harmonized rules developed on the basis of the current rules. 
 
21. Portugal 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gories of covered animal diseases/disease types, participation of livestock farmers: compulsory or voluntary, 
the objective of the CRSSs, like efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk manage-
ment, differentiation in financial contributions between cost sharing actors, risks and losses (di-
rect/consequential) that can be covered by the CRSS and maximum threshold for public funding. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Both in peace-time and time of crisis. 
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Compensation for which losses 
Also compensation of consequential losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS 
and compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the op-
erator. No previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under 
Council Decision 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Assessment of these losses is possible.  
Prevention of moral hazards by means of an epidemiological inquiry. Approximate values of frequency and 
probability of indirect losses can be calculated. The payment of indirect losses may help disease eradication, 
but they have a high cost/benefit. It could be implemented with clear criteria established.  
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Yes, option 2 (EU-cofinancing rules are maintained, with maximum public contribution). 
 
Final remarks 
Questionnaire difficult to understand. 
 
22. Romania 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gories of covered animal diseases/disease types (Zoonosis and diseases with high diffusivity), voluntary par-
ticipation of livestock farmers and the objective of the CRSSs (support of on-farm risk management). 
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Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Peacetime contribution to reduce risk during the crisis. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
Compensation only for direct losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Important to support prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered 
by the CRSS.  
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
It will not be possible to determine all real costs. 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Maybe a different plan for the animals with a great compensation economic value. 
 
Final remarks 
I think the environmental impact has not been sufficiently achieved in this feasibility study.  
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23. Slovakia 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gories of covered animal diseases/disease types, participation of livestock farmers: compulsory or voluntary, 
the objective of the CRSSs, e.g. efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk man-
agement, differentiation in financial contributions between cost sharing actors, risks and losses (di-
rect/consequential) that can be covered by the CRSS. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes and co-financing of losses in times of crisis are equally 
important. 
 
Compensation for which losses 
Only compensation of direct losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS; 
compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to the operator; 
previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are currently financed under Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC. 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Losses are very difficult determinable (different types of farming, technologies that affect the cost and loss). 
Guarantees by veterinary control and ensuring compliance with the conditions. 
The frequency and probability of indirect losses can probably not be calculated.  
Indirect losses are difficult to determine and difficult to prove. It is necessary to ensure the prevention. 
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 203 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
No answer 
 
24. Slovenia 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gorisation and prioritisation of diseases, compulsory participation and definition of participating stake-
holder, introduction of more preventive-driven policy; well-known and well-defined responsibilities and be-
haviour of all the stakeholders strictly in line therewith, which impacts for also the on-farm risk manage-
ment; the objective is to define the roles and respective contributions of particular stakeholders; in CRSS, 
the direct, as well as indirect/ consequential losses shall be included, as well as preventive measures. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
EU co-financing should comprise the times of crisis as well as peace time. 
Compensation for which losses 
For minor MSs and minor economies, the consequential losses are much worse (ensuring and maintaining 
the competitive edge). 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
a) Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the 
CRSS and b) compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the compensation paid to 
the operator. 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
Considering the previous business operations and data, as for instance, if a farmer situated in the endan-
gered zone would dispatch animals for slaughter (also to the other MSs) – where there applies the ban on 
trade – the loss is not committed intentionally, and it is within the range of the ban.  
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Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
 
25. Spain 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b THAT should at least be harmonised on EU-level are: cate-
gories of covered animal diseases/disease types, participation of livestock farmers: compulsory or voluntary, 
efficient risk transfer from farmers to CRSS, support of on-farm risk management, differentiation in financial 
contributions between cost sharing actors, risks and losses (direct/consequential) that can be covered by the 
CRSS, maximum threshold for public funding.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Both options are right. Peace time support will enhance prevention and support in time of crisis will allow 
control and eradication.  
 
Compensation for which losses 
Both losses should be compensated. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Preferred ways of support: support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock 
numbers covered by the CRSS, compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed percentage of the 
compensation paid to the operator, previously agreed flat rates for all other losses of operators that are cur-
rently financed under Council Decision 2009/470/EC (instead of the current compensation of real expenses). 
These rates could be established considering previous experience.  
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
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It is feasible to determine and measure indirect losses. Valuation and joint research between the govern-
ment and technical valuation of insurance companies can give certain guarantees. In addition, advances in 
epidemiology, diagnostics and traceability allowing greater ability to detect moral hazards. The frequency 
and probability of indirect losses can be calculated. The Spanish Agricultural Insurance System has been per-
formed by actuarial and advances in predictive epidemiology. For eradication and prevention of animal dis-
eases, collaboration of farmers is essential. Indirect losses sometimes can be more serious than the direct.  
 
It could be implemented through a system of subsidizing insurance premiums, so that responsibility is dis-
tributed between the farmer and the administration. 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No answer 
 
26. Sweden 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
Criteria regarding CRSS conform option 3a and 3b that should at least be harmonised on EU-level are the fol-
lowing. Harmonized categorization of diseases should be a basis for decisions on EU financing. Furthermore 
It should be discussed whether on a Member State or regional level other diseases could be included, for 
example in connection with ongoing control schemes as agreed with farmer s’ organizations. Furthermore, 
the most effective and efficient system would probably be if all farmers were included and were obliged to 
pay to the system. Farmers could also have the option to choose a higher level of biosecurity than the legal 
basis and this should entitle them to a reduction of the fee. Such additional biosecurity schemes must be de-
signed to be transparent and cost-effective, taking into account the need for controls. The goal is to reduce 
the total risk by increasing the biosecurity and the CRSS is a tool to produce economic incentives for the 
farmer without putting the whole risk directly on the individual farmer. Support of on-farm risk manage-
ment, e.g. training in biosecurity Differentiation in financial contributions between cost sharing actors can 
be discussed. Also maximum threshold for public funding and WTO compliance.  
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Peace time support to creation of CRSS: biosecurity training, surveillance is preferable as it aims at reducing 
the risk not paying for risks taken.  
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Compensation for which losses 
Only compensation for direct losses. 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock numbers covered by the CRSS 
is important (but is this a direct loss?) 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
EU should not pay indirect losses. A CRSS could pay some indirect losses as for example parts of production 
losses.  
 
Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
Certain measures can be paid in Member States neighbouring a high risk third country. e.g. extra monitoring 
for FMD or vaccination of wild animals against rabies. 
 
27. United Kingdom 
Minimum harmonisation of criteria 
TB surveillance and control program is compulsory. Support of on-farm risk management is important. 
 
Peace-time support or co-financing losses in times of crisis 
Peace-time support is not so relevant for TB (UK).  
Should the EU decide to bring forward proposals which would require farmers to bear some of the costs as-
sociated with direct losses (either through defining a maximum percentage of public financial contribution 
or requiring the compulsory introduction of cost sharing schemes in Member States), then it would be im-
portant that such proposals would be brought forward gradually so as to lessen the impact on NI farmers 
and to allow time for insurance companies to re-evaluate the cover they provide (Northern Ireland). 
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Compensation for which losses 
The Scottish Government supports the legitimate use of CAP funds for the promotion of animal health and 
animal disease prevention to reduce the risks of notifiable disease and to support the public goods associ-
ated with high health status, e.g. the mitigation of environmental impact of livestock production through 
improved efficiency.  
 
There will also be a need to ensure that NI farmers, and the local livestock and livestock products sector, are 
not disadvantaged vis-a-vis farmers in the Republic of Ireland, possibly as a result of the UK opting for a least 
cost to the public purse option in the scenario that each member State can opt for its own system (Northern 
Ireland). 
 
Only direct losses should be compensated for (Welsh Assembly Government). 
 
Ways of EU support for direct losses 
Compensation needs to be set at an appropriate level to encourage the prompt reporting of disease and 
farmer cooperation with control programmes and on biosecurity. It is accepted that, transferring an increas-
ing proportion of the cost of disease control from the taxpayer to the primary producer, would be likely to 
have a beneficial effect in terms of encouraging greater attention to biosecurity (Northern Ireland). 
For TB, there is already support to prevention and surveillance programmes, e.g. on basis of livestock num-
bers covered by the CRSS (United Kingdom). Also, compensation for losses due to animals killed as fixed per-
centage of the compensation paid to the operator is already the current situation for TB (United Kingdom) 
 
Regarding compensation of indirect losses 
The UK government does not compensate for indirect losses. Generally, the UK government does not think 
compensation is a pragmatic option, the government is concerned about the level of complexity any scheme 
wanting to do this, will have. The UK government believes it would be prohibitably expensive. The UK gov-
ernment considers it to be very difficult to decide what things should be compensated for i.e. the difficulty 
in operating it.  
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Other ways of providing EU financial aid 
No.  
 
Final remarks 
TB is fundamentally different from the diseases that this questionnaire appears to be targeted at, it is not 
about emergency response but a long-term eradication programme. That is not to say that there is not read 
across in terms of support for enhanced on-farm biosecurity et cetera (United Kingdom). 
In order to enable livestock keepers in epidemiologically distinct sectors or regions to act collectively to pre-
vent disease incursions, there should be greater possibilities to implement external biosecurity within the 
framework of the single market. And for the cost of these measures to be passed to relevant actors that, 
through their activities, present a higher risk to the sector as a whole, such as traders in live animals (Scot-
tish Government) 
 
Additional remarks by the respondents  
 
Some additional remarks given by the respondents concerning a further detailing of certain questions are 
gathered below: 
 
What kind of preventive measures do you have in mind in relation with contagious animal disease and how 
should these be part of a CRSS? (AI, FMD, CSF)? 
 (Finland)The main preventive measures are minimizing trade in live animals and taking general 
biosecurity measures to protect the animals from infection through visitors, equipment, feed, 
water or contact with wild animals. The best way to link such measures to a CRSS would be to 
classify holdings in accordance with their risk status and introduce lower insurance or other con-
tributions for holdings with a better status, but the system needs to be simple to be manage-
able. A second option is to level the compensation in accordance with the risk status. 
 (UK) For TB there are the two main sources of infection, through cattle and badgers. Differing 
approaches are needed to militate against the different disease pathways, but biosecurity plays 
an important part in minimizing the risks of disease spread. The current option does not incen-
tivise this approach, since it deals with direct costs.  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 209 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
 We need a system that rewards good behaviour and penalizes bad behaviour (Welsh Assembly 
Government) 
 (IT) Improve identification and registration of animals; effective notification of animal disease; 
support biosecurity measures at farm level.  
 (DE) Biosecurity, monitoring, information of stakeholders, training. 
  (PL) a) Funding from public money of programmes for animal disease control, eradication and 
surveillance; b) Veterinary border inspection; c) Requirements for movements of animals; c) Re-
quirements for biosecurity; e) Possible vaccination of animals - vaccination against major animal 
diseases should be funded from public money, vaccination against other diseases should be fi-
nanced by the farmer (the proportion of public and private funds would be dependent on dis-
ease categorisation); f) Granting funds for investments in biosecurity infrastructure (but not for 
maintaining biosecurity). 
 (BE) Implementation by the farmers of hygiene and biosecurity measures on farm level; good 
farming management practices (e.g. reduced purchase policy and reduced number of origins of 
animals and products). In peace time, but also in periods of epizootic disease and restrictive 
measures, there should be a good cooperation and communication between farmer’s organiza-
tions and the authorities and responsible behaviour of individual farmers as members of the 
farmer’s organization. The financial consequences of an epizootic have direct consequences on 
the farmer’s contributions; therefore a swift and a successful result of the animal disease con-
trol measures have a direct positive impact.  
 
What kind of incentives will enforce farmers to fully participate in the prevention control in relation conta-
gious animal disease? 
 (Fin) Financial incentives (financial support for biosecurity through the CAP and/or better com-
pensation or lower fees for farms with good biosecurity). Administrative incentives (less controls 
and/or access to market). 
 (IT) Incentives system linked to the level of biosecurity measures application (less compensation 
or support for farmers that not/bad apply biosecurity measures). Penalties for Countries who 
not/bad implement the identification and registration of animals or notification of animal dis-
eases. 
 (DE) Full compensation of direct losses if certain (preventive) prerequisites are fulfilled by the 
farmer. Proportionate financial aid on preventive measures. 
 (PL) a) Granting funds for investments biosecurity infrastructure; b) Compensation of vaccina-
tion; c) Once the CRSSs are introduced an option to compensate up to 100% (instead of a lower 
value, which would be the result of the CRSS), of costs born due to disease eradication if the 
farmer complies with high biosecurity standards.  
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 (BE) A swift and adequate compensation, differentiated where possible according to rapid noti-
fication [in case of rapid notification the number of dead animals will be lower (e.g. CSF: healthy: 
100% , clinical illness: 50%, dead pigs: 0% compensation]. The administrative burden to obtain 
compensation should be minimized, which is a strong incentive for the farmers. 
 The full compliance with hygiene and biosecurity measures, good farming practices and low risk 
behaviour should result in lower levies imposed on the farmers. Other incentives in case of dis-
ease outbreak are a good and clear communication and reminder of the risks on farm level, re-
gional, national and international level.  
 
What kind of costs need to be covered and what is an ‘adequate’ compensation? 
 (Fin) Farmers already bear a considerable part of the losses, since there are far more losses in 
relation to a disease outbreak than can ever be compensated (extra work, loss of valuable 
breeding animals, interrupted production etc). When clinically healthy animals are culled by the 
authorities to prevent disease spread, it is only reasonable that the individual farmer gets com-
pensation. The question is whether that compensation should come from public money or from 
the industry of farming community, which are the main beneficiaries. The compensation should 
at least cover the value of the culled animals (if clinically healthy) and cost of cleaning and disin-
fection. It is also reasonable to compensate costs for business interruption, at least partly.  
 (UK) The costs to be covered should only concern direct losses such as the value of the animal 
slaughtered. Consequential losses should not be covered, nor should repopulation costs.  
 (IT) Public support for direct cost is essential in case of contagious diseases such as FMD. The 
farmers’ participation should be linked to a specific categorization of animal diseases. 
 (DE) Farmers should be participating on the costs of the system, either by levies or by other fi-
nancial contribution. The following costs should be covered: adequate compensation of killed 
animals, costs for destruction of the animals and rendering, cleansing and disinfection. 
 (PL) In our view, all costs born due to major disease eradication should be financed from public 
funds. If our concept changes over years, we will have an option to switch to the CRSS, yet we 
will need to develop the criteria for listing the costs that need to be covered by the farmers in 
the framework of the CRSS. 
 (BE) The compensation level of the current Belgian system differs according to the disease  
Epizootic diseases: FMD, CSF: 100% (with restrictions for healthy (100%), clinically illness (50%) or dead 
animals 0%)); Enzootic diseases: Tuberculosis, brucellosis, leucosis 80-85 %; Special cases with important 
public health risk: TSE, Rabies: 100% Poultry diseases: 70 % (Newcastle disease and Salmonella); except 
for AI : 90 %  
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The value of an individual animal should not exceed a certain maximum: Valuable animals: standard 
compensation, value above the standard level is the individual risk/responsibility of the owner. Costs to 
be covered:  
Direct losses: yes ; Compensation for culled animals, destroyed products (eggs, milk, sperm, feed,); Op-
erational costs: Culling costs,(killing, transport) , cleansing and disinfection costs and pest control in case 
of epizootic diseases; Monitoring costs on farm level in order to lift restriction measures in the zone(s); 
Emergency vaccination costs : yes. Indirect losses: in Belgium: competence of the regions. In the past 
there has been no compensation for indirect losses, except in some circumstances where an ad hoc EU 
regulated framework had been adopted.  
 
What should a balance in distribution of costs and responsibilities look like? 
 (Finland) This question must consider three things: 1) what is the added value of having EU fund-
ing? 2) Why is there a need to regulate cost-sharing in Member States? And 3) must the balance 
between the public and private sector be the same in all Member States?  
 It could be argued that EU funding is mainly needed in catastrophic events when individual 
Member State funds may not be sufficient. Otherwise using MS funds instead of EU funds could 
reduce overall administrative costs resulting in overall savings for the European taxpayer. As re-
gards the regulation of cost-sharing within Member States it is mainly a competition issue, 
which also could be addressed through the state aid rules. And finally, since there are large dif-
ferences in the structure and development of the animal production sector in various Member 
States, it may not be feasible to envisage the same balance between the private and public sec-
tor throughout the EU. 
 (UK) All options provide some degree of division of responsibilities and costs. 3a or 5 offer the 
best chance of a balance across industry, public and private sector – but – option 5 may be too 
complex to implement effectively. Extremely difficult to define without much more rigorous 
analysis. All options allow for costs to be shared.  
 (Welsh) The industry needs to take a greater proportion of risks. 
  (IT) The identification of evaluating criteria is crucial to assess objectively the responsibility of 
farmers. The difficulty lies in the dynamism of epidemiology, so should be planned a system 
linked to the disease's categorization and capable of adapting to new situations in a simple and 
feasible way  
 (DE) Everybody being involved in the system should bear financial responsibility according to 
their responsibilities (EU, national authorities and farmer). 
 (PL) Regarding the costs of the major diseases eradication, farmers should not be burdened with 
those costs (or they should be as small as possible). In consequence - even if the MS budget is 
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burdened with all of the costs (which would be co-financed from the EU budget), we believe 
that the costs are distributed in a balanced way. 
 (BE) In case of direct losses, operational costs should be financed by a budget of public origin. 
Other direct costs, such as compensation and emergency vaccination, should at least for a cer-
tain percentage be financed with a budget of private origin. Costs concerning direct losses in 
minor species sectors (equidae, aquaculture, rabbits, bees) should continue to be covered by a 
budget of public origin. 
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APPENDIX 4: RESPONSE OF COPA COGECA 
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APPENDIX 5: EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS BY EU MS, ISSG AND COPA COGECA 
 
Table A5.1: Evaluation of the different policy options by EU MS, ISSG and Copa Cogeca  
 Option 1 
'no change sce-
nario' 
Option 2  
'EU co-financing 
rules maintained 
with maximum 
public %' 
Option 3a 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS 
with gradual in-
troduction' 
Option 3b 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS' 
or 'no change' 
Option 4a 
'Deregulation to 
catastrophic 
events' 
Option 4b 
'Deregulation 
with lump sum 
payment' 
Option 5  
'Fully harmonised 
CRSS managed by 
EC' 
  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  
1. Does the option support a more prevention-driven and incentive-oriented approach of the EU financial aid for disease control and eradication? 
MS 1.4 10 7 0 2.1 2 11 3 2.6 1 4 12 2.0 3 11 3 1.2 14 2 1 1.5 9 7 1 2.3 3 6 8 
ISSG 1.4 5 4 0 2.0 2 4 2 2.9 0 1 8 2.1 1 6 2 2.0 3 2 3 1.9 4 1 3 2.9 0 1 8 
Copa  ± ± + -    -    -    ±    
                              
a. Does it encourage strengthening of the bio-security on the farm (basic hygiene, prevention) ? 
MS 1.5 8 6 1 2 5 5 5 2.5 1 5 9 2.1 1 12 2 1.4 10 4 1 1.3 11 3 1 2.3 2 7 6 
ISSG 1.5 5 5 0 1.9 3 4 2 2.7 0 3 6 2.4 0 5 3 2 4 1 4 1.8 5 1 3 2.5 1 3 6 
Copa  -    -    +    ±    -(±)   -(±)   ±    
 
b. Do farmers bear an adequate part of the losses due to contagious animal diseases? 
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MS 1.6 5 7 0 2.1 1 10 2 2.5 0 7 6 2.1 2 8 3 1.8 6 4 3 1.7 6 5 2 2.5 0 7 6 
ISSG 2 3 4 3 2.6 0 4 6 2.8 0 2 8 2.2 1 5 3 1.6 6 1 2 1.5 4 4 0 2.8 0 2 8 
Copa  ±    ±    +    ±    ±    ±    ±    
 
2. Does the option provide in a balance of the distribution of costs and responsibilities between EU institutions, national authorities and the farming 
sector? 
MS 1.5 9 6 1 1.9 4 9 3 2.8 0 3 12 2.1 2 10 3 1.3 13 2 1 1.5 8 7 0 2.5 1 5 9 
ISSG 2.1 2 4 3 2.7 0 3 6 2.7 0 3 6 2.5 1 2 5 1 7 0 0 1.4 5 1 1 2.6 2 0 7 
Copa -    -    +    ±    -    -    ±    
 
a. Does it stimulate the development of consultation mechanisms and common approaches by the cost sharing actors in times of crisis? 
MS 1.5 8 7 0 2.0 1 13 1 2.6 1 4 10 2.2 1 10 4 1.7 5 9 1 1.8 4 10 1 2.7 1 3 11 
ISSG 1.8 4 4 2 2.0 4 2 4 2.7 0 3 7 2.3 1 4 4 1.6 5 1 2 1.4 6 1 1 2.6 1 2 7 
Copa -    -    +    ±    -    -    +    
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Table A5.1: Evaluation of the different policy options by EU MS, ISSG and Copa Cogeca (continued)  
 Option 1 
'no change sce-
nario' 
Option 2  
'EU co-financing 
rules maintained 
with maximum 
public %' 
Option 3a 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS 
with gradual in-
troduction' 
Option 3b 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS' 
or 'no change' 
Option 4a 
'Deregulation to 
catastrophic 
events' 
Option 4b 
'Deregulation 
with lump sum 
payment' 
Option 5  
'Fully harmonised 
CRSS managed by 
EC' 
  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  
3. How effective and efficient is the option: 
a. with respect to prevention of animal diseases?  
MS 1.6 7 7 1 2.2 1 10 4 2.9 0 2 13 2.3 1 8 5 1.5 10 3 2 1.5 8 6 1 2.2 1 10 4 
ISSG 1.8 2 8 0 2.2 1 6 3 2.6 0 4 5 2.4 0 5 3 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 4 2.8 0 2 8 
Copa ±    ±    +    ±    ±    -    ±    
b. with respect to eradication of animal diseases? 
MS 2.1 2 9 4 2.5 0 8 7 2.6 0 6 9 2.4 1 6 7 1.7 7 5 3 1.3 10 5 0 2.4 1 7 7 
ISSG 2.3 3 1 6 2.2 2 3 4 2.8 0 2 7 2.5 0 4 4 1.4 5 1 1 1.3 7 1 1 2.9 0 1 8 
Copa -    -    +    ±    -    -    ±    
 
c. with respect to encouraging preventive behaviour? 
MS 1.5 9 5 1 2.0 4 7 4 2.7 0 4 11 2.2 1 9 4 1.5 9 4 2 1.7 6 8 1 2.5 1 5 9 
ISSG 1.7 3 6 0 1.8 2 7 0 2.8 0 2 7 2.5 0 4 4 2.1 3 1 4 2.1 3 0 4 2.8 0 2 7 
Copa ±    ±    +    ±    ±    ±    +    
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d. with respect to early reporting of disease outbreaks? 
MS 1.9 5 5 4 2.1 5 4 6 2.7 0 4 11 2.4 1 7 6 1.7 6 8 1 1.5 9 4 2 2.6 1 4 10 
ISSG 2.4 1 3 5 2.2 2 4 4 2.6 0 4 6 2.2 1 5 3 1.3 7 1 1 1.3 7 1 1 2.7 0 3 7 
Copa -    -    +    ±    -    -    ±    
 
e. with respect to the implementation of flexible Costs and Responsibility Sharing Schemes at national or regional level? 
MS 1.6 7 6 1 1.9 4 7 3 2.7 0 4 9 2.3 1 8 5 1.7 7 4 3 1.7 6 6 2 2.4 2 4 8 
ISSG 1.9 3 5 2 2.1 2 5 3 2.5 1 3 6 1.9 1 8 0 1.8 5 1 3 1.9 4 2 3 2.1 4 1 5 
Copa -    -    +    ±    -    -    +    
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Table A5.1: Evaluation of the different policy options by EU MS, ISSG and Copa Cogeca (continued)  
 Option 1 
'no change sce-
nario' 
Option 2  
'EU co-financing 
rules maintained 
with maximum 
public %' 
Option 3a 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS 
with gradual intro-
duction' 
Option 3b 
'EU harmonised 
frame-work CRSS' 
or 'no change' 
Option 4a 
'Deregulation to 
catastrophic 
events' 
Option 4b 
'Deregulation with 
lump sum pay-
ment' 
Option 5  
'Fully harmonised 
CRSS managed by 
EC' 
  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  Av  - ± +  
4. Will the option provide in simple and clear rules for EU co-financing of losses due to animal diseases? 
MS 2.1 3 8 4 2.6 1 4 9 2.6 0 6 8 2.0 2 10 2 2.0 5 3 5 2.1 6 2 7 2.4 1 6 7 
ISSG 2.3 2 2 4 2.4 1 3 4 1.9 3 3 2 1.3 5 2 0 2.4 1 2 4 2.7 1 0 6 2.0 3 1 3 
Copa  -    -    +    ±    -    -    +    
 
a. Will the option ensure consistency in and coherence with the several MS compensation mechanisms within the EU? 
MS 2.1 3 5 4 2.5 1 4 6 2.5 0 5 6 1.9 3 6 2 1.2 9 2 0 1.4 8 3 1 2.5 1 4 6 
ISSG 1.9 3 4 2 2.2 2 3 4 2.3 3 0 5 1.4 5 1 1 1.3 5 2 0 1.7 4 1 2 3.0 0 0 9 
Copa -    -    +    -    -    -    +    
5. Does the option prevent distortion of competition among Member States and/or regions? 
MS 1.7 5 6 1 1.9 5 4 4 2.1 2 8 3 1.7 5 6 1 1.4 8 5 0 1.3 9 4 0 2.2 4 3 6 
ISSG 1.9 3 5 2 2 2 6 2 2.2 3 2 5 1.7 3 6 0 1.6 6 1 2 1.7 6 0 3 2.6 2 0 8 
Copa -    ±    +    -    -    -    +    
6. Does the option minimize risks for the EU and MS budgets? 
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MS 1.5 8 8 0 2.3 2 7 7 2.6 0 6 10 2 2 11 2 1.7 9 3 4 1.8 8 4 4 2.3 3 5 8 
ISSG 1.5 4 4 0 2.5 1 2 5 2.6 0 3 5 2 0 7 0 2 3 2 3 2.6 1 1 6 2.6 0 3 5 
Copa -    ±    +    -    ±    ±    ±    
 
a. Does it provide in proportionate thresholds for public resources linked to for instance the disease categorisation or other criteria? 
MS 1.8 3 5 1 2.1 2 4 3 2.7 0 3 6 2.2 2 3 4 1.7 4 4 1 1.7 4 4 1 2.4 1 3 5 
ISSG 2.2 1 6 3 2.6 0 4 5 2.7 1 1 8 2.1 2 4 3 1.3 7 0 1 1.1 8 1 0 3 0 0 10 
Copa -    -    +    -    -    -    +    
b. Does it ensure long term stable financing for disease control? 
MS 1.9 5 8 3 2.3 1 10 5 2.8 0 4 12 2.3 2 8 6 1.4 9 7 0 1.4 10 6 0 2.8 0 3 13 
ISSG 2 3 4 3 2.2 1 6 3 2.6 1 2 7 2.1 1 6 2 1.6 5 3 1 1.9 4 2 3 2.5 0 5 5 
Copa -    ±    +    -    -    ±    ±    
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APPENDIX 6: EXAMPLES PEST-ELEMENTS  
 
Examples of PEST analysis 27 of opportunities and threats in the environment on macro level: 
Political: 
 Government type and stability. 
 Freedom of press, rule of law and levels of bureaucracy and corruption. 
 Regulation and de-regulation trends. 
 Social and employment legislation. 
 Tax policy, and trade and tariff controls. 
 Environmental and consumer-protection legislation.  
 Likely changes in the political environment.  
Economic: 
 Stage of business cycle.  
 Current and projected economic growth, inflation and interest rates.  
 Unemployment and labour supply.  
 Labour costs.  
 Levels of disposable income and income distribution.  
 Impact of globalization.  
 Likely impact of technological or other change on the economy.  
 Likely changes in the economic environment.  
Socio-Cultural: 
 Population growth rate and age profile.  
 Population health, education and social mobility, and attitudes to these.  
 Population employment patterns, job market freedom and attitudes to work.  
 Press attitudes, public opinion, social attitudes and social taboos.  
 Lifestyle choices and attitudes to these.  
 Socio-cultural changes.  
 
                                                 
 
27
 (http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_09.htm) 
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 221 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
Technological Environment: 
 Impact of emerging technologies.  
 Impact of Internet, reduction in communications costs and increased remote working.  
 Research and development activity.  
 Impact of technology transfer.  
 
Table A6.1: Effect of different forces on the feasibility of different policy options  
POLITICAL FORCES Option 1 Option 2 Option 3A Option 3B Option 4A Option 4B Option 5 
 No change EU co-
financing 
with max 
% public 
contribu-
tion 
EU har-
moni-sed 
CRSS 
gradual 
introduc-
tion 
EU har-
moni-sed 
CRSS or 
‘No 
change 
Deregula-
tion – 
catastro-
phic 
events 
Deregula-
tion- lump 
sum pay-
ment 
Fully har-
moni-sed 
CRSS 
managed 
by EC 
EU Principles of proportionality 
and subsidiarity in all new legis-
lation 
↓ ↓ ↑ - - -  ↓ 
EU Polluter-pays principle ↓ - ↑ - ↓ - ↑ 
EU Tendency towards European 
Models of Agriculture Sustain-
ability (PPP) 
↓ - ↑ - ↓ ↓ ↑ 
EU tendency: first prospective 
studies towards a risk partner-
ship between agricultural busi-
ness, the insurance companies 
and the government. 
↓ ↑ ↑ - ↓ ↓ ↑ 
Individual interests: 
Category 1 MS* 
Category 2 MS 
Category 3 MS 
 
- 
↓ 
↓ 
 
↑ 
↓ 
↓ 
 
- 
↑ 
- 
 
↑ 
↓ 
↓ 
 
↑ 
↓ 
↓ 
 
↓ 
↑ 
↑ 
 
- 
- 
↓ 
ECONOMIC FORCES        
Increasing competition from 
third country imports (e.g. milk) 
- ↓ ↓ - ↓ -  ↓ 
Increasing production costs EU 
farmers due to:  
* increasing societal demands 
and associated legislation  
* Limited willingness-to-pay by 
↑ ↓ ↓ - ↓ - ↓ 
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 (↑ = in line with / upward pressure); ↓ = not in line with / downward pressure; - = neutral;/ upward 
or downward pressure) 
consumer for extra costs con-
nected with extra societal de-
mands 
* fall in direct public payments 
(CAP) 
Competitive pressure to in-
crease profitability (market 
strategies towards more high 
added-value products) 
↓ - ↑ - ↓ - ↑  
Tendency towards large scale 
farming 
- - ↑ - - -  ↑ 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FORCES        
Increasing societal demands in 
various fields (food safety, 
animal health, welfare et c) 
↓ - ↑ - ↓ -  ↑ 
Increasing social unrest by large 
scale killings in case of notifi-
able diseases 
↓ - ↑ - ↓ -  ↑ 
Different production cultures in 
MS: backyard farming in new 
MS with sparsely populated 
livestock areas 
↑ - ↓ - - - ↓ 
Different production cultures in 
MS: backyard farming in new 
MS with sparsely populated 
livestock areas 
Farmers demand: also respon-
sibility sharing in policies to-
wards animal disease problem 
solving 
↑ 
↓ 
- 
- 
↓ 
↑ 
- 
- 
- 
↓ 
- 
↓ 
↓ 
↑ 
TECHNICAL FORCES        
Climate change in relation with 
emerging diseases (animals as a 
vector to humans) 
↓ - ↑ - ↓ -  ↑ 
Increasing availability of diag-
nostic and monitoring tools 
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Increasing availability of diag-
nostic and monitoring tools 
Increasing development and 
availability of supporting qual-
ity insurance schemes for ani-
mal production  
↑ 
 
- 
↑ 
 
↑ 
↑ 
 
↑ 
↑ 
 
- 
↑ 
 
- 
↑ 
 
- 
↑ 
 
↑ 
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 * Category 1 = MS with densely populated livestock areas; Category 2 = Old MS with mainly medium 
or sparsely populated livestock areas; Category 3 = New MS with mainly medium or sparsely popu-
lated livestock areas. 
 
To use in SWOT: take advantage of the opportunities and minimize the threats. 
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Table A6.2: Identified PEST forces and related opportunities/threats in relation to option 3a.  
Political forces Related threats and opportunities for OPTION 3A 
a. Principles of proportionality and  
 subsidiary in all new legislation reflected  
 by all Commission legislative proposals  
 for approval in the Council.  
T: Harmonization could be hampered by  
 individual MS interests or specific measure  
 downsized  
O: To establish a flexible system adapted to MS needs 
b. Simplification and deregulation reflected  
 in implementing rules  
O: If there really is a reduction of Administrative burden in enforcement, it should help the sector 
and MS in applying a harmonized system 
T: But, this option might also imply more regulation at EU level and more administrative burden 
T: Public acceptability of option 3a. On the other  
 side, recent economic crises has raised questions on how private parties manage risks, if there 
are not appropriate controls from public authorities. 
 Farmers will have a "say" on the measures to be  
 taken for controlling outbreaks (vaccination,  
 culling) 
T: Risks of poor implementation and total disaster  
 in the event of a major animal disease outbreaks 
c. First prospective studies towards a risk  
 partnership between agricultural business, 
the insurance companies and the govern-
ment. 
O/T: Evidence based decision making offers the  
chance for better founded actions but costs time and money 
O: Opportunities to develop new CRSS, tailored to  
 specific situations 
d. Polluter pays principle: more private  
 responsibility 
T/O: Public funding linked to mandatory private  
 co-funding. This might limit available funds but  
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  also, increase efficiency. Depends on the nature of the private schemes. 
 Difficult to allocate responsibilities, difficulties in preventing spread of vector-born diseases, pre-
vention strategies are not exclusive of the farming sectors, legislation, MS controls and veteri-
nary services are as important as preventive measures taken at farm level 
e. Prevention better than cure-principle 
 
O: Following this principle, funds will be allocated  
 to ex-ante and not to ex-post measures  
f. European Models of Agriculture –  
 sustainability  
 
O: Reflecting sustainability in production and consumption, legislation will aim to include all im-
pacts in actual cost for the sector e.g. internalization of risks.  
T: economic sustainability of the EU model. EU farmers already comply with higher standards 
than our trading partners 
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Table A6.3: Identified PEST forces and related opportunities/threats in relation to option 3a (continued)  
Economic forces Related threats and opportunities for OPTION 3A 
a. Increased hazard of epidemics within the EU  
 27;  
O/T: opportunities/threats to check whether the  
 system works or not and whether it will allow to  
 achieve a better prevention of animal diseases 
b. Increasing competition from third country  
 imports (e.g. milk) 
O: High food safety standards and public health as  
 competitive advantage on the market 
T: Competitiveness of AGRI_business in  
 international markets already hampered by EU  
 legislative framework, labour costs and  
 legislation. Additional costs might increase the  
 gap with third country producers 
c. Increasing production costs due to increasing  
 societal demands (human health, animal  
 welfare, ...) and linked legislation  
O: Access to EU and MS public funds for  
 compensation of 'public goods' production 
d. Strong tendency towards large scale farming O: Economic sustainability of industrial livestock  
 production, if full costs of risks of animal  
 disease outbreaks etc will have to be  
 internalized  
O: easier implementation of CRSS by large scale  
 farms 
e. Fall in direct public payments (CAP) O: High animal health and welfare and public  
 health as legitimacy for Direct payments (SFP)  
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T: lower acceptability of extra-costs 
f. Competitive pressure to increase profitability  
 (Market strategies towards more high added- 
 value products) 
O: High quality and food safety as competitive  
 advantage on EU market  
T: animal health not perceived by consumers as an  
 added-value, not willing to pay more, especially  
 in the crisis context 
 
Social/cultural forces Related threats and opportunities for OPTION 3A 
a. Increasing societal demands in various areas (including human and 
animal  
 health, feeds, animal welfare, ..); 
O: Increased legitimacy for Direct payments (CAP  
 SFP) to compensate for higher costs 
O: Acceptance of the new schemes by the general  
 public 
b. Limited -willingness-to-pay of consumer for  
 extra societal demands (e.g. disease  
 prevention) leading to higher costs; 
O/T: Necessity for labelling and (global)standards  
 as well as consumer information and awareness  
 on high quality of EU production  
c. Social unrest by large scale killing in cases of  
 notifiable animal diseases; 
O: Prevention and risk internalization as tool to  
 end unsustainable production methods 
T: Not sure CRSS will help to prevent this  
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Technological forces Related threats and opportunities for OPTION 3A 
a. Climate change in relation with emerging  
 diseases (animals as a vector to humans); 
O: More incentive for the schemes 
b. Increasing availability of diagnostic and  
 monitoring tools; 
 
c. Increasing development and availability of  
 supporting quality insurance schemes for  
 animal production (animal health, welfare,  
 environment, ...) 
O: Will help to develop the schemes 
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APPENDIX 7: ECONOMIC PARAMETERS 
Table A7.1: Prices and costs in € per animal for culling and disinfection 
 Value culled 
animal (price) 
Value destructed 
feed 
Costs of vaccina-
tion 
Clearing and dis-
infection 
Weight in kg 
Cattle:      
Dairy cows 759 44 8.8 1000 600 
Young stock 577 44 8.8 1000 250 
Veal calves 411 26 2.6 150 250 
Other cattle 759 33.3 8.8 1000 600 
Sheep: 73 1.6 2.6 100 70 
Pigs:      
Sows 522 33 7.2 400 450 
Fattening pigs 77 3.7 1.8 150 65 
Poultry      
Broilers 0.98 0.08 0.00 3.18 1.1 
Layers 2 0.18 0.00 7.30 1.5 
Breeders 7 0.32 0.00 13.10 3.5 
Ready-to-lay 5.84 0.32 0.00 13.10 0.6 
Hatching 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table App 7.2  Costs related to Screening and Movement restriction Measures 
 These Direct Cost are NOT ELIGIBLE within regulation EC no 349/2005  
 
 NL FI RO  
Destruction (transport included) 0.19 0.19 0.19 €/kg 
Taking samples as suspect 237901 37332 34404 €/case 
Taxation 395 395 395 €/cleared farms 
Execution of screening 194699 30552 28156 €/case 
Materials, etc. 5323 835 769 €/cleared farms 
Enforcement     
Costs for RDW 16208 18678 8490 €/week 
Costs for defence (army) 230163 265236 120561 €/week 
Costs for customs 97252 112071 50941 €/week 
Cost for police 1137851 1311238 596017 €/week 
Costs for agr. inspection (AID) 389009 448286 203766 €/week 
(total) 1870486 2155512 979778  
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Table A7.3: Farm size in the Netherlands, Finland, and Romania 
Farm size (animals/farm) 
 cattle farm sheep pig poultry 
NL 101 78 1227 39627 
FL 50 53 513 203 
RO  3 16 3 13 
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APPENDIX 8: STAKEHOLDER MEETING 15TH APRIL 2011 
 
Name  Organisation 
Participants in the workshop  
Penny Johnston Copa Cogeca 
Mg Salman Copa Cogeca 
Mette Jensen Copa Cogeca 
Pasquale Di Rubbo Copa Cogeca 
Klaas Johan Osinga Copa Cogeca 
Cees van Meeren Avec 
Jos Klessens Clitravi 
Capogena Guiseppe Luca EUCVB 
Jan Vaarten FVE 
Francisco REVIRIEGO-GORDEJO (chair) DG SANCO D1 
Velentina Piazza DG SANCO D4 
L. Vandenberghe DG SANCO D4 
Chiara Pinna DG SANCO D1 
Ines Moreno DG SANCO D1 
Sanna Mesma DG SANCO D1 
Barbara Boue  Hungarian presidency 
Martien Bokma  WUR 
Ron Bergevoet WUR 
Elisabetta Pesenti IBF 
Not present but responding to the questionnaire  
Alain C. CANTALOUBE FESASS 
 
 
Organisations represented at the workshop 
AVEC represents and promotes the interests of the European poultry sector. http://www.avec-poultry.eu/ 
Clitravi The Liaison Centre for the Meat Processing Industry in the European Union (CLITRAVI) is the profes-
sional organisation. http://www.clitravi.eu/ 
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The European Livestock And Meat Trading Union (UECBV), is the mouthpiece of national federations repre-
senting livestock markets, livestock and meat traders, slaughterhouses, cutting plants and meat preparation 
plants. http://www.uecbv.eu 
COPA COGECA: COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations) and COGECA (General Commit-
tee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union). http://www.copa-cogeca.be 
The Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE) is an umbrella organisation of veterinary organisations 
from 38 European countries. hfve.org 
European Federation for Animal Health and Sanitary Security/ Féderation Européenne pour la Santé Animale 
et la Securité Sanitaire, FESASS) is an European organization representing breeders in the field of animal 
health. adt.de/fesass_en.html 
  
European Union funded project 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
653006: Feasibility study on the revision of council decision 2009/470/EC 
Final Report  
Page 234 of 249                                                                                                                                                                                    
Workshop  
Date 15th April DG SANCO 
Introduction 
In the presentation the Cost and responsibility Sharing scheme (CRSS) was described. This CRSS has 3 com-
ponents: 
1. The Bonus Malus system (BM); 
2. A public private partnership (PPP) in each MS that covers the direct costs of a disease outbreak;  
3. Coverage of indirect costs. 
In this workshop we want to obtain insight in your opinion towards the different components. 
Therefore we want you to fill in this form that consists of two items: 
1. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS; 
2. Ranking of the different policy options. 
Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS 
 
In the first part we want you to evaluate the relative emphasis you think that the components should have. 
For this we want you to distribute 100 point amongst the 3 components.  
For example: If you think that only 1 part is vital for the CRSS and the rest is irrelevant than you give 100 
point to this components. If you think all three are equally important you give all 3 components 33 1/3 
points. 
This part consists of 3 rounds: 
 In the first round we ask you to fill in the table based on your opinion. 
 We will display the response of the different participants and each participant is asked to 
briefly motivate her/his distribution of points. 
 In the 2nd round you are asked again (having heard the motivation of the other respondents) 
to fill in the table 
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Table 1: The different parts of the CRSS 
Part of CRSS Points session 1 Points session 2 
The Bonus Malus system (BM)   
Public Private Partnership to cover direct costs 
(PPP) 
  
Part of indirect costs covered   
Ranking of the different policy options 
In the CRSS: 
 The Bonus Malus system can be included (Yes) or not included (No) 
 The public private partnership (PPP) can be voluntary of compulsory for MS to implement 
  Coverage of part of the indirect costs in the CRSS can be included or excluded 
Combining the different parts of the CRSS gives 8 different combinations as shown in table 2.  
Table 2 Different policy options 
 BM PPP Coverage of part of 
indirect costs 
Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded  
2 No Voluntary Included  
3 No Compulsory Excluded  
4 No Compulsory Included  
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded  
6 Yes Voluntary Included  
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded  
8 Yes Compulsory Included  
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Please rank the different option according to your preference. Where rank 1 is the most preferred option in 
your opinion and 8 is the least preferred option.  
 
Thank you for your collaboration. 
Ron Bergevoet (ron.bergevoet@wur.nl) 
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Copa-Cogeca contribution to the feasibility study on the development of a harmonized EU framework for 
Cost and Responsibility Sharing Schemes (CRSS) for animal diseases 
 
Final remarks  
 
I. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS 
Copa-Cogeca has been asked to distribute 100 points amongst the 3 different components28 of the CRSS. The 
rank should reflect our priority list.  
 
Part of CRSS Points  
(Copa-Cogeca views) 
The Bonus Malus system (BM) 0 
Public Private Partnership to cover direct costs (PPP) 0 
Part of indirect costs covered 100 
Copa-Cogeca views: 
1. Farmers already bear a lot of costs to control animal diseases on the farm. It should be clear that the 
aim of CRSS should be “better regulation” and not incurring extra costs for farmers for disease control. 
2. It is of the utmost importance that remains an incentive for the farmer to report diseases as early as 
possible, also in case of difficult financial situation at the farm level; 
3. There must always be reliable public intervention and support for the animal health sector, and guaran-
teeing that special disease status’ at regional or MS level are fully respected; 
4. Despite appropriate preventive measures, farmers are often faced with threats over which they have 
little or no control (e.g. introduction on the farm of FMD, HPAI, BTV or CSV). 
 
 
                                                 
 
28
 For example, if you think that only 1 part is vital for the CRSS and the rest is irrelevant than you give 100 point to this components. 
If you think all three are equally important you give all 3 components 33 1/3 points. 
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5. The CRSS scheme shall cover all direct and consequential losses:  
- losses to farms within the zones, which do not have the disease but will be affected by the stand still 
(not able to slaughter, slaughter of animals for welfare reasons, market disturbances, etc.);  
- removal of the killed or dead animals;  
- costs for cleaning and disinfection of premises (initial + final);  
- monitoring measures to be implemented;  
- measures to fight diseases including vaccination;  
- costs of obtaining disease-free status again;  
- costs associated with getting back in business for the affected farmer, such as the restocking of 
farms and possible falling prices as a result of market disturbances related to the outbreak. This in-
cludes the possibility of food chain partners are avoiding products from animals emergency vacci-
nated against FMD, CSF or AI.  
6. The Bonus Malus system between the EU and MS, as presented in the study, is not sector related. This 
means, for example, that the levels of outbreaks in the poultry sector can recogniz the level of contribu-
tion that the pig sector may receive for an outbreak. The sector might be not credited for the work al-
ready carried out in the area of biosecurity and fighting animal diseases on farm.  
II. Ranking the different policy options 
In the CRSS: 
 The Bonus Malus system can be included (Yes) or not included (No) 
 The public private partnership (PPP) can be voluntary of compulsory for MS to implement 
  Coverage of part of the indirect costs in the CRSS can be included or excluded 
Option BM PPP Coverage of part of indirect costs Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded  
2 No Voluntary Included 1 
3 No Compulsory Excluded  
4 No Compulsory Included  
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded  
6 Yes Voluntary Included  
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded  
8 Yes Compulsory Included  
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Rank 1 is the most preferred option and 8 is the least preferred option.  
 
Copa-Cogeca views 
 
Among all policy options presented above, Copa-Cogeca would be in favour of option 2: 
 
-  no Bonus Malus system in place; 
- voluntary possibility for each Member State to decide whether or not to implement a public private 
partnership to cover part of the animal diseases losses; 
- covering part of indirect costs. 
However, in a limited number of Member States farmers are already included in a mandatory public/private 
partnership to cover animal disease costs, and this should be recognized.  
_____________ 
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Topic: Stakeholder meeting Feasibility study on the revision of Council Decision 2009/470/EC (ex 
90/424/EEC) 
 
Name  :……Jos Klessens………………………….. 
Organisation : …Clitravi/Dutch Meat association (COV).. 
 
1. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS 
 
Table 1 The different parts of the CRSS 
Part of CRSS Points session 1 Points session 2 
The Bonus Malus system (BM)   20 
Public Private Partnership to cover direct 
costs (PPP) 
  50 
Part of indirect costs covered   30 
  
Ranking of the different policy options 
In the CRSS: 
 The Bonus Malus sytem can be included (Yes) or not included (No) 
 The public private partnership (PPP) can be voluntary of compulsory for MS to implement 
  Coverage of part of the indirect costs in the CRSS can be included or excluded 
Combining the different parts of the CRSS gives 8 different combinations as shown in table 2.  
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Table 2 Different policy options 
 BM PPP Coverage of part of 
indirect costs 
Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded 7 
2 No Voluntary Included 3 
3 No Compulsory Excluded 5 
4 No Compulsory Included 1 
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded 8 
6 Yes Voluntary Included 4 
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded 6 
8 Yes Compulsory Included 2 
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Topic: Stakeholder meeting Feasibility study on the revision of Council Decision 2009/470/EC (ex 
90/424/EEC) 
Workshop  
Date 15 April DG SANCO 
 
Name   :Vermeeren……………………………….. 
Organisation : …a.v.e.c.……………………………. 
E-mail  :…cv@avec-poultry.eu……………………………… 
 
Table 1 The different parts of the CRSS 
Part of CRSS Points session 1 Points session 2 
The Bonus Malus system (BM) 20  
Public Private Partnership to cover direct 
costs (PPP) 
70  
Part of indirect costs covered 10  
 Comment C. Vermeeren: Reflecting on the Bonus-Malus after the meeting I considered them not in balance 
with each other. I expressed not to be convinced of the effect, but as it looks now is unbalanced and not 
really an incentive. It will take 10 year to get the max bonus where after an outbreak of more than 9 Million 
the MS get a penalty of 10% and it will need 20 year to arrive again at the max of 60. I would suggest a bo-
nus scheme that grants 4% after the first year without an outbreak plus 3% after 2 years plus 2% after 3 
years and 2% for every following year till max 60%.  
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Table 2 Different policy options 
 BM PPP Coverage of part of 
indirect costs 
Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded 8 
2 No Voluntary Included 6 
3 No Compulsory Excluded 1 
4 No Compulsory Included 3 
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded 7 
6 Yes Voluntary Included 5 
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded 4 
8 Yes Compulsory Included 2 
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FESASS contribution to the feasibility study  
on the development of a harmonized EU framework for Cost and 
 Responsibility Sharing Schemes (CRSS) for animal diseases 
 
 
FESASS welcomes the consultation of stakeholders on the feasibility study on the revision of Council Deci-
sion 2009/470/EC (ex 90/424/EC) on expenditure in the veterinary field. Adequately compensating farmers 
for their losses during an outbreak is one of the most important elements to safeguard an efficient fight 
against animal diseases. Although the current system worked pretty well in the past, it seems advisable to 
take in account some lessons learnt in the past and to align it with the new EU animal health strategy’s pri-
orities.  
  
 
 I. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS 
The Bonus Malus system (BM) 0 
Public Private Partnership to cover direct costs (PPP) 20 
Part of indirect costs covered 80 
 FESASS views: 
1. The Bonus Malus system could be an incentive for MSs to have a better management of an animal 
health crisis. But it is hard to see how it could be applied without creating new inequities. The BM is for 
example not sector related, whereas it would be important in our view to distinguish between out-
breaks in different animal species (for instance the pig or the poultry sector in some MSs, which already 
apply strong biosecurity systems, should not have to bear the risk of lower compensation for the re-
spective MS due to disease outbreaks in other sectors). Conversely, the high density and intensive pro-
duction in these sectors are risk factors which must not weigh on other sectors. In addition, the BM 
does not take care of the geographical risk exposition and the consequences for farmers are not evalu-
ated. It is also important to understand that the geographical risk is not the same between MSs and the 
likelihood of an outbreak will differ. So it would be very difficult to respect the equity in this kind of Bo-
nus Malus system. 
2. Farmers already bear the costs to prevent and control animal diseases on their farms and the total 
amount spent by the sector is higher than the public expenses in this field. The new animal health 
strategy’s goal is to improve private and public investment in prevention. This should not lead to in-
creasing costs for farmers. FESASS is in favour of a private – public partnership for the adoption of pre-
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ventive measures and for crisis management. The PPP is not the right tool to share responsibilities and 
costs for disease outbreaks over which farmers have little or no control. It is also a question of competi-
tiveness. It should be recognized that farmers in some MS are already part of such compulsory public - 
private partnerships to cover animal disease costs.  
3. The adequate and fast compensation is also an important tool to maintain farmers’ confidence in the 
system. It must remain an incentive for the farmer to report diseases as early as possible. 
4. The CRSS scheme should also cover, at least partly, consequential losses like:  
- Production losses (culled farms and farms affected by the stand still), 
- Additional cost for feeding animals in farms affected by the stand still, 
- Costs to get disease-free status again,...  
These costs are important for the farms and the amount is depending on the decisions actually taken by 
the competent authorities. However, it has to be borne in mind that indirect costs are more difficult to 
calculate and such a procedure should not overly add administrative burden.  
II. Ranking the different policy options 
Option BM PPP Coverage of part of 
indirect costs 
Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded   
2 No Voluntary Included 1 
3 No Compulsory Excluded   
4 No Compulsory Included  2 
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded   
6 Yes Voluntary Included   
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded   
8 Yes Compulsory Included   
 
FESASS views 
  
FESASS prefers option 2 because it is in favour of a CRSS: 
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- without Bonus Malus system, 
- with the possibility for each Member State, on a voluntary basis, to decide the implementation of a 
public private partnership to cover part of the animal diseases losses; 
- with a coverage of most important consequential losses and costs. 
Option 4 would be the second choice.  
 
Options with a BM or those excluding the compensation of indirect costs are out of the question for us. 
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Topic: Stakeholder meeting Feasibility study on the revision of Council Decision 2009/470/EC (ex 
90/424/EEC) 
Workshop  
Date 15 April DG SANCO 
 
Name  :……CAPODIECI Giuseppe Luca…….. 
 
 
Organisation : …UECBV – European Livestock and Meat Trading Union……. 
 
 
E-mail  :……info@uecbv.eu…… 
 
 
Introduction 
In the presentation the Cost and responsibility Sharing scheme (CRSS) was presented. This CRSS has 3 com-
ponents: 
4. The Bonus Malus system (BM); 
5. A public private partnership (PPP) in each MS that covers the direct costs of a disease outbreak;  
6. Coverage of indirect costs. 
In this workshop we want to obtain insight in your opinion towards the different components. 
Therefore we want you to fill in this form that consists of two items: 
3. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS; 
4. Ranking of the different policy options. 
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2. Assessing the importance of the different items of the CRSS 
 
In the first part we want you to evaluate the relative emphasis you think that the components should have. 
For this we want you to distribute 100 point amongst the 3 components.  
For example: If you think that only 1 part is vital for the CRSS and the rest is irrelevant than you give 100 
point to this components. If you think all three are equally important you give all 3 components 33 1/3 
points. 
This part consists of 3 rounds: 
 In the first round we ask you to fill in the table based on your opinion. 
 We will display the response of the different participants and each participant is asked to 
briefly motivate her/his distribution of points. 
 In the 2nd round you are asked again (having heard the motivation of the other respondents) 
to fill in the table 
 
Table 1 The different parts of the CRSS 
Part of CRSS Points session 1 Points session 2 
The Bonus Malus system (BM)  20 
Public Private Partnership to cover direct 
costs (PPP) 
 50 
Part of indirect costs covered  30 
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3.  Ranking of the different policy options 
In the CRSS: 
 The Bonus Malus system can be included (Yes) or not included (No) 
 The public private partnership (PPP) can be voluntary of compulsory for MS to implement 
  Coverage of part of the indirect costs in the CRSS can be included or excluded 
Combining the different parts of the CRSS gives 8 different combinations as shown in table 2.  
Table 2 Different policy options 
 BM PPP Coverage of part of 
indirect costs 
Rank 
1 No Voluntary Excluded 7 
2 No Voluntary Included 3 
3 No Compulsory Excluded 5 
4 No Compulsory Included 1 
5 Yes Voluntary Excluded 8 
6 Yes Voluntary Included 4 
7 Yes Compulsory Excluded 6 
8 Yes Compulsory Included 2 
 
Please rank the different option according to your preference. Where rank 1 is the most preferred option in 
your opinion and 8 is the least preferred option.  
 
Thank you for your collaboration. 
Ron Bergevoet (ron.bergevoet@wur.nl 
                                                 
 
i
 Relevant regulations: (EEC) No. 2759/75, (EEC) No.2771/75, (EEC) No. 2777/75, (EC) No. 
